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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 develops a model that studies the
interaction of two forces in the formation of social groups: the preference for high
quality peers and the desire for status among one’s peers. I present a characterization
of fundamental properties of equilibrium group structures in a perfect information,
simultaneous move game when group membership is priced uniformly and cannot
directly depend on type. While equilibrium groups generally exhibit some form of as-
sortative matching between individual type and peer quality, the presence of status
concern reduces the potential degree of sorting and acts as a force for greater homo-
geneity across groups. Chapter 2 expands on this framework and analyses the effect of
status concern for the provision of groups under different market structures. I partic-
ularly focus on the implications for segregation and social exclusion. I find that status
concern reduces the potential for and benefit from segregation - both for a social plan-
ner and a monopolist - but the interaction of preference for rank and status can make
the exclusion of some agents a second-best outcome. Social exclusion might occur
even if the market is served by competitive firms.
Chapter 3 studies how two fundamental mistakes in information processing affect
the welfare ranking of information experiments. In the spirit of Blackwell (1951), the
binary ranking of informative action profiles is analysed under different classes of
perception distortions. By themselves, an agent’s tendency to misinterpret signals
and the degree to which the prior deviates from the truth reduce expected utility in
a model where payoff relevant actions also generate informative signals. However, ex-
periments can be affected to different degrees. Necessary and sufficient conditions
for when any binary ranking of action profiles can be reversed are provided. As a con-
sequence, different types of mistakes can interact in non-obvious ways such that an
agent might be better off suffering from both rather than just one. The chapter con-
cludes with a characterization when such positive interaction is possible and illus-
trates the implications in an investment setting with costly information acquisition.
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Chapter 1
The Structure of Social Groups under
Status Concern
Because sometimes the only way you can feel good about yourself is by mak-
ing someone else look bad! And I’m tired of making other people feel good
about themselves. - The Simpsons, ‘Dead Putting Society’ (7F08).
1.1 Introduction
When people interact in a social environment, whether it is at work or school, in clubs
or in their neighborhood, social spillovers tend to play an important role. At work, co-
operation with colleagues might be essential, at school and university, studying with
peers can promote understanding and enhance the learning experience. For any team
sport, other players are a pre-requisite. In many of these situations, we would like to
be surrounded by ‘strong’ peers as their ability influences the benefit we gain from the
interaction. At the same time, we might want to be someone with a relatively high
standing in the group. This presents a clear tension: the stronger the peers, the lower
one’s own standing.
Consider moving house and choosing a new neighborhood: when faced with the choice
between South Kensington, one of the most affluent boroughs in London, and Cam-
den, a borough with a more heterogeneous crowd, the decision is, among other fac-
tors, most likely influenced by the quality of public services, the valuation for these,
and the price of living in the two boroughs. But in addition, one might also be wor-
ried about one’s own relative status among the potential neighbors. A lower crime rate
does not necessarily compensate for the discomfort caused by being one of the lowest
earners.
This chapter develops a model to explore the importance of this (potential) tension
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in the formation of social groups very much in the spirit of Frank (1985). It addresses
the question what groups can be formed and how these differ from a setting where
the peer effects don’t have a status component. I explore observational differences be-
tween group structures with and without status concern.
In the model, a large number of agents observe a set of prices for group membership
and simultaneously decide which group to join. Agents are heterogeneous in their
type: a one-dimensional variable; for example, income. The agents’ payoff is deter-
mined by the composition of the group, the membership price, and their own type. In
particular, two statistics of the distribution of types within a group are payoff relevant:
the quality of the group - a function of the types of agents’ choosing the same group
- and the status of an individual - the rank in the distribution of types.1 It is assumed
that there is a positive interaction between type and the characteristics of a group.
Agents with higher type value quality and rank more; just like high earners might care
more about the quality of schools as well as their own social status.
It is shown that status concern reduces the possibility of segregation. Status concern is
a force for homogeneity across groups as it limits the degree to which groups can differ
in their composition of types. For example, if two groups are priced equally, then they
have to be identical in their probability distribution over types, not just their qual-
ity. Additionally, there might be no prices that make a given group structure incentive
compatible even though such prices exist if agents only care about quality. Sorting
cannot be arbitrarily fine. If groups take the form of non-overlapping intervals, then
the number of such intervals in equilibrium is necessarily finite. If status concern is
relatively more important, less segregation can be achieved. In the extreme case where
agents have preferences only over their rank, no segregation is possible and all agents
joining a group pay the same price. In contrast, in the absence of status concern, ar-
bitrarily fine sorting is possible, at least if the quality function is suitably monotone in
types.
These findings can inform the literature on social groups: if status concern is relevant
in a given setting, empirical investigations might lead to different conclusions and ul-
timately different policies. If policies are misspecified, there can be significant mis-
allocations. More specifically, when agents care about their relative rank, we should
1While social status can have multiple dimension, Heffetz and Frank (2011) argue that it is inherently
positional can be seen as a form of ‘rank’. The simplification in this model is that agents agree on the
same ranking. There is evidence that this is often the case. See Weiss and Fershtman (1998) for a survey
of the relevant economic and sociological literature.
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expect groups to be less segregated. If two groups are similar in quality, they should
also be similar in their distribution over types. In the empirical literature on Tiebout
sorting2 - the sorting of agents into different communities based on their preferences
for public goods - it is often noted that communities are much more similar across and
more diverse within than should be expected.3 This squares with the finding on seg-
regation here. Status concern can, for a similar reason, have important implications
when identifying peer effects. If we try to measure the magnitude of complemen-
tarities by the degree of segregation across groups, we need to consider how impor-
tant status considerations are. An absence of positive sorting can indicate strong rank
preferences rather than the absence or irrelevance of complementarities. This can, of
course, lead to very different policy implications.
1.2 Related Literature
There are two themes in the literature this paper closely relates to: positional concerns
and the provision of (semi)-public goods.
The notion that agents have preferences over their relative status has received consid-
erable attention in various contexts. Veblen (1899)4 expressed the idea of conspicuous
consumption early on and Duesenberry (1949) stressed the importance of relative in-
come in consumption and savings decisions. Generally speaking, the conspicuous
consumption literature analyses the effects of preferences over consumption differ-
ences within a reference group on equilibrium outcomes. As a key contribution, the
model here looks at the effects from social interaction as well as social comparison.
For example, Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) study a setting where agents have pref-
erences over their rank in a distribution of a conspicuous consumption good. Becker,
Murphy and Werning (2005) characterize equilibrium income and consumption dis-
tributions when market participants can trade status. And Ghiglino and Goyal (2010)
analyse how the social structure in a pure exchange economy affect equilibrium prices
and allocations; finding that relatively less well-off agents can lose from social integra-
tion. Frank (1985) addresses the connection between status concern and sorting. And
Ray and Robson (2012)5 focus particularly on status as the rank in a distribution of a
one-dimensional characteristic. Rank enters utility in the same way as in this model.
Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2012) provides a decision-theoretic founda-
2See Tiebout (1956)
3See, for example, Persky (1990) and Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001). Stephen Calabrese, Dennis Epple,
Thomas Romer and Holger Sieg (2006) provides empirical evidence for the role of peer effects in this.
4See Veblen (2007) [1899]. The Theory of the Leisure Class. Oxford world’s classics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
5See also: Robson (1992).
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tion for such preferences. With a stronger focus on ordinal comparisons, the litera-
ture on contests and tournaments has examined status as a way to incentivize perfor-
mance. Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2007), for example, looks at the optimal partition of
agents into status categories. As a key difference to this literature, in the model here
status arises automatically within a group and cannot be directly controlled by a third
party.6 Nevertheless, the models do share the zero-sum nature of status allocations.
The importance of positional concerns is also validated in the empirical literature.7
Particular attention has been paid to the link between relative income and well-being.
Alesina, di Tella and MacCulloch (2004) provide evidence that there is a significant re-
lation between the relative income position and self-reported happiness in both the
US and Europe. Card et al. (2012) exploit informational differences to investigate the
role of income inequality on work satisfaction. They find that having a lower income
rank than close peers has a significant negative effect on satisfaction. A similar conclu-
sion is reached by Brown et al. (2008) where the importance of income rank is high-
lighted specifically. Positional concerns can also be a driver for migration decisions
as shown in Stark and Taylor (1991). The role of relative income within a neighbour-
hood has been investigated extensively in Luttmer (2005) using data from the Ameri-
can Household survey. He not only finds that relative changes have an effect of similar
magnitude on life satisfaction as absolute ones, but also that the effect is stronger for
people that socialize more with their neighbors. Furthermore, Ashraf, Bandiera and
S. Lee (2014) presents evidence from an educational setting that people are aware of
their relative standing and that the salience and payoff-relevance of rank influences
choices. Additionally, there is experimental evidence from Jemmott and Gonzalez
(1989) that status affects performance in group settings; students performed better in
groups where they have high status. Perhaps most closely related, Bottan and Perez-
Truglia (2017) investigate locational preferences among medical students in the con-
text of the National Resident Matching Program with particular focus on relative in-
come rank. They find that people care about the cost of living and relative income
rank to a similar degree. They also demonstrate that there is significant heterogeneity
in the magnitude of positional concerns and that this is driven by differences in valua-
tion of some of the spillovers generated by the different locations - in their case dating
prospects.
6In a similar way, Rayo (2013) looks at the optimal partition of agents into status categories. See Chapter
2 for a more detailed comparison.
7See Frank (2005) for a brief survey of the economic literature and Weiss and Fershtman (1998) for a
survey of both the economic and sociological literature.
9
There is a large body of literature on social spillovers and particularly the production
and sharing of ‘social goods’ that blur the line between purely public and private goods
- not unlike the quality of a group in the model proposed here. Buchanan (1965) es-
tablishes a foundation by augmenting a standard consumption model with clubs that
allow the sharing of a single consumption good. Those preferences can be either di-
rectly over the sharing good or simply the characteristics of other agents. In Levy and
Razin (2015), for instance, agents care directly about the average income of the people
in their group. Board (2009) explores in a setting closely related to the one here the
optimal group partitions offered by a monopoly supplier when these partitions also
determine the social good available in each group.8 The literature on clubs has paid
particular attention to existence and stability of equilibria; primarily in the context of
cooperative game theory. It has been shown that when firms providing these clubs can
freely enter the market, there is a tension between heterogeneous preferences leading
to differentiation and increasing returns causing greater centralization.9 In a general
equilibrium setting, Scotchmer (2005) studies the pricing of clubs with heterogenous
agents. If group memberships can discriminate between relevant characteristics and
thus effectively limit free movement of consumers, consumption externalities can be
internalized.
The literature on networks delivers many additional insights by focusing on the spe-
cific structure within a group. Ultimately, this can be traced back to models of ef-
ficient matching, for instance Becker (1973).10 Several papers have studied settings
with social spillovers that vary across different types. In a non-specific networking
environment, which is closest to the model here, agents choose how much to social-
ize across their network, unable to discriminate between individuals. Durieu, Haller
and Solal (2011) analyse properties of Nash equilibria in such a model where agents
select between discrete networking intensities that apply to all their links. Also tak-
ing the network structure as given, Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) study the provi-
sion of public goods in a network when investments can be directed to specific links.
Bloch and Dutta (2009) endogenize both the link itself and the link quality. Cabrales,
Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2011) study a setting where undirected investments in
links generate positive spillovers on private investment. Stable equilibria are char-
acterized by too high or too low investment relative to the Pareto efficient outcome.
8See Chapter 2 for a more detailed comparison.
9See Aumann and Dreze (1974) for the theoretical underpinnings and Demange and Henriet (1991) for
a stability result when preferences can be ordered along a single dimension.
10The supermodularity in traits of a match has a close analogy to the complementarity between group
and individual characteristics in this model.
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Baumann (2015) looks at a similar setting where benefits from (directed) investment
across links are symmetric but not separable and finds asymmetric equilibria in which
some agents form many low quality links while others establish few high quality con-
nections.
The empirical literature on these social spillovers is too rich to attempt even a cursory
overview here. Instead, I focus on one particular issue raised in Tiebout (1956): the
endogenous sorting of agents in communities when preferences are heterogenous.
Tiebout has spawned a large literature that studies the provision of public goods by
competing jurisdictions that can differentiate through the public goods they offer and
the taxes they charge. Theoretically, this should lead agents to cluster efficiently.1112
The empirical evidence, however, has been mixed. The Tiebout model in it’s simple
form predicts relatively homogeneous communities within i.e. fine sorting.13 How-
ever, communities appear to be more heterogeneous within and accordingly more
similar across than predicted.14 This has been discussed in Persky (1990) and more ex-
tensively in Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001) and Calabrese et al. (2006); the latter specif-
ically shows that this disparity can be largely resolved when allowing for preferences
over the composition of the communities.15 The model here captures some of these
aspects: depending on the group quality function, there can be an incentive to sepa-
rate finely but the preferences over rank can have an offsetting influence reducing the
benefit from sorting and limiting the degree of segregation.
1.3 The Model
A continuum of agents drawn from the Lebesgue unit interval I choose from a count-
able set of groups G as part of a complete information, simultaneous move game. An
agent is allowed to join at most one group. The action set is A =G∪ {;} where {;} rep-
resents the choice of not joining any group. Group membership is excludable through
prices. For each g ∈G , there is a charge pg ∈ R+ for joining that group. The vector p
11For example, Conley and Wooders (2001) explore a settings where agents differ in tastes and genetic
types. Genetic types affect the cost of acquiring a ‘crowding’ type that causes an externality. They
characterize when taste-heterogeneous jurisdictions are optimal.
12Epple and Romano (2011) provides an overview of the Tiebout literature in the context of schooling
choices.
13A prediction that has been questioned, for example in Pack and Pack (1977).
14See Ghiglino and Nocco (2017) for a theoretical analysis of the the interaction between conspicuous
consumption and urban sorting.
15While Calabrese et al. (2006) delivers evidence for the importance for peer effects, the channels
through which they work remain unidentified.
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contains all such membership prices.16 The price of not joining any group is normal-
ized to 0. While these prices could be thought of more generally as costs associated
with participating in a group - membership in a country club not only requires the
payment of fees but also the right attire and the ability to travel there - they will, for
clarity, be interpreted more literally. For example, these could be the tuition fees at a
university or the membership fees of a social club.
Each agent has a one dimensional type or characteristic w ∈ W where W is the set
of characteristics in the population. W is simply taken to be the closed interval [w , w]
in R. L is a strictly positive probability measure on W and (W,Bw ,L ) is the corre-
sponding probability space. It admits a continuous density f with the corresponding
CDF denoted F . The agent space is the atomless probability space (Ω,B,P ) where
Ω = W × I and the Borel σ-algebra B = Bw ×B I .17 P is the probability measure
L ×λ where λ is the Lebesgue measure on the unit interval.18
By joining a group, agents gain access to the peer effects generated by the agents
within the same group. In particular, I distinguish between two different types of
spillovers: there is a benefit φ that everybody values but potentially to a different de-
gree. φ could be interpreted as a preference over the composition of members or sim-
ply a public good that is ‘produced’ within the group with the output level depending
on the members’ characteristics.19 I call this the quality of the group. Formally, φ is a
function that maps from B to R+ and is continuous almost everywhere.20 This can,
for instance, be a statistic of the distribution of agents choosing the same group like
the average type, the median type, or the lowest or highest type.21
Furthermore, agents have preferences over the rank in the distribution of types within
their group; another statistic of the distribution of agents. I call this the status of an
agent. Given the agents that choose g , the rank rg (w)= Fg (w) of an agent with type w
is the CDF of types in g evaluated at w . In other words, rank is a function from W and
probability distributions over W to [0,1].
16As a matter of convention, I take p to be in ascending order such that pi ≥ pi−1
17B I is the Borel σ-algebra of the unit interval and BW accordingly the Borel σ-algebra of W .
18This follow the modelling approach for infinitely many agents suggested in He, Sun and Sun (2017).
19For example, Kacperczyk (2013) demonstrates the importance of university peers in the decision to
become an entrepreneur - mainly through the transmission of information and a reduction in uncer-
tainty.
20This is to restrict φ to more intuitive cases although all of the analysis would go through without this
assumption given appropriate adjustment of Definition 5.
21Strictly speaking, it is a statistic of the distribution over W×A since the quality of a group g can depend
on the measure of agents joining the group, which is not captured by the probability distribution Fg ,
generated by the agents choosing group g .
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I characterize the agents that make the same choice in A as the social group - a fea-
sible22 measure on W .
Definition 1 (Social groups). A social groupL g is a Lebesgue measure on W with the
property that the combination of all such social groups
∑
g∈AL g (B) ≤L for any B ∈
BW . The vector containing all social groups is denotedL A
An agent of type w is in g (w ∈ g ) if some agents with trait w are part of the social
groupL g - i.e. w is in the support of that social group.
Preferences of agents are represented as follows:
U
(
w, g ,L A
)= u (w,φg ,rg (w))−pg (1.1)
Beyond additive-separability of prices, I make the following assumptions on prefer-
ences and quality:
Assumption 1 (General). u(w,φr ) is continuous and at least twice differentiable. It
is strictly increasing in w, φ and r , and ∂
2
∂w∂φu(w,φ,r ) > 0, ∂
2
∂w∂r u(w,φ,r ) > 0 and
∂2
∂φ∂r u(w,φ,r ) ≥ 0. For every subset Wi ⊆ W , φ is bounded for every social group L g
with its support contained in Wi .
Assumption 2 (Single-crossing). If u(wˆ,φ′,r ′)≥ u(wˆ,φ,r ) for some r ′,r ∈ [0,1], φ′ ≥φ,
and wˆ ∈W , then this inequality holds for all w > wˆ .23
Assumption 3 (Stand-alone payoff). The stand-alone payoff for any social groupL g =
0 as well as the payoff from the isolation choice ; denoted u is such that u ≤ u(w,φ,0)
for all w ∈W where φ is the lower bound of φ given W .
The general assumptions capture the notion that agents not only value quality and
rank but that this valuation is increasing in their own type. A mere scaling of W does
not diminish the effect of either component. People with higher wealth living in a
richer neighbourhood might exhibit stronger positional concerns. They might also
have a higher valuation for school quality and other public goods exclusive to their
22Feasibility requires that for all measures L g with g ∈ A and all sets B ∈BW , we have ∑AL g (B) ≤
L (B).
23In other words, u is such that the single-crossing property in the sense of Edlin and Shannon (1998)
holds.
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neighbourhood. 24 25 Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007), for example, provide ev-
idence that more highly educated households value the education characteristics of
their neighbours more. And Barrow (2002) finds evidence that the valuation for school
quality is positively related with income and education. The fact that these prefer-
ences tend to be observable through location choice implies that they are not (en-
tirely) obscured by status concerns. This motivates Assumption 2. It essentially states
that if an agent of type w prefers higher quality over a given rank trade-off, then this
must also be the case for agents with a higher type. Otherwise status concern might
outweigh other preferences and impede positive sorting simply by assumption. To il-
lustrate the assumption in terms of the university choice example, suppose a student
prefers university A over university B where A offers a higher educational quality but
the student’s relative ability is less at A. Then, under Assumption 2, a student with
higher ability would also prefer university A if she faced the same quality/rank trade-
off.
Assumption 3 states that agents that choose not to participate, do not interact in this
social environment. Someone who chooses not to study does not benefit from any
spillovers in higher education institutions. Finally, joining any group is generally ben-
eficial - at least at 0 cost.26
We can now introduce the equilibrium notion. With the next chapter in mind, I re-
fer to the (sub-)game in which the agents observe the prices of groups and then join a
group as the agents’ game. In Chapter 2, this will be extended by an additional stage.
The focus lies on pure-strategy Nash equilibria. An equilibrium is an assignment of
agents to groups such that, given the social groups generated by the assignment, no
agents (measure 0 set) can be made strictly better-off by an individual deviation.
Definition 2 (Equilibrium). ApureNashEquilibrium in the agents’ game is aB-measurable
function y from the agent space to A that either assigns each agent a group g ∈G or no
group (;), with the property that for all agents i ∈Ωwith type w(i ):
U
(
w(i ), y(i ),L A
)≥U (w(i ), a,L A) ∀a ∈ A
24This is similar to models where rank enters multiplicatively as in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004).
25This can be seen to an analogy to the ‘networks as resources’ view in the sociological literature. Con-
nections with peers can be interpreted as a resource - for example due to the information peers hold.
See, for example, Campbell, Marsden and Hurlbert (1986) for evidence that people with higher so-
cioeconomic status are better connected and have thus better access to network resources. Sobel
(2002) offers a critical (economic) perspective of this literature on social capital.
26It is, for the following analysis, without loss to simply assume u is equal to the lowest possible payoff
an agent can receive in any group u = u(w ,φ,0).
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whereL A is the vector of social group generated by the assignment function y.27
Given an assignment, only some social groups might have a non-zero measure of
agents and, mainly to avoid the negation, I call these non-empty groups the active
social groups. An active price pg is the membership price of an active social group.
The smallest convex set containing the support of an active social group L g is de-
noted [w g , w g ].
28 The highest type in any group g is thus w g , and the lowest w g .
In several instances the outcomes under preferences with status concern are con-
trasted against preferences where agents care only about quality or only about status.
The utility functions below are used for these comparisons.
The utility function for agents without status concern is defined as:
U q (w, g ,L A)= u(w,φg ,r )−pg
for some constant r ∈ [0,1]. And similarly, the utility for agents with only status con-
cern is defined as:
U r (w, g ,L A)= u(w,φ,rg (w))−pg
for some constant φ ∈R+.
I refer to preferences characterized by U as preferences with status concern, prefer-
ences captured by U q as preferences without status concern, and those described by
U r as preferences over status only.
1.4 Structure of Social Groups
We start by analysing some fundamental properties of equilibrium social groups. De-
spite the potential multiplicity in equilibria typical for coordination games, the struc-
ture of equilibrium social groups can be characterized in terms of the relation between
price, quality, and the ‘extreme’ types in each group. This is then contrasted to a set-
ting with no status concern. While status concern adds some potential freedom in how
distributions can overlap, it generally imposes stronger restrictions on how exactly the
distributions over types can differ. This section thus explores properties that have to
be fulfilled given any price vector, independent of how these prices arise. I then restrict
attention to equilibria that are ‘stable’ in the sense that they don’t rely on indifference
of a continuum of agents. I exploit those results in the subsequent chapter to charac-
27We treat L ; as a ’special’ social group in which agents do not interact and thus by assumption
U (w,;,L A)= u
28Clearly, for any social group w g ≤w and w g ≥w
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terize equilibria in a sequential game where first some provider - like a social planner
or monopolist - sets these prices and then agents make their group choice.
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium, two active social groups have equal prices pg = ph if
and only if they are identical in their probability distribution over W , meaning Fg = Fh .
Proof: All omitted proofs are in the Appendix (1.6).
Let us first consider the extreme case where all prices are equal: Proposition 1 implies
the probability distribution over W generated by an active social group must be iden-
tical to all other active social groups. There can be very little variation across groups.
The relevant statistics - quality and status - need to be identical. Such homogeneous
price vectors can arise from legal or practical restrictions. For example, in countries
where tuition fees are set on a national level, this model would predict that the distri-
bution of student ability should look very similar across universities if students care
about their rank in the distribution at their university (abstracting from other factors
like regional variation and locational preferences). Furthermore, this can have impli-
cations for sorting at work. If an employer lets agents freely decide on their team or
choose their shift, and if employees need to be equally paid, for instance due to union
rules, then we should expect the distribution of abilities within each team to reflect
the overall distribution of abilities. This might give an indication why even when an
employer has a strict incentive to create such representative teams, it might not be
necessary to actively allocate workers across teams. 29 Without status concern, only
the quality would have to be the same across active groups.
As the proposition states, this logic generalizes to any two groups that are equally
priced. If they are both active groups, meaning they are chosen by agents in equi-
librium, then status concern puts a strong requirement on the homogeneity across
groups. Equal prices imply equal quality. But if two groups are equally priced and
equal in quality, agents choose the group in which they achieve the higher rank. There-
fore, the rank r (w) that members with type w can attain needs to be the same across
these groups. This, in turn, implies that the probability distributions over W need to
be the same. The only remaining differences between groups can be in size i.e. the
measure of agents in each group. Whether or not such differences can exist in equilib-
rium depends on the quality function φ. If φ is invariant to the size of the group and
only depends on the probability distribution over types, it displays no returns to scale
and equivalently, if φ changes if the measure over W is scaled, it displays returns to
scale.
29See Mas and Moretti (2009)
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Definition 3. Any two social groupsL g ,L h are identical up to size ifL g (B)= κL h(B)
for some κ> 0 and all B ∈BW . They are identical if κ= 1.
Corollary 1.1. If in equilibrium there are two active social groupsL g ,L h with pg = ph ,
then they must be such that:
a) if φ has no returns to scale thenL g andL h are identical up to size.
b) if φ has returns to scale thenL g andL h are identical.
If any two active groups are priced equally, then if φ depends on the size of the social
group, these groups must be measure-0 identical. If φ only depends on the probabil-
ity distribution of types but not the size of the social group, then any such two social
groups must be identical up-to a positive scaling parameter.
Moving to a more general price vector, we can ask how group quality, cut-off types, and
prices are related. The following definition establishes a particular link between qual-
ity and extreme types. If it is fulfilled, any strict ordering in quality implies a related
weak ordering in extreme types and vice versa. In its strict version, any strict ordering
in quality implies a related strict ordering in type and vice versa. For instance, if social
groups are strictly monotonic in the highest type, then if w h >w g for two active social
groups, we can also conclude that φh >φg .
Definition 4 (Monotonicity). Social groups are (weakly) monotonic in quality
(i) at the top if for any two active groups g ,h ∈G:
φh >φg ⇒w h ≥w g
(ii) at the bottom if for any two active groups g ,h ∈G:
φh >φg ⇒w h ≥w g
Social groups are (weakly) monotonic in type
(i) at the top if for any two active groups g ,h ∈G:
w h >w g ⇒φh ≥φg
(ii) at the bottom if for any two active groups g ,h ∈G:
w h >w g ⇒φh ≥φg
I call them strictly monotonic if the inequalities are strict.
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Figure 1.1: A group structure ruled out by Proposition 2
As the following Proposition establishes, we can indeed equivalently order social groups
by their highest type and their quality. Furthermore, if we can strictly rank two groups
by the lowest type in each group, say w h >w g , then the ordering in terms of quality is
the same, i.e. φh > φg . And finally, if we can strictly rank two groups by their quality,
sayφh >φg , then this means the lowest type in h has to be at least weakly greater than
the lowest type in g .
Proposition 2. In any equilibrium, social groups are strictly monotonic in type at the
top and bottom, strictly monotonic in quality at the top and weakly monotonic in qual-
ity at the bottom.
In equilibrium, social groups are such that we can observe some degree of assortative
matching between quality and type - at least at the top and bottom end of groups. The
potential trade-off between rank and quality allows for a greater variety strictly inside
of the support of groups. For instance, just because an agent of type w ′ chooses a
group with quality φ′ does not imply that all types w > w ′ choose a group of quality
φ ≥ φ′. But if an agent of type w ′ is member in a group with quality φ′ where she
obtains rank 1, then all agents with higher type must be in a group with strictly higher
quality. Intuitively, if the most able student at University A is better than the most able
at University B, then University A must also have the higher educational quality.
Figure 1.1 shows a structure ruled out by Proposition 2. There are two social groups
and strict monotonicity in type at the bottom implies that φ2 > φ1. But then strict
monotonicity in quality at the top requires w 2 > w 1 which is not the case. Figure 1.2,
on the other hand, shows a possible equilibrium structure with φ2 >φ1.
The monotonicity in quality has implications for the prices of groups in equilibrium.
The larger social spillovers generated by a higher quality group require a larger mone-
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Figure 1.2: A possible equilibrium structure that is not stable
tary transfer to avoid low ranked agents in lower quality groups to join. A group with
higher quality needs to have a higher price. To stay within the previous example, tu-
ition fees at University A need to be higher. In Figure 1.2, the price of g2 needs to be
strictly greater than that of g1.
Corollary 2.1. In equilibrium, for any two active social groupsL h ,L g :
φh >φg ⇔ ph > pg
Similar to the result that equal prices must imply equal characteristics of groups, we
find that if two groups are equal in their highest type then they must be identical in
their payoff-relevant characteristics:
Corollary 2.2. For any two active social groupsL g ,L h in equilibrium,
(i) if φ has no returns to scale, w h =w g if any only if the social groups are identical up
to size.
(ii) if φ has returns to scale, w h =w g if any only if the social groups are identical.
1.4.1 Stable Equilibria
Attention is now restricted to equilibria that exhibit a certain stability. If groups differ
in quality, then any intersection of their supports on a set of positive measure requires
the agents in this set to be exactly indifferent between higher rank versus higher qual-
ity. But indifference for a continuum of agents entails a degree of instability. Suppose,
for example, a number of students over a range of abilities is indifferent between two
schools. Now if the distribution of one of these schools is slightly perturbed, either
because the distribution changes or because the perception of it is altered, then the
status of almost all students in that school is affected. Indifference breaks necessarily
for almost everybody with an ability in the overlap; even if this perturbation is arbitrar-
ily small. When the distribution is altered by, for instance, adding a measure of agents
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around some w , then the rank of almost all agents above that is increased while that
of those below is reduced. Independent of the effect on quality, indifference can’t hold
for (almost) anyone.30
Definition 5 (²-Perturbation). A measureL ²g is an ²-perturbation of a social groupL g
ifL ²g ≤L and the related quality φ²g and rank r ²g differ from φg and rg by at most ².
Clearly, for ² large enough, any active social group is the ²-perturbation of another. But
for small ², it allows us to describe the set of (potential) groups that are similar in status
and quality. Given the continuity of φ, such a perturbation always exists. Stability
here is the notion that if one equilibrium group was to be replaced by a very similar
group (even if this group is not actually feasible), then the set of agents for which the
membership in this perturbed group is suboptimal should also be small. Negligible
differences in groups (or the perception of these groups) should have negligible effects
on outcomes. The following refinement captures this:
Definition 6 (Stable equilibrium). An equilibrium is stable if for any ²-perturbation of
any active social groupL g , as ²→ 0, the measure of agents with w ∈W such that
U
(
w, g ,L ′A
)≥U (w, a,L ′A) ∀a ∈ A (1.2)
whereL ′A is the perturbed vector of social groups, approachesL g .
Take any equilibrium group structure. This equilibrium is stable if after the status or
quality in any group is perturbed by an arbitrarily small amount, the set of agents for
which the group assignment is not optimal is also arbitrarily small. As the following
Lemma concludes, this rules out any overlap in between the supports of groups:
Lemma 1. In any stable equilibrium, the intersection of the supports of all active social
groups has measure 0.
As the following result states, stability significantly narrows down the type of social
groups that can form in equilibrium. At the same time, it does not pose an issue with
existence. Stability simply rules out any overlaps in the support; whether complete
overlaps, as in the case of social groups with equal cost that are identical up to size,
or partial overlaps. The supports of all active social groups (that are not the isolation
choice) form an interval partition of [w, w] where w ≥w .
Proposition 3. In a stable equilibrium, the group structure can be represented by an
interval partition of [w 1, w] with w 1 ≥ w. The support of any active social group is
convex.
30At an endpoint, e.g. at r = 0, indifference might still hold but these have measure 0.
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The convexity result highlights that in a stable equilibrium, there can be no ‘gaps’ in
the support of any social group. Any such gap is driven by the rank/quality trade-off.
Since the two groups can’t be identical in quality, a gap in the support means that the
agents with types in that gap achieve higher utility in a lower quality group.31 But this
can only arise if there are also intersections in the support. These are ruled out by sta-
bility. A group structure as in Figure 1.2 cannot be a stable equilibrium.
Stability allows for a stricter monotonicity result. Since there can be no overlaps, a
higher group quality implies a higher lowest type and vice versa. Given the interval
structure, we can further conclude that for any two active groups with φh > φg , we
need w h ≥w g ; the lowest type in the higher quality group needs to be weakly greater
than the highest type in the lower quality group.
Corollary 3.1. In a stable equilibrium, social groups are strictly monotonic in type and
quality.
Without the stability refinement, we were able to conclude that if two groups have
equal quality, they must be equally priced and have equal support. With stability we
find that there can be no two active groups of equal quality at all. It is therefore without
loss to think of agents paying the same price as being members of the same group.
Corollary 3.2. In a stable equilibrium, there can be no two active social groups equal in
price or quality.
With the combination of status concern and stability, we are able to eliminate some
multiplicity. Any groups equal in quality need to be equal in their distribution over
W. With stability, every type needs to be assigned just one group. Accordingly, there
can be only one group of a particular quality. Following those results, not only can we
represent an equilibrium group structure as an interval partitionI = {w1, ..., w},32 but
every interval corresponds to a distinct group. In the following sections, stable equi-
librium social groups will be characterized by the partition of W they induce. When
convenient, I highlight the equilibrium group structure or equilibrium partition that a
set of prices induces, rather than the social groups themselves.
Definition 7 (Equilibrium group structure). I = {w1, ..., w} is called an equilibrium
group structure if there exists an assignment y : W → A such that for every interval
[wi , wi+1] with wi , wi+1 ∈I , there is a unique gi ∈G with y(w)= gi for all w ∈ (wi , wi+1]
31In the opposite case, where the quality of the group covering the gap is higher, the single-crossing
assumption would imply that all higher types achieve higher utility in that group. This could not be
an equilibrium independent of stability.
32I is taken to be a set of points that partitions W or a subset thereof
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and y(w)=; for all w ∈ [w , w1) and there exists a p such that this is an equilibrium in
the agents’ game.
1.4.2 Degree of Sorting
We now explore how status concern affects the equilibrium sorting or ‘segregation’.33
It is shown that with status concern, there is a bound on the number of active social
groups in a stable equilibrium. If status concern is parametrized, it can be shown
that a stronger preference for status reduces the number of active groups that can be
maintained in equilibrium and, in the extreme case where only status matters, there
can only be a ‘representative’ social group.
Without status concern, given a suitable price vector, any interval partition can be
maintained in equilibrium; at least if the group quality is increasing in types.34 The
preference of agents over status in their social group puts a limit to this:
Proposition 4. There is an upper bound k ≥ 1 on the number of active social groups in
any stable equilibrium.
The economic intuition is that for a very fine group structure, the quality difference
between any two adjacent groups is very small. But because of the interval structure,
there is a cut-off type that achieves rank 1 in one group and rank 0 in the other. If
groups are too close in quality, incentive compatibility for such social groups cannot
hold for any vector of prices. In an equilibrium, the quality difference between two
adjacent social groups needs to be sufficiently large if agents have status concern. If
University A is almost identical to University B but any student in A could achieve a
strictly higher rank in B, then this is not an equilibrium outcome independent of the
tuition fees.
We can further show that this is ‘monotone’ in status-concern: as status becomes
more important, the maximum number of active social groups in a stable equilib-
rium decreases. To capture this comparative static, I write preferences as uα(w,φ,r )≡
u(w,φ,r )+αv(w,r ) for some 0≤α<∞ and a continuous and differentiable function
v with ∂∂r v(w,r )> 0, ∂
2
∂r∂w v(w,r )> 0.35 Ordering preferences by this parameter α, we
can conclude that as α increases, less segregation can be maintained.
33I refer to a population being (unambiguously) more segregated if the equilibrium group structure is
finer. This is, of course, only a partial order.
34If the group qualityφ is monotone in type in the sense that if almost all types in a group are higher then
the quality of that group is (weakly) higher, then any (convex) interval partition can be maintained as
a group structure in equilibrium. See Definition 9 for a formal definition of monotonicity.
35All previous assumptions on preferences are maintained.
22
Corollary 4.1. The least upper-bound on the number of active social groups in any sta-
ble equilibrium is weakly decreasing in α.
But the fact that a stronger status concern allows for less segregation does not hinge
on the stability refinement. Without stability, groups can ‘overlap’ and we cannot de-
scribe segregation in terms of the coarseness of the partition of W . However, in a sense
groups need to be more similar. It is shown in the Appendix (1.6.2) that for any increas-
ing sequence ofα’s approaching infinity, in any corresponding sequence of probability
distributions of active social groups, the difference between these distributions has to
converge uniformly to 0. Furthermore, as α increases, these distributions have to be
arbitrarily close to the population distribution - at least over their support. If status
concern becomes very important, than agents can still be excluded from participating
in social groups but differences in active social groups have to disappear.
Taking this yet one step further, if agents have preferences over status only, previously
defined as U r , then no segregation can be achieved at all. If there are multiple groups,
then they must be identical in their payoff relevant characteristics p and r . In a stable
equilibrium, there can only be one active social group whose probability distribution
is equal to the population distribution over the support of the group.36
Corollary 4.2. If agents have preferences over status only, then in any equilibrium all
active social groups must be identical up to size and have equal prices. In a stable equi-
librium, there can be at most one active social group.
1.5 Discussion
This Chapter establishes that status concern limits the degree of segregation across
social groups that can be sustained in equilibrium when the composition of groups
determines the payoff. Status concern is a force for homogeneity across groups. When
people care only about the ‘quality’ of a group, then arbitrarily fine separation is feasi-
ble and, at least for quality functions that are increasing in the type of members, any
interval partition of the type space can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome. If
agents care about the rank they occupy in a group, this is no longer possible. If groups
take the form of interval partitions, there is a finite upper bound on the number of
non-identical social groups that can be sustained in equilibrium. In the pure status
case where agents care only about their rank, there can be only one type of group.
36In fact, if uw (w,0)< 0 where u(w,r )≡ u(w,φ,r ) then the only active social group can be the represen-
tative group, i.e. all agents join the same group.
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While complementarity in types and quality allows for sorting, status concern consti-
tutes a countervailing force.
If status concern is important, empirical models might need to take this into account.
For instance, Kendall (2003) tries to derive conclusion about whether or not spillovers
in ability in professional basketball exhibit complementarities - stronger players ben-
efitting more from stronger team members - by analyzing the concentration of strong
players in teams. It is found that teams are more similar in quality than would be ex-
pected if complementarities were strong. If, however, players care about their rank
within the team, there might be little concentration despite the presence of comple-
mentarities. Status concern might constrain firms in how they can allocate employees
across teams. In Mas and Moretti (2009) it is found that due to the nature of spillovers
in ability of cashiers, it is efficient to create representative teams for each shift. Never-
theless, the firm does not actively assign workers to shifts. If these workers care about
their relative ability within their team, then workers have a tendency to sort efficiently
without an explicit allocation. More generally, if prices are forced to be equal across
groups (e.g. laws setting tuition fees, union rules equalizing pay, etc.) then we can
expect these groups to be similar in their distribution of agents’ types - if agents care
about status.
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 A: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
First, the following Lemma is proved:
Lemma 2. If there are n equal active prices, in any equilibrium the corresponding n
active groups must be identical in φ and their probability distribution over W .
Proof. Take any probability distribution over G×W . Suppose there are n active groups
with equal prices. Let Gn ⊆G be the set of these groups with equal prices. Let further-
more G
n ⊆ Gn such that for any g ∈ Gn , the corresponding social group L g is such
that φg =max{φ j : j ∈Gn}.
Let [w n , w n]=W n ⊆W be the smallest interval containing the supports of all groups
in Gn . We first observe that an agent with characteristic w sufficiently close to w n
must be member of a group with g ∈Gn . Suppose not and she’s member of a group k
with φk <φg . Given equal prices, this can only be optimal if rk (w)> rg (w).
But it follows from continuity of u that there exists an ²> 0 such that for any w > w˜ ≡
w −² we have rk (w)− rg (w)< δ where δ is such that:
u(w˜,φg ,rk (w˜)−δ)= u(w˜,φk ,rk (w˜))
For any w > w˜ , there is a strict incentive to join a group in Gn . It follows that agents
sufficiently close to w n must be in a group with the highest quality.
Similarly, agents sufficiently close to w n must be in a group g ∈Gn . We can conclude
this by noting that for any other group k with k ∉Gn and rk (w)> rg (w) for all g ∈Gn
there exists some ² > 0 such that for all w < w˜ = w n + ² we have rg (w)− rk (w) < δ
where δ is such that:
u(w˜,φg ,rk (w˜)−δ)= u(w˜,φk ,rk (w˜))
For an agent with a sufficiently low type, if prices are equal, there is a strict incentive
to join the highest quality group since the agent’s rank is close to 0 in any group and
∂
∂φ
u(w,φ,r ) is strictly positive for any r .
Furthermore, by the same argument, any agent in a group k ∈ {Gn \ Gn} with type w
such that rk (w) is sufficiently close to 0 has a strict incentive to join a group in G
n
since
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∂
∂φ
u(w,φ,r ) > 0. Since every group with positive mass must have such members, all
such groups need to be in G
n
.
To conclude, we can observe that when prices and quality are equal across a set of
groups, then for any w ∈W , we need rg (w)= rh(w) for any g ,h ∈Gn . All active groups
need to be identical in terms of quality and rank for any type. But since the rank of an
agent with type w is equal to the CDF evaluated at w , the CDF over types needs to be
equal across groups.
Using this Lemma, we can prove the Proposition:
Proof. Sufficiency:
If two active social groups L g ,L h have the same probability distribution, then nec-
essarily w g =w h . For indifference, we need:
u(w h ,φh ,0)−ph = u(w g ,φg ,0)−pg
WLOG suppose ph > pg . Then for indifference φh > φg . But since the probability
distributions are equal, we also know that w h = w g > w g . Complementarity in w , r
and φ imply that
u(w h ,φh ,1)−ph > u(w g ,φg ,1)−pg
which contradicts w g =w h .
Necessity:
If for two active social groups pg = ph , then applying the argument from Lemma 2 to
W n = [w h , w h]∪[w g , w g ] and Gn = {g ,h}, we can conclude thatφh =φg which implies
that for all w ∈ g ,h we need rg (w)= rh(w) which means the probability distributions
over W must be identical.
Proof of Corollary 1.1:
Proof. a) Suppose not and for some subset B ⊂W we haveL g (B) 6= κL h(B). Then it
follows from the Radon-Nikodym theorem that the probability distribution over types
within each group is such that for some w ∈ g , Fg (w) 6= Fh(w). But it follows from
Proposition 1 that this cannot be the case in equilibrium since ph = pg .
b) As the probability distributions have to be the same across both groups, suppose
indeed thatL g = κL h for some κ> 0 but κ 6= 1. Ifφ has returns to scale, thenφg 6=φh
if κ 6= 1. WLOG, asumme that φh >φg . Since rg (w)= rh(w) for all w ∈W and ph = ph ,
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all agents in g have a strict incentive to join h since they obtain the same r but higher
φ at the same price. In equilibrium, φh =φg and thereforeL g =L h .
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. Take any two active social groupsL g ,L h with with g ,h ∈G . By definition, the
smallest convex set containing their support are [w h , w h] and [w g , w g ].
Case 1 - bottom:
Suppose monotonicity in quality at the bottom fails such that φh > φg but w h < w g .
Then any agent with type w sufficiently close to w h in group g can instead join group h
and obtain a strictly higher rank and benefit from higher quality. This switch is strictly
beneficial unless ph−pg is sufficiently large. But due to the complementarity inφ and
w , we know that if w g >w h then
u(w g ,φh ,0)−u(w g ,φg ,0)> u(w h ,φh ,0)−u(w h ,φg ,0)
Therefore, if ph −pg ≥ u(w g ,φh ,rh(w g ))−u(w g ,φg ,0) then
u(w h ,φh ,0)−ph < u(w h ,φg ,0)−pg
Membership in h for agents close to and including w h cannot be optimal.
Case 1 - top:
Suppose strict monotonicity in quality at the top fails such that φh >φg but w g ≥w h .
Using the previous result, we know that
u(w h ,φh ,0)−ph ≥ u(w h ,φg ,rg (w h))−pg
with rg (wh)≥ 0. It follows that
u(w h ,φh ,0)−ph ≥ u(w h ,φg ,0)−pg
From complementarity in φ and w , it must be the case that for all w >w h :
u(w,φh ,0)−ph > u(w,φg ,0)−pg
From complementarity between w and r , and (weak) complementarity between φ
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and r , it follows that:
u(w,φh ,1)−ph > u(w,φg ,1)−pg
and therefore for any rg (w)≤ 1
u(w,φh ,1)−ph > u(w,φg ,rg (w))−pg
Agents with type w such that w ≥w h must strictly prefer membership in group h. By
continuity, this is also true for agents with types below but sufficiently close to w h . A
contradiction to w g ≥w h .
Case 2 - bottom:
Suppose strict monotonicity in type at the bottom fails such that w h >w g butφg ≥φh .
It must be that
u(w h ,φh ,0)−ph ≥ u(w h ,φg ,r (w h))−pg (1.3)
Since φg ≥φh , this can only hold if ph < pg . But we know that:
u(w g ,φg ,0)−pg ≥ u(w g ,φh ,0)−ph
From complementarity we conclude that this must also hold for agents with w > w g
and furthermore:
u(w g ,φg ,r )−pg > u(w g ,φh ,0)−ph
for all r ∈ (0,1]. Since rg (w h)> 0, group membership in h cannot be optimal for agents
close to and including w h . A contradiction.
Case 2 - top:
Suppose strict monotonicity in type at the top fails such that w h >w g but φg ≥φh .
From monotonicity in quality at the bottom, we know that w g ≥w h . It follows
u(w g ,φg ,0)−pg ≥ u(w g ,φh ,rh(w g ))−ph
This implies for any r ∈ (0,1] and w ≥w g :
u(w,φg ,r )−pg > u(w,φh ,r )−ph
It follows that
u(w h ,φg ,1)−pg > u(w h ,φh ,1)−ph
A contradiction.
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Proof of Corollary 2.1:
Proof. For any two active social groups with φh > φg , monotonicity in quality at the
bottom implies that w h ≥w g . In equilibrium:
u(w g ,φg ,0)−pg ≥ u(w g ,φh ,0)−ph
But since for any w ∈ W , φ, and r ∈ [0,1] we have ∂
∂φ
u(w,φ,r ) > 0, we need that
ph > pg .
For the other direction, suppose ph > pg . Take the type w h ∈ h with rh(w h)= 0. Nec-
essarily, the rank obtained in the other group is rg (w h) ≥ 0. Suppose now φg ≥ φh .
Monotonicity in quality at the bottom implies w g ≥w h . In equilibrium we need:
u(w h ,φh ,0)−ph ≥ u(w h ,φg ,0)−pg
But if φg > φh , it cannot be that ph > pg as again ∂∂φu(w h ,φh ,0) ≥ 0. And if φg = φh ,
it follows immediately that we cannot have ph > pg as the above inequality would be
violated.
Proof of Corollary 2.2:
Proof. Case (i) - sufficiency:
It follows from strict monotonicity in quality at the top that φg = φh . Given strict
monotonicity in type at the bottom, we can then conclude that w g = w h . This im-
plies that ph = pg . It follows from Proposition 1 that the probability distributions need
to be the same.
Case (i) - necessity:
If the CDF’s are identical, then since φ has no returns to scale, φ must be identical.
Strict monotonicity in type at the top then implies that w h =w g .
Case (ii) - sufficiency:
The argument is the same as in Case (i) with the addition that equal quality requires
the measures to be identical for every measurable subset of W.
Case (ii) - necessity:
If the social groups are identical, then φ is identical and then strict monotonicity in
type at the top implies w h =w g .
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Suppose there are two active social groupsL g andL h that overlap over a set
[w1, w2]⊂W . LetL ²g be an ²-perturbation such thatL ²g does not differ fromL g over
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[w ′1, w2] with w
′
1 > w1. Because of the continuity of φ almost everywhere, for every
² there exists such a perturbation (noting that rank is necessarily continuous). If for
every ² there exists such aL ²g with quality φ
′
g such that ²> |φ²g −φg | > 0, then no mat-
ter the ², all agents in [w ′1, w2] either strictly prefer membership in social groupL
²
g or
L h . The equilibrium is not stable.
If this does not exist, then we can conclude from continuity that at least for some such
²-perturbations, φ²g −φg = 0. But then there exist ²-perturbations that increase (or
decrease) the status of all agents in L ²g with type [w
′
1, w2]. Again, all agents in that
interval either strictly preferL ²g orL h for all such perturbations. The equilibrium is
not stable.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. We first prove the interval result:
Suppose the support of social groups does not represent an interval partition of a sub-
set of W . Then there must be at least two social groups L g ,L h and a compact set
S ⊂W such that for every subset Si ⊆ S,L g (Si )> 0 andL h(Si )> 0. This requires that
(alomst) all agents in S are indifferent between the two groups.
If not and there is a type w strictly inside S that is not indifferent and, for instance,
u(w,φh ,rh(w))−ph > u(w,φg ,rg (w))−pg
then for a small enough ²> 0,
u(w +²,φh ,rh(w +²))−ph > u(w +²,φg ,rg (w +²))−pg
This means types immediately above w must also strictly prefer h. This implies that
rg (w)= rg (w ′) for all w ′ > w . Single-crossing then implies that all w ′ strictly prefer h
to g . The support cannot intersect over S.
But if all types in S are strictly indifferent, then they have measureL (S) > 0 which is
ruled out by Lemma 1.
Finally, we observe that no set of agents [w1, w2] strictly inside of W can be priced
out of every group unless all agents with type w <w1 are also not participating in any
group. If there is any type w ≤ w1 in group g , then U (w, g ,L A)> u. But from single-
crossing we can infer that this is also true for all w ′ >w1.
We can now derive the convexity result:
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Suppose the support of an active social group is not convex. Then there is an interval
W1 = [wl , wh]⊂W such thatL g ([wl , wh])= 0 for some group g and there are intervals
Wl = [w g , w ′l ] and Wh = [w ′h , w g ] withL g positive for any measurable subset of these
two intervals and w ′l ≤wl <wh ≤w ′h .
Note that by the previous argument there must be at least one group f ∈G withL f (W1)>
0.
The membership prices p f and pg must be such that for some wˆ <wh :
u(wˆ,φ f ,r f (wˆ))−p f ≥ u(wˆ,φg ,rg (wˆ))−pg
If φ f ≥ φg , then for all w ∈ (wˆ, wh], the following must be true noting that rg (w) is
constant for all w ∈W1 while r f (w) is increasing:
u(w,φ f ,r f (w))−p f > u(w,φg ,rg (wˆ))−pg
It follows from the single-crossing condition that it cannot be the case that for any
w∗ ≥wh :
u(w∗,φ f ,r f (w∗))−p f ≤ u(w∗,φg ,rg (wˆ))−pg
Suppose instead that φ f <φg :
We know that
u(w g ,φg ,0)−pg ≥ u(w g ,φ f ,r f (w g ))−p f
and since u is strictly increasing in r and w , and as r f must be constant in Wl ac-
cording to the interval partition statement, we can conclude that for any w ′ >w g with
w ′ ∈Wl :
u(w ′,φg ,rg (w ′))−pg > u(w ′,φ f ,r f (w ′))−p f
But then it follows from the single-crossing condition that it cannot be that for any
w ′′ >w g ) that
u(w ′′,φg ,rg (w ′′))−pg < u(w ′′,φ f ,r f (w))−p f
The result follows.
Proof of Corollary 3.1:
Proof. Take any two social groupsL g ,L h . Suppose φh > φg . Weak monotonicity in
quality at the bottom implies w h ≥ w g . However, it follows from the interval result
that w h 6=w g and thus w h >w g . Everything else follows directly from 2.
31
Proof of Corollary 3.2:
Proof. By definition, there can be no two groups with supports that overlap on a set
of positive measure. It follows from Corollary 3.1 that groups are strictly monotonic
in type which implies that if the supports do not overlap then the quality must be
different.
As a direct consequence of Corollary 2.1, if two groups are not equal in quality then
they can’t be identical in prices. No two active social groups can be equal in price or
quality in a stable equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. Denoteφ as the upper-bound to group quality for all feasible social groups and
φ as the lower-bound. As φ is bounded for a given set of agents, these exist.
As in a stable equilibrium active social groups have non-overlapping, convex interval
support, a necessary condition for incentive compatibility is that for any two adjacent
social groupsL l ,L h with φh >φl , we have:
u(w h ,φh ,0)> u(w h ,φl ,1)
Notice that due to the single-crossing assumption, if this inequality holds for some
w h , it holds for all w >w h .
For every φ in [φ,φ) and w ∈W , we can define ∆φ(w) as the minimum quality differ-
ence required such that for any δ<∆φ(w), the inequality fails for w meaning
u(w,φ+δ,0)< u(w,φ,1)
while
u(w,φ+∆φ(w),0)= u(w,φ,1)
If no such threshold exists, which would imply
lim
δ→∞
u(w,φ+δ,0)< u(w,φ,1)
then set ∆φ(w)=φ−φ.
For a given w , we can define ∆φ(w) as inf{∆φ(w) :φ ∈ [φ,φ]}. Since for every φ ∈ [φ,φ],
∆φ(w) is greater than 0, this lower bound is greater than 0. Note that if ∆φ(w) was not
bounded away from 0, it would imply that for someφ∗, ∂
∂r u(w,φ
∗,r )= 0 contradicting
∂
∂r u > 0.
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We can then define
∆φ ≡ inf{∆φ(w) : w ∈W }
as the lower bound over all these. Since for every w the difference is bounded away
from 0, this is again strictly positive.
We can conclude that in equilibrium, the number of active social groups is bounded
above by N ≡ φ−φ∆φ . For any number of active groups N >N it must be that for at least
one pair of adjacent social groups with φh > φl , we have that φh −φl < ∆φ which im-
plies by definition that φh −φl < ∆φ(w h) which means that incentive compatibility
fails.
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Proof of Corollary 4.1:
Proof. Since the number of possible active social groups in an equilibrium is a subset
of N, the least-upper-bound property implies that since it has an upper bound it has
a least upper bound. Take some α as given and suppose kα ∈ N is the corresponding
least-upper-bound.
Let I kα be an equilibrium partition that has exactly kα groups. Let I
′ be a strictly
finer partition. By definition, there exists no price vector p ′ such thatI ′ is an equilib-
rium partition. Let p ′ be the price vector such that all cut-off types w ∈ i nt (I ′) - the
interior of the set - are indifferent between their group and the adjacent groups. If this
does not exist, then for some w h ∈I ′ and adjacent groups h, l ∈G :
u(w h ,φh ,0)+αv(w h ,0)< u(w h ,φl ,1)+αv(w h ,1)
But if this is true for some α, it is true for all α′ >α.
If instead such a p ′ does exist, then for some w ∈ g and some group h with φh >φg :
u(w,φl ,rl (w))+αv(w,rl (w))−p ′l < u(w,φh ,0)+αv(w,0)−p ′h
We take h as the group immediately adjacent to l meaning that w h =w l but the argu-
ment goes through for any group g withφg >φl . Asα increasesα(v(w,rl (w))−v(w,0))
increases. But it follows from incentive compatibility of p ′ at the cut-off that:
p ′h −p ′l =α(v(w l ,0)− v(w l ,1))+u(w l ,φh ,0)−u(w l ,φl ,1)
As v(w l ,1)− v(w l ,0) > v(w,rl (w))− v(w,0), any increase in α reduces the price dif-
ference by more than it increases the loss in utility from the lower rank. If incentive
compatibility fails at some w for α, it fails for all α′ >α.
Finally, note that if p ′ is incentive-compatible at the cut-off types, we do not need
to consider agents switching from a higher to a lower-quality group because of the
single-crossing assumption. Consequently, kα is weakly decreasing in α.
Proof of Corollary 4.2:
Proof. Suppose there are two active social groupsL g ,L h .
If prices are equal, then agents have a strict incentive to join the group in which they
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achieve the higher rank. In equilibrium, it must be that rg (w) = rh(w) for all w ∈W
which implies that the CDF’s are identical.
Now suppose prices are not equal and assume wlog that ph > pg . We can deduce
that agents close to w must be in g since the rank difference between groups is ar-
bitrarily close to 0 for agents sufficiently close to w . Furthermore, there exists an
² > 0 such that agents with types in [w h , w h + ²) must also be in g . This follows since
rg (w h) ≥ rh(w h) = 0. For a small enough ², all agents in [w h , w h + ²) have a strict
incentive to be in g since the rank difference rg (w)− rh(w) is either positive or suf-
ficiently small. But this is a contradiction since there exists a δ > 0 such that agents
in [w h , w h +δ) must be in h by definition of w h . It must be that ph = pg . In a sta-
ble equilibrium, this cannot be the case which follows from Corollary 3.2. The result
follows.
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1.6.2 B: Convergence
The following result shows that, loosely speaking, the stronger the status concern, the
more similar any active groups have to be in equilibrium. Given a parametrized spec-
ification of preferences, for a given αn let L
n
g and L
n
h be any two equilibrium social
groups for some price vector p. There always exists such an equilibrium sinceL g and
L h can be identical and equally priced. We can denote the corresponding probability
distributions over W as F ng and F
n
h . The following result shows that for any sequence
of (αn)n∈N that is strictly increasing and converging to infinity, any corresponding se-
quence (Gn)n∈N where Gn ≡ F ng −F nh - the difference of two equilibrium probability
distributions given αn - must converge to 0 and this convergence is uniform.
Proposition 5. For any increasing sequence (αn)n∈N converging to infinity, the differ-
ence of the probability distributions over W for any corresponding sequence of two ac-
tive social groups in equilibrium converge uniformly to 0.
Proof. For any two groups h, l with φh ≥ φl , we can establish an upper bound on the
rank difference such that there can exist prices that make these two groups incentive
compatible. As the price of any group must be increasing in φ (see Corollary 2.1), we
know that ph ≥ pl with strict inequality if the quality difference is strict.
For every w ∈W , let
∆r (w)= supRw
where
Rw =
{
rl − rh : rl ,rh ∈ [0,1]&u(w,φh ,rh)−u(w,φl ,rl )+α [v(w,rh)− v(w,rl )]> 0
}
This is the maximum rank difference that can be sustained in equilibrium for any w .
If ∆r (w)= 0, then it must be that φh =φl or there can be no such two groups in equi-
librium as incentive compatibility requires that∆r (w)> 0 otherwise ph−pl ≤ 0 which
implies that incentive compatibility fails for type w if φh >φl .
As φ is bounded, we can conclude that this maximum rank difference is bounded for
every w by:
∆
∗
r (w)= supRw
where
Rw =
{
rl − rh : rl ,rh ∈ [0,1]&u(w,φ,rh)−u(w,φ,rl )+α [v(w,rh)− v(w,rl )]> 0
}
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We can define the upper bound over all these ∆
∗
r (w) for a given α as
∆
∗
r (α)=max{Rw : w ∈W }
Ifα is sufficiently large, then due to the boundedness of utility we have∆
∗
r (α)< 1. This
implies that Fh(w)−Fl (w)≤∆∗r (α) for all w ∈W .
Take any increasing sequence {αn}n∈N where αn →∞ as n →∞.
For every ² > 0, there exists an N such that ∆∗r (αn) < ² for all n > N . This means that
Fh−Fl converges uniformly to 0. Asφ andφ are upper and lower bounds on the quality
of any two groups and as uφ > 0, the maximum difference in rank for any two qualities
φ>φh ≥φl ≥φ is bounded by ∆∗r (α). The result follows.
Corollary 5.1. For any increasing sequence (αn)n∈N converging to infinity, the proba-
bility distribution over (w1, w]⊆W for some w1 ≥w for any corresponding sequence of
active social groups in equilibrium converges uniformly to the population distribution
F .
Proof. If in any equilibrium there is an active social group L g that somewhere over
its support differs from L on some subset Wd ⊆ W , then it follows from Assump-
tions 1 and 3 that there must be another active social group L h different from L g
with L h(Wd ) > 0. But it follows from Proposition 5 that if there are two active social
groups, then as α→∞, they must be arbitrarily similar. But then either there is only
one active group in some interval, in which caseL g =L over its support. Or there is
more than one but as αn →∞, the difference in their probability distributions must
go to 0 and so they both must converge toL which implies that their associate prob-
ability distributions converge to F . It again follows from 5 that this convergence is
uniform.
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Chapter 2
The Provision of Social Groups under
Status Concern
2.1 Introduction
This chapter extends the previous analysis and explores the consequences of status
concern on aggregate welfare and revenue. Rather than just asking what groups can
be offered, we might be interested in what groups a social planner maximizing utili-
tarian welfare or a private firm maximizing profit want to offer. And in particular, this
chapter tries to answer how these optimal provisions are affected by the presence of
status concern. The focus lies on two key aspects: segregation and social exclusion.
It is explored how status concern affects the segregation of agents; i.e. how fine is the
optimal group structure offered by a social planner, monopolist, or in an extension,
competitive firm. And it is examined what status concern implies about social ex-
clusion, addressing the question of how many agents might not be offered any social
group.
While Chapter 1 examined properties of social groups that hold for any set of prices,
this Chapter extends the setting by introducing an additional stage: a seller or ‘provider’
posts a menu of prices for social groups and then agents choose from this set of prices.
This is modelled as a direct communication mechanism where agents report their type
and the mechanism recommends a price and group. For simplicity, it is assumed that
offering groups is costless. This provider could, for example, be a local authority de-
ciding on the number, type, and tuition fees of schools in the district; or a firm de-
veloping a new housing project, choosing how inclusive the development should be.
The provider might act as a benevolent social planner - the authority maximizing ag-
gregate welfare - or as a monopolist - the authority maximizing profits. The role of
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competition is also discussed.
It is shown that, in addition to the reduced potential for segregation which was ob-
served in the previous chapter, status concern also reduces the benefit from segre-
gation. More precisely, ‘splitting’ a population into several, separate groups is less
beneficial under status concern - both in terms of aggregate welfare and, under some
restrictions, in terms of revenue. Status concern not only leaves less room to manoeu-
vre in terms of which groups can be offered, a provider also gains less from offering
a finer group structure. In the extreme case where agents only care about status, the
unique welfare maximizing group structure is the representative group in which all
agents participate. In contrast, Board (2009) finds in a closely related setting without
status concern that for sufficiently convex quality functions, full separation can in-
deed be both a welfare and profit maximizing equilibrium.
As a second key observation, the interaction between quality and status concern can,
in combination with the limitation to anonymous pricing, make the exclusion of some
agents from any social group a second-best outcome. This is true even if in the first-
best, where agents can be directly assigned a group, full participation is optimal. If
agents care only about quality or only about status, this cannot be the case. In this
sense, the agents’ concern for status and quality can lead to social exclusion. The
group provider achieves social exclusion by setting all prices high enough so that some
agents strictly prefer not to join any group. Social exclusion can only be maintained
at the ‘bottom’; the set of excluded agents forms an interval at the low-end of the type
distribution. In the context of the education example, even an authority maximizing
utilitarian welfare might set university tuition fees such that some students choose not
to acquire higher education. If we alter the population distribution - suppose a group
of new agents arrive in a society - the planner might want to raise prices in order to
exclude the low-type arrivals even though their utility enters the planner’s objective
function. Similarly, if a new group of high-type agents arrives, a planner might set
prices such as to exclude some low-type agents that were previously members of a
group. Maybe surprisingly, in some cases a monopolist might charge a lower price
for the lowest-quality group and thus exclude fewer agents than a social planner. The
presence of status concern can imply that the welfare effects of otherwise unambigu-
ous policy interventions become less straight-forward. If, for instance, a policy maker
aims to reduce social exclusion, this might come at a cost of lower aggregate welfare.
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2.2 Related Literature
The model presented here draws from two closely related theoretical papers: Board
(2009) investigates the optimal monopoly pricing of social groups when the agents’
types determine the quality of the group.1 It is shown that independent of the exact
nature of the quality function, the monopolist provision is too segregated and excludes
too many agents. As key distinction, in Board (2009) agents value the distribution of
types only in terms of group quality; the payoff is independent of other aspects of the
underlying distribution of types. In Rayo (2013), the agents’ type is their private infor-
mation and they obtain status through signals sold by a monopolist. The monopolist
thus controls the agents’ status. This can lead to pooling for some subsets of agents
and full-separation for others. Broadly speaking, in Board (2009) agents care about
local quality - the quality of their social group - while in Rayo (2013) they care about
global status - the status in the population. In the model developed here, agents have
preferences over local quality and local status.
In a broader sense, the model here is also related to a large body of literature on
monopoly screening and product variety. For example, Brito and Oakland (1980) ex-
amine the optimal monopoly provision of excludable public goods, finding that a mo-
nopolist underprovides goods. The setting here differs as agents not just care about
their ‘product category’ but also about the other agents in the same category. Mussa
and Rosen (1978) examines the problem of a monopolist differentiating products to
discriminate between different consumers. In their model, a monopolist generally un-
derprovides quality, overly differentiates products, and inefficiently excludes agents.
While all of these aspects can be present here, it is demonstrated that status concern
can lead to too little sorting and exclusion compared to the social planner solution.
2.3 Setting
The set-up here closely follows the model introduced in Chapter 1. A group provider
offers a menu of prices and groups. The agents, after observing this menu, choose
which group to join. This is modelled as a direct communication mechanism where
agents report their type to the mechanism (the message space being restricted to W)
and then get assigned a group and payment. The solution concept is a correlated equi-
librium (in the sense of Myerson (1982) and Aumann (1987)). As a key assumption, the
1Windsteiger (2017) presents a sorting model where agents care about the average type in their group
and a monopolist can offer two segregated groups, or a representative group. It is shown that the
monopolist’s incentives do not generally align with the socially optimal outcome.
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mechanism designer has no direct control over the status of an individual. If an agent
was to submit a different type, it is assumed that agents within the same group still
recognize the agent’s true type and he thus obtains the same status. In contrast to
Rayo (2013), it is not the mechanism that awards status. An agent’s type is known by
the other members without any involvement of the designer. This captures settings
where agents have good information about their peers or can easily signal their type.2
Definition 8 (Group provision). A group provision is aBW -measurable function
m : W → A×R+
This group provision generates social groups in the sense of Definition 1 (Chapter
1). For every g ∈ G , the associated social group L g is such that for every B ⊂ W ,
L g (B) =L (m−1(g ×R+)∩B). The resulting vector of social groups is again denoted
L A.3
Analogous to the notation in Chapter 1, the group assignment of an agent of type w
consistent with m is denoted y(w) and the price as p(w) so that the group provision
can be decomposed into m(w) = (y(w), p(w)). Agents’ preferences follow the same
assumptions as in Chapter 1 and are characterized as follows:
U (w,m(w ′),L A)= u(w,φy(w ′),ry(w ′)(w))−p(w ′) (2.1)
where w ′ ∈W is the type reported by the agent. Note that even if w ′ is reported, the
agent still obtains rank ry(w ′)(w) where y(w
′) is the group assignment following report
w ′.
The planner problem can be written as a problem of setting prices and assigning agents
to groups such that the group provision is incentive compatible and individually ra-
tional (i.e. satisfies the participation constraint). Incentive compatibility requires that
reporting the true type is optimal for all agents:
U (w,m(w),L A)≥U (w,m(w ′),L A) ∀w, w ′ ∈W (2.2)
We can then state the planner problem as:
2Ashraf, Bandiera and S. Lee (2014) provides evidence in an educational setting where this is indeed the
case. Participants in a training scheme seem to be aware of their position in the distribution of relative
abilities.
3While the stand-alone choice ; is included in the group provision, individual rationality requires the
price to be 0
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max
m(w)
∫
W
[
U (w,m(w),L A)+p(w)
]
dF (w)
s.t . U (w,m(w),L A)≥U (w,m(w ′),L A) ∀w, w ′ ∈W
U (w,m(w),L A)≥ u ∀w ∈W
(2.3)
where F is the population distribution over W as defined byL , andL A is the vector
of social groups generated by m(w). Incentive compatibility then requires that p(w)
is constant over the support of each group: 4
Lemma 3. Every incentive compatible group provision m(w) = (y(w), p(w)) is such
that p(w)= p(w ′) for all w, w ′ ∈W with y(w)= y(w ′).
Proof. All omitted proofs are in the Appendix (2.8).
Following this result, we can write the planner problem as the optimal choice of as-
signment y(w) and membership prices p:
max
y(w),p
∫
W
[
U (w,m(w),L A)+py(w)
]
dF (w)
s.t . U (w,m(w),L A)≥U (w,m(w ′),L A) ∀w ′ ∈W
U (w,m(w),L A)≥ u ∀w ∈W
(2.4)
Since incentive compatibility requires the planner to offer a uniform price for each
group, we can as in Chapter 1 denote the vector of all group prices as p. As a conven-
tion, this does not include the ‘price’ for the stand-alone social groupL ; which is by
default 0. As before, ‘active’ groups refers to social groups chosen by a positive mea-
sure of agents. Despite the change in focus, the results from the previous chapter still
hold, as Proposition 6 shows:
Proposition 6. A group provision m(w)= (y(w), p(w)) is incentive compatible and in-
dividually rational if and only if p(w) is constant for each active social group and y(w)
is a stable equilibrium in the agents’ (sub-)game given p.
We can conclude that the optimal group provision is equivalent to the planner-optimal,
stable equilibrium in the agents’ game. This allows us to proceed with the notation
from Chapter 1 (as well as the relevant results) despite the shifted focus and modified
setting.
4As y(w) is a function, the supports of the social groups generated by the corresponding m(w) intersect
on a measure 0 set. We can thus again describe the social groups in terms of the partitionI of W they
generate.
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2.4 Status and Welfare
This section closely examines the problem of a social planner maximizing aggregate
welfare. We can think of the planner as a local government authority planning the
provision of public goods that involve some form of social interaction. In the context
of education, the local authority in a school district might determine which schools
to offer and how to set entry barriers. Or a housing board might want to plan new
housing developments to maximize aggregate welfare. The question here is whether
to set prices such as to segregate residents according to some dimension, e.g. income,
or create a more inclusive housing project. Any transfer paid by an agent enters the
objective function and is part of aggregate welfare (as opposed to money burning).5
Since the transfers cancel out, the planner maximizes welfare as if there were none.
Prices simply serve the purpose of maintaining incentive compatibility:
Incentive Compatibility and Prices
Before developing results on segregation and exclusion, let us first examine the con-
straint incentive compatibility poses on the groups that a planner can provide.
For each active social groupL g and w ∈ g , define:
∆r (w, g )≡ u(w,φg ,rg (w))−u(w,φg ,0)
and
∆r (w, g )≡ u(w,φg ,rg (w))−u(w,φg ,1)
This is the difference between the actual utility obtained by a w-agent and the utility
he would receive if he had rank 0 and 1 respectively. Take any two adjacent groups g
and h with φh > φg . Incentive compatibility holds if and only if prices are such that
for all w ∈ g :
u(w,φh ,0)−u(w,φg ,0)−∆r (w, g )≤ ph −pg (2.5)
and for all w ∈ h:
u(w,φh ,1)−u(w,φg ,1)+∆r (w,h)≥ ph −pg (2.6)
At the boundary between any two active social groupsL h andL g , we have a cut-off
type wˆ = w h = w g with rh(wˆ) = 0 and rg (wˆ) = 1. Since agents of this type need to be
5Recall that U (w,m(w),L A)≡ u(w,φy(w),ry(w)(w))−p(w).
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indifferent between both groups, incentive compatibility completely pins down the
price difference:
ph −pg ≥ u(wˆ,φh ,0)−u(wˆ,φg ,0)−∆r (wˆ, g )
ph −pg ≤ u(wˆ,φh ,1)−u(wˆ,φg ,1)+∆r (wˆ,h)
which imply
ph −pg = u(wˆ,φh ,0)−u(wˆ,φg ,1) (2.7)
Without status concern, ∆r (w,h) = ∆r (w, g ) = 0 for all w . Given the complementar-
ity between type and quality, incentive compatibility is thus satisfied for all agents if
(2.7) holds for any two adjacent groups. Under status concern, this is not necessarily
the case. The single-crossing assumption guarantees that if (2.6) is satisfied for some
type w , it also holds (strictly) for all w ′ >w . However, ‘upward’ incentive compatibil-
ity in (2.5) might not hold. Problems with incentive compatibility can arise because
∆r (w, g ) is increasing in w . An agent with low rank in group g loses less from switch-
ing to a higher quality group because of the lower rank in g .6 The smaller the quality
differenceφh−φg , the more of a problem this is. Furthermore, if the quality difference
is ‘too small’, then no prices might exist such that (2.7) holds.
Suppose a local school authority tries to separate students along different ability lev-
els. If the quality of education is nevertheless similar across these schools, then such
a separation cannot be achieved through tuition fees. This can arise for two rea-
sons: students that have a low rank in the lower quality school might strictly prefer
the higher quality school given the price difference pinned down by the cut-off type.
Or low ranked students in the higher quality school strictly prefer to switch down and
achieve a high rank. There is no set of prices that achieves the desired cut-off.
This discussion leads to two observations: First, a social planner can only provide so-
cial groups such that given the dispersion in types, the quality differences between
groups are sufficiently large. And second, since only price differences matter, any in-
centive compatible full-participation group structure can be offered with the lowest
price 0. For an equilibrium provision, we can thus focus on incentive compatibility
alone as the participation constraint poses no issue.
6Stark and Taylor (1991) present evidence that a low relative income rank increases the probability of
(temporary) migration to a higher income country relative to internal migration. This is consistent
with the notion that people with a lower rank have less status to lose when switching to a new refer-
ence group. They can have a stronger incentive to join to a group with higher spillovers despite the
complementarities in type and quality.
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2.4.1 Status and Segregation
Without status concern, the degree of segregation - or sorting - a social planner would
want to induce is determined by the ‘convexity’ of the group quality. If splitting a group
leads to a sufficient increase in average quality, such a split is welfare improving. This
can lead to arbitrarily fine sorting. For example, if the quality of a group only depends
on the lowest type, then any split increases aggregate welfare. As was shown in Propo-
sition 4, under status concern the number of groups in any equilibrium is necessarily
finite. Status concern imposes a limit to the degree of segregation that can be sus-
tained in equilibrium. As will be shown in this section, status concern also lowers a
planner’s incentive to segregate in the first place - at least as long as status concern
does not change the valuation of quality on aggregate.
General welfare comparisons in this context are difficult to make without imposing
strong assumptions on how preferences with and without status concern relate to each
other. To minimize these, I restrict attention to Welfare rankings of group structures
that can be unambiguously compared in terms of coarseness - i.e. segregation - as well
as participation - i.e. social exclusion.
The following assumption rules out that the effect of changes in quality on aggre-
gate depends on status concern. If we look at an entire group, then under Assump-
tion 4, on average agents value quality the same whether or not they have preferences
over status. For example, if we add up all the individual valuations within a school,
then a change in school quality should have the same aggregate welfare consequences
whether or not students care about their relative standing within the school. A suffi-
cient (but not necessary) condition for this to be fulfilled is that preferences are sepa-
rable in quality and status - thus closely resembling the utility-representation derived
in Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2012). This assumption for a cleaner result
but an equivalent statement could be made as long as this interaction is sufficiently
small.
Assumption 4 (Status-quality neutrality). Preferences are such that for every measure
L g ≤L with support over [w1, w2]⊆W and associated φ and r :
∂
∂φ
∫ w2
w1
u(w,φ,r (w))dF (w)= ∂
∂φ
∫ w2
w1
u(w,φ,r0)dF (w)
where r0 ∈ [0,1] is the constant rank for U q (w,m(w),L A)≡ u(w,φy(w),r0)−p(w).
It is now shown that given any incentive compatible group provision, offering a finer
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group structure has a less positive (more negative) effect on welfare if agents have pref-
erences over rank than with preferences over quality only.
Suppose there exist group provisions m(w) and mq (w) for preferences with (U ) and
without (U q ) status concern such that the partitionI represents the associated equi-
librium group structure. Suppose further that I ′ is a strictly finer partition than I
and there are also incentive compatible provisions m′(w) and mq ′(w) that induce I ′
under the respective preferences.
Proposition 7. Under Assumption 4, offering m′(w) compared to m(w) achieves higher
aggregate welfare under status concern only if offering mq ′(w) compared to mq (w)
achieves higher aggregate welfare without status concern.
Intuitively, if we could freely allocate ranks to agents, the complementarity between
type and rank would lead us to assign high ranks to high-type agents. If any social
group is split, then almost all agents in the higher group are assigned a lower rank than
before and almost all agents in the lower group a higher rank. Since the total measure
does not change, this leads to a drop in welfare due to the complementarity between
type and rank. Since the effect of a change in φ is the same with and without status
concern, given this re-assignment of ranks, we can conclude that the overall effect on
welfare is less positive under status concern. Segregation (potentially) helps to match
quality and type efficiently but there is a necessary loss from the mismatch between
type and rank.
This tension between the ‘allocation’ of status and quality can be further illustrated by
again parametrizing status concern. As status becomes relatively more important, the
benefit from segregation falls. To capture this comparative static, we write preferences
again as uα(w,φ,r )≡ u(w,φ,r )+αv(w,r ) for some 0≤α<∞. Ordering preferences by
this parameter α, we can conclude that as α increases, segregation not only becomes
harder to maintain but is also less beneficial.
Let mα(w) and mα′(w) refer to incentive compatible group provisions that, under sta-
tus concern with parameter α, lead to the group partitions I and I ′, with I ′ finer
thanI :
Corollary 7.1. With preferences uα(w,φ,r ), the group provision mα′(w) achieves higher
aggregate welfare than mα(w) only if m′αˆ(w) achieves higher aggregate welfare than
mαˆ(w) under uαˆ(w,φ,r ) for all αˆ ∈ [0,α].
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In the extreme case where agents only have preferences over status, segregation into
several social groups cannot be maintained and is not optimal. If so, the second-best
outcome is unique (up to the level of transfers) and is equal to the first-best.
Corollary 7.2. With preferences over status only (U r ), the full participation groupL g =
L is the unique welfare-maximizing group structure. There exists an equilibrium group
provision m(w) that induces this group structure.
Example: Segregation and welfare loss
While status concern makes segregation less beneficial, it can nevertheless cause a
large welfare loss if the reduced possibility to segregate agents interacts sufficiently
negatively with the group quality. This example demonstrates such a setting.
Consider a quality function φ that in sensitive to ‘congestion’. If a group exceeds a
certain size, the benefit to the members decreases:
φg =w g + 1L g (W )≤²(K1−K0)+K0
where K1 > K0 > 0, ² ∈ (0,1), and 1 the indicator function. For a group with measure
less or equal ², the quality equals the highest type plus a constant K1. If the size of the
group surpasses the threshold ², then the quality of the group drops by K1−K0. For
simplicity, let types be distributed uniformly over [w , w] and the utility be separable
in rank and quality:
u(w,φ,r )=wφ+αw(r − 1
2
)
As the quality of a given group is determined (beyond the measure) by the highest type,
if there was no congestion (²= 1), the welfare maximizing partition would be the rep-
resentative group. Any further segregation lowers the quality of some groups, without
increasing the quality of any other group. Due to the congestion, the representative
group is no longer optimal if K1−K0 is large enough. In this case, some segregation is
optimal. In particular - ignoring incentive compatibility - if the increase in quality by
avoiding the negative effect of congestion is large enough, then in the optimal provi-
sion groups are segregated as much as necessary and are all reduced to measure less
or equal ². Without status concern, there exist prices such that this can be achieved
in an incentive compatible way. As the following two cases show, a relatively small in-
crease in status concern can, however, lead to a large welfare loss if it means that the
first-best group structure can no longer be implemented:
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Case 1: α= 0, K1−K0 >w −w
Agents don’t exhibit status concern. The welfare-maximizing group structure is the
interval partition I ² with F (wi )−F (wi−1)= ² for all wi ∈ I ² with i > 2. All groups have
exactly measure ² (except for the lowest quality group which has measure ≤ ²). Be-
cause of the complementarity between w and φ, and as φi is strictly increasing in wi ,
prices exist such that I ² is an equilibrium group structure.
Let ²′ ≡ ²w−w . Total surplus is bounded below by:
∫ w
w−²′
w(K1+w)d w +
∫ w−²′
w
w(K1+w)d w (2.8)
Case 2: α= ²′, K1−K0 >w −w
In this case, agent’s exhibit status-concern. With α = ²′, there exist no prices that im-
plement the group structure I ² in an incentive compatible way as for any wi ∈ I ² at the
boundary between gi and gi+1:
u(wi ,φi+1,0)−u(wi ,φi ,1)=wi (wi +²′−wi )+²′wi (0−1)= 0
which cannot be incentive compatible (see Corollary 2.1). Active groups (except for
the highest-quality one), must have measure greater than ². Maximum social surplus
is then bounded above by
∫ w
w−²′
w(K1+w)d w +
∫ w−²′
w
w(K0+w)d w + 1
8
²′(w −w) (2.9)
Comparing Cases 1 and 2, the difference in welfare is at least:
1
8
²′−
∫ w−²′
w
w(K1−K0)+
∫ w−²′
w
w(w −w) (2.10)
As (K1−K0)→∞, the welfare loss from the ²′ change in status-concern becomes arbi-
trarily large. Without status concern, the complementarity between quality and type
allows for enough flexibility in providing groups that congestion can be avoided. With
status concern, this might no longer be possible causing a welfare loss - even if the
value of status is small relative to the value of being in group without congestion.
2.4.2 Status and Social Exclusion
Another question pertains to the ‘degree’ of participation. Is it ever optimal for a social
planner to exclude some agents from joining any group? I refer to this more extreme
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version of segregation as social exclusion.
If agents don’t join a group, they are reduced to their stand-alone payoff. This de-
scribes a situation where agents don’t benefit from any social spillovers; their pay-
off does not depend on their peers. Since a social planner has to respect incentive
compatibility and the utility from group membership net of payments by assumption
exceeds the stand-alone payoff, this can only be done through prices. For instance,
tuition fees might be high enough to deter some people from acquiring any higher ed-
ucation. They then don’t obtain any of the absolute or relative benefits generated by
higher education institutions. Because of the restriction to prices, a planner can only
exclude agents at the bottom end of the type space - the excluded agents are in an in-
terval [w , w 1). If some students are deterred from enrolling at university by the tuition
fees, then all students with lower ability are also deterred by these prices.
In this section it is shown that while a social planner would not choose to exclude
agents if they had preferences over quality7 or status alone, if both concerns matter,
some social exclusion might be a second-best outcome. Social exclusion by a social
planner is thus an issue that arises from the interaction of both types of peer effects.
First, a notion of monotonicity of the quality φ is introduced that captures the idea
that higher types lead to at least weakly higher quality groups - and in this sense φ in-
deed captures the ‘quality’ of the group. Under weak monotonicity of φ, if we observe
two social groups such that all types in the support of one group are higher than those
in the support of the other, we can conclude that the group with higher types also has
(weakly) higher quality.8 This is, for instance, the case if the quality φ is the average
type, the lowest or highest type, or a strictly increasing function thereof. The results
are robust to variations of this definition that capture similar ideas of monotonicity.
Definition 9 (Weakly monotone φ). The group quality φ is weakly monotone if for any
two social groups with support over [w l , w l ] and [w h , w h] with w l ≤ w h , the group
qualities are such that φl ≤φh .
If φ is weakly monotone, then without status concern, excluding agents is always
Pareto-dominated:
Lemma 4. Without status concern (U q ) under weakly monotone quality, for any in-
centive compatible group provision mq (w) inducing a partition I = {w1, ..., w} where
7At least under some assumption on φ, that make it non-decreasing in agents’ types - see Assumption
9.
8Given aL , φ induces an order of measurable subsets in the agent space (Ω,B). If weak monotonicity
holds, then this ordering is aligned with the ordering of those sets induced by inf and sup in W if inf
and sup induce the same order for these sets.
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w1 > w, there exists an incentive compatible provision mq ′(w) such that the equilib-
rium under mq ′(w) Pareto-dominates that under m(w).
Without status concern, there is no benefit in pricing agents out of the market. The so-
cial planner can always increase aggregate welfare by offering these agents a separate
group or merging them into the existing one. Under monotonicity of φ, every parti-
tion of W into convex sets can be sustained as an equilibrium.9 So if one partition
Pareto-dominates another, there exists a price vector such that the corresponding so-
cial groups can be sustained as an equilibrium in the agents’ game. Note that not only
has the planner an incentive to offer prices such that all agents participate, this also
increases the payoffs of all agents directly as prices are lower under full participation.
When agents have preferences over status only (U r ), the situation is almost opposite:
in equilibrium there can at most be one group. Nevertheless, social exclusion is also
not optimal because of the inefficient allocation of rank as well as the welfare loss from
reducing some agents to their stand-alone payoff.
Result 7.3. Social exclusion is not optimal when agents have preferences over status
only.
Proof. This follows directly from Corollary 7.2 where it is shown that under status-only
preferences, full-participation is the unique welfare-maximizing equilibrium.
Even when agents have preferences over both quality and status, the first-best out-
come where the planner does not have to respect agents’ incentive constraints, would
also not produce any exclusion. However, since for the constrained problem the plan-
ner is restricted to agents truthfully reporting their type and thus self-selecting into
groups, exclusion can be a second-best outcome.
Proposition 8. For any incentive compatible group provision m(w) with partitionI =
{w1, ..., w} where w1 > w, the full-participation group partition I ′ =I ∪{w} achieves
strictly higher aggregate welfare. Under status concern, no provision m′(w) might exist
that sustainsI ′ as an equilibrium.
We can develop the argument further and show that given some W and some pref-
erences that include status concern, we can always find a probability measure over
9To see this, note that for any two adjacent groups g and h with support over [w g , w
∗] and [w∗, wh],
weak monotonicity guarantees that φh ≥φg . Because of supermodularity in w and φ, the willingness
to pay for quality is strictly increasing in w . Since prices are determined by the utility difference of the
cut-off type, we know that without status concern, the increase in utility from the difference φh−φg is
higher for w∗ than for all w <w∗. There exist prices pg and ph such that all w ≥w∗ prefer membership
in h while all w <w∗ prefer membership in g .
50
W and a quality function φ, such that at least some social exclusion is a second-best
outcome.
Proposition 9. For every U and W , there exists a weakly monotone quality function φ
and measureL such that the exclusion of some agents is a second-best outcome.
Looking at this from a different angle, let’s consider a population where everybody is
a member of a social group in the welfare maximizing, stable equilibrium. What if
this population is joined by new agents? To keep it simple, suppose we extend the
support at the low end of types. Would a social planner offer prices that make these
new agents participate? Without status concern and under weak monotonicity of φ,
the answer is yes. A social planner can always increase aggregate welfare relative to the
initial equilibrium by offering prices such that the new agents form a separate group.
The new welfare maximizing equilibrium also has full participation. This is not the
case with status concern. The social planner might not want the agents to join any
of the existing groups and, as the following result demonstrates, there always exists
a measure over this extended set such that they cannot be offered a separate group.
Even though there might be a larger measure of agents in the population, aggregate
surplus beyond the stand-alone payoff does not necessarily increase.
Corollary 9.1. For every equilibrium group partitionI of W , there exists a measureL ′
over W ′ ≡ [w ′, w]∪W such thatI ′ =I ∪{w ′0, ...} is not an equilibrium group structure
for any w ′i ∈ [w ′, w] and any prices.
If the support is extended at the top end, a similar situation can arise. Social exclusion
occurs because of the effect some agents have on quality. This becomes a stronger
force when there are agents that value quality sufficiently highly. So if there is full par-
ticipation in the welfare maximizing equilibrium for some W and if this W is extended
by some interval (w , w ′], depending on the preferences andφ, this might lead to a pos-
itive degree of social exclusion. While here at least for monotone φ aggregate surplus
necessarily increases - noting that full participation could be maintained - agents with
low type can be left reduced to their outside option.
2.5 Privatization
What if the incentives of the group provider are less aligned with the agents’ prefer-
ences? For instance, an authority might be maximizing revenue instead of welfare.
Tuition fees might be set very differently if the objective is to maximize receipts rather
than benefits from education. Alternatively, we can think of an authority handing over
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this task to one or several private companies. What are the consequences of such a
privatization? Moving away from aggregate welfare as an objective, the next section
focuses on firms supplying groups to maximize profits. As before, a provider posts a
set of prices and then agents decide which group to join. As will be shown, if pref-
erences are separable in rank and quality, status concern unambiguously lowers the
increase (or magnifies the decrease) in revenue from splitting any given group - segre-
gation is less beneficial. But we reach some negative result for the comparison with the
social planner: no clear conclusion can be drawn whether a monopoly leads to more
or less segregation or social exclusion. As an example shows, a monopolist might ex-
clude too few agents relative to the constrained welfare maximum. I provide sufficient
conditions when this is the case.
Competition, in comparison, leads to lower prices and less social exclusion in some
cases but a general statement is not possible without making stronger assumptions
on the interactions among firms and consumers. Nevertheless, similar to the previous
results, the presence of status concern tends to exacerbate social exclusion.
2.5.1 Monopoly
A natural starting point for this line of inquiry is to examine the monopolist’s problem.
Just like in the social planner’s case, the monopolist offers an incentive compatible,
individually rational group provision m(w) = (y(w), p(w)).10 Since the provision of
groups is assumed to be free, a monopolist offers a group provision that maximizes
revenue.
We can state the monopolist’s problem as:
max
y(w),p
∑
G
pgL g (W )
s.t . U (w,m(w),L A)≥U (w,m(w ′),L A) ∀w, w ′ ∈W
U (w,m(w),L A)≥ u ∀w ∈W
(2.11)
where y(w) is a function that assigns an agent of type w an action g ∈ A, and L A is
the vector of social groups generated by this assignment.
10As before, incentive compatibility requires that p(w) is constant over the support of each active social
group and we can thus focus on prices for each group rather than each agent.
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We first look at the problem for preferences that are separable in φ and r in the form:
U (w,m(w),L A)≡ u
(
w,φy(w)
)+ v (w,ry(w)(w))−p(w)
Differences in group quality do not affect the importance of rank. As discussed before,
this fulfils Assumption 4. With this restriction, we can establish that under status con-
cern, segregating any group increases revenue by less than it would under U q .
Suppose there exist a group provisions m(w),mq (w) for preferences with and without
status concern such that the partitionI represents the associated equilibrium group
structure. Suppose further thatI ′ is a strictly finer partition thanI , and there are in-
centive compatible provisions m′(w),mq ′(w) that induceI ′. Furthermore, prices for
each group structure are such that profits are maximized given the group structure.
Proposition 10. If utility is separable in φ and r , then offering m′(w) achieves higher
profits than m(w) under status concern only if offering mq ′(w) achieves higher profits
than offering mq (w) without status concern.
If group quality does not interact with status directly,11 the incentive to segregate is
weaker for preferences with status-concern; just as in the social planner case. As status
concern ‘increases’ in importance, this effect gets stronger. To demonstrate this, we
can parametrize status concern as before:
Uα(w,m(w),L A)≡ u
(
w,φy(w),ry(w)(w)
)+αv (w,ry(w)(w))−p(w)
And again, let mα(w) and mα′(w) refer to the incentive compatible, revenue maximiz-
ing group provision that, under status concern with parameterα, lead to the partitions
I andI ′, whereI ′ is finer thanI :
Corollary 10.1. The group provision mα′(w) achieves higher profits than mα(w) under
Uα only if mαˆ′(w) achieves higher profits than mαˆ(w) under Uαˆ for all αˆ ∈ [0,α].
Note that for this result, we only assumed separability of the component that magni-
fies status concern. Even when no clear-cut ordering between preferences with and
without status concern is possible, we can still order the effects within this class of
preferences. Naturally, this includes the case where utility is separable in φ and r .
Stronger status concern weakens the incentive to segregate for a private provider. Sup-
pose, for example, a private company is tasked with developing a housing project. If
11I.e.
∂2
∂φ∂r
u(w,φ,r )= 0
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people have strong preferences over their relative standing in their housing commu-
nity, then the revenue from offering segregated communities is lower than if they only
cared about the quality of their community. The stronger the concern for rank relative
to quality, the more beneficial it is to offer an inclusive community.
Without separability, the result in Proposition 10 holds for sufficiently weak interac-
tion between φ and r . In the general case, the outcome is more ambiguous and de-
pends on the magnitude of the interaction as well as the relative changes in group
quality. Intuitively, this is because splitting a group might lead to lower quality for one
and higher quality for the other group. Status concern generally lowers price differ-
ences and thus the benefit from splitting a group. But since r and φ are complements,
the reduction in price at the low end of the group might be less under status concern.
In other words, the lower quality impacts the agent with rank 0 in the lower quality
group less because of his low rank. And since the utility of this agent determines the
price of the low-quality group, the drop in revenue caused by the reduction in quality
is less. In some cases, this could compensate for the negative revenue effect rank has
for the high-quality group. Nevertheless, we can still identify some cases where a clear
comparison is possible.
The table below summarizes the different cases that can occur when ‘splitting’ a group
with support over some interval into a high- and a low-type group. In particular,
suppose a monopolist offers a modified provision such that a group with support
over [w g , w g ] and quality φg is instead separated into two groups with support over
[w l , w l ] and [w h , w h] where w l = w g , w h = w g , and w l = w h with qualities φl and
φh . The effect of this group provision on overall revenue depends on the difference
between the new qualities φl , φh and the initial group quality φg . As is summarized
below, whether or not we can in this case establish an ordering of the effect on revenue
between preferences with and without status concern depends on the sign of the qual-
ity differences. Of course, for any such new structure to be an equilibrium, the new
provision needs to be incentive compatible which necessarily requires φl <φh .
φl φh increase in revenue: status vs. no-status
(1) <φg <φg ambiguous
(2) <φg >φg ambiguous
(3) >φg >φg lower under status concern
(4) >φg <φg not incentive compatible
Table 2.1: Comparison of revenue effects - proof see appendix
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A clear-cut comparison is only possible if the split leads to an increase in quality for
both groups - case (3). Offering the corresponding group provision increases revenue
under status concern only if it increases revenue without status concern. Interestingly,
even though this split has the most positive welfare effect in terms of quality, status
concern unambiguously reduces the return from offering this provision. A monopo-
listic provider could cause a large welfare loss. But it also highlights that a monopolist
might induce less segregation than a social planner.
In cases (1) and (2), a comparison is less straight-forward due to the nature of the com-
plementarities. Observe that a drop in utility for a type w g and an increase in utility
for a type w g both (weakly) reduce revenue.12 Compared to preferences without sta-
tus concern, the revenue effect of a drop in quality is less negative at r = 0. Or in other
words, the price difference pg −p ′l that makes this provision incentive compatible at
w l is smaller. A low ranked agent is less sensitive to a drop in quality. At the same
time, an increase in quality at r = 1 has a more negative negative effect on revenue.
High ranked agents are more sensitive to changes in quality. In all cases, the price dif-
ference p ′h −pg is less under status concern. This leads to the ambiguity in the overall
effect which depends on the relative magnitudes of all these factors.
Social Exclusion - Monopolist
Concerning social exclusion, the effect of status concern - comparing preferences U
and U q - is twofold. On the one hand, excluding an entire group that could be offered
in equilibrium is more beneficial under status concern. However, the increase in rev-
enue from lowering the price at the lowest cut-off - and thus offering a group to more
agents - is generally greater when agents’ have status concern. Overall, this means the
presence of status concern can lead to more or less social exclusion.
The first effect - the greater benefit of excluding an entire group - is captured by the
following result: Suppose for preferences with and without status concern there exist
incentive compatible group provisions m(w),mq (w) and m′(w),mq ′(w) inducing the
partitionsI = {w1, ..., w} andI ′ ≡w∪I respectively - i.e. there is less social exclusion
underI ′. Suppose further the provisions maximize profits given the group structures.
Result 10.2. Offering m′(w) instead of m(w) leads to higher revenue under status con-
cern, only if offering mq ′(w) instead of mq (w) leads to higher revenue without status
concern (U q ).
12The former has a strict negative effect while the latter only takes effect for wh <w
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To see this, notice that the intra-group utility difference
U (w g ,m(w g ),L A)−U (w g ,m(w g ),L A)
is larger under status concern due to the difference in rank. This means by excluding
the lowest group, all prices can be raised by that intra-group difference. The logic is
the same as in the classic monopoly screening problem of Mussa and Rosen (1978);
serving low types has a negative effect on the revenue from higher value types. When
agents have status concern, this effect is stronger. The monopolist can raise prices by
more if a group is excluded - i.e. if p(w) and q(w) are the price schedules with and
without status concern then for all non-excluded w , we have q(w)− q ′(w) < p(w)−
p ′(w).
However, there are cases when a separate group couldn’t even be offered in an incen-
tive compatible way. Exclusion is then a question about the effect of marginal changes
in the lowest cut-off on revenue. Looking at any given group structure: raising the
lowest price to exclude more agents has a less positive effect on revenue when agents
care about status since the low rank of a cut-off agent reduces the effect from poten-
tial changes in quality (and the effect of the increase in w itself). This is due to the
complementarity in rank, type and quality. If a monopoly provider raises the tuition
fees of all universities, some students choose not to attend. Given the same change in
price, more students are excluded under status-concern since the students’ valuation
at the cut-off is ‘depressed’ by the low rank. Status concern can thus, in principle, lead
to more or less exclusion if a monopolist serves the market.
The direct comparison between a monopolist and a social planner on the basis of so-
cial exclusion in equally ambiguous. But this means a monopolist might set a lower
price for the lowest quality group and thus exclude fewer agents than a social plan-
ner. This is beneficial to agents with low type. As discussed earlier, the social planner
might exclude a set of agents if they have a sufficiently negative influence on the qual-
ity of the adjacent group but they cannot be offered a separate, incentive compatible
group. The monopolist’s incentives, in contrast, are independent of whether or not
the agents could be offered a separate group and only depend on the influence on the
utility of the cut-off type - as this determines prices. This means the monopolist might
exclude fewer agents than the social planner. A numerical example for exactly this
case is presented later. The following result summarizes this argument. Note that here
separability of status and quality is no longer required.
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SupposeI = {w1, ..., w} is an equilibrium group structure with w1 >w for some m(w)
andI ′ = {w ′1, ...w} is an equilibrium group structure with w ′1 <w1 for some m′(w) and
w ′i = wi for all i > 1 - the group structure only differs in the cut-off type of the lowest
group; underI ′ fewer agents are excluded.
Result 10.3. If u(w ,φh ,0)−u(w ,φl ,0) is sufficiently close to 0 for all φh ≥φl , and if for
any [w g , w g ]⊂W , the quality φg is weakly increasing in w g , then aggregate welfare is
higher under m′(w) than m(w) only if profits are higher under m′(w) than m(w).
If excluding agents has a very small effect on the utility of the cut-off type, then doing
so has little benefit to the monopolist. An increase in price will lead to a decrease in
revenue. To the social planner, however, excluding agents might still be beneficial as
long as it raises the utility of (some) other members of the group. In that case, a mo-
nopolist prefers excluding fewer people than a social planner. Intuitively, if the student
with the lowest relative ability in a university benefits very little from interaction with
the other students - maybe because he socializes less - then a monopoly provider can-
not benefit from making the university more exclusive. In comparison, an authority
maximizing welfare might still prefer to do so if it sufficiently benefits students that
have a higher relative standing.
As the previous discussion highlights, comparing the optimal provisions of a social
planner and a monopolist does not generally allow for straight-forward results if agents
care about their status. Regarding the degree of segregation, a monopolist might achieve
higher profits with a strictly finer group structure even if this lowers quality in all of the
more segregated groups. On the other hand, a monopolist might prefer a coarser pro-
vision even though there exists a provision that achieves a finer group structure with
higher quality in all of the more segregated groups. Similarly, a monopolist might in-
duce less or no social exclusion while a social planner might choose to exclude agents.
The ambiguous interaction between type, quality and rank denies any more clear-cut
comparison without stronger assumptions on preferences.
2.5.2 Competition
Instead of a monopolist, the market for social groups might be served by several com-
peting firms - municipalities competing for inhabitants or universities competing for
students with the goal to maximize revenue. This section provides a brief discussion
of some of the implications of such a competitive environment. It is shown that at
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least for full-participation outcomes, competition leads to lower prices and poten-
tially even subsidized memberships. Furthermore - unlike in a monopoly setting - no
set of agents is excluded if they could be offered a separate group. Competition thus
reduces social exclusion in some cases. Nevertheless, status concern allows for equi-
libria with social exclusion even though without status concern, offering the excluded
agents a separate group would be a Pareto-improvement. Competition does, however,
not generally lead to more or less segregation or social exclusion. Ultimately, stronger
assumptions on the agents’ coordination would be necessary to derive sharper pre-
dictions.
Suppose instead of a single firm, there is a large (countable) number of potential providers.
As in the monopoly case, every firm can offer a menu of prices and assignments. We
combine all these offers into the set of group provisions:
{mn(w)}n∈N
where mn(w) is the offered group provision of firm n. Since each firm offers their
own, ‘unique’ groups, agents joining group yi (w) according to some provision mi (w)
are members of a different group than agents joining group y j (w) according to some
m j (w) with i 6= j . The timing is unchanged: the firms simultaneously offer group pro-
visions and maximize revenue given the other firms’ and the agents’ strategies. Then
the agents simultaneously choose a supplier and report their type. This is still referred
to as the agents’ game. Different agents can, of course, go to different suppliers so
that, for example, some set W1 ⊂W is supplied by firm i while a different set W2 ⊂W
is supplied by firm j . Agents of the same type, however, are restricted to choose the
same supplier. This ensures that all equilibria in this game are stable in the sense of
Chapter 1.
To keep this closely aligned to the monopoly setting, this is modelled as a mecha-
nism µ that, given the firms’ offers and the agents’ report of their type, recommends a
provision mn . This µ is called the market provision:
Definition 10. The market provision µ is a BW -measurable function that assigns ev-
ery type w ∈ W a group and price consistent with some group provision mn(w)(w) ∈
{mn(w)} j∈N :13
µ(w)=mn(w)(w)
13This reduces to the monopoly case for N = 1 and µ being the identity function µ(w)=m(w).
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Given the continuum of players, the coordination aspect needs to be carefully consid-
ered as single-player deviations on the agents’ side have no bearing on the aggregate
outcome. For example, if all agents decided to join a particular group, there cannot be
a beneficial deviation to another group for any single agent. Without any restriction,
any incentive compatible group structure can be an equilibrium outcome because of
the coordination aspect in the agents’ game. In the previous setting, we circumvented
the problem by selecting the seller-optimal equilibria through a mechanism. With a
large number of competing firms, a focus on seller-optimal outcomes seems inap-
propriate. It appears natural to shift some of the advantage towards the agents. We
therefore focus on equilibria that are Pareto-efficient from the agents’ perspective:
Definition 11. A market provision µ given a set of provisions {mn(w)}n∈N is Pareto effi-
cient in the agents’ game if there is no other market provision µ′ given {mn(w)}n∈N such
that all agents are weakly better-off and a positive measure of agents is strictly better-off.
The analysis focuses on all market provisions that are incentive compatible, individu-
ally rational, and Pareto-efficient in the agents’ game and that are a Nash equilibrium
from the firms’ perspective. Formally, these are the subset of subgame-perfect equilib-
ria in which the market provision constitutes a Pareto-efficient correlated equilibrium
in the agents’ game.14 As again incentive compatibility requires that active prices15
are constant over the support of a social group, the equilibrium outcomes can be de-
scribed in terms of the vector of active social groupsL A, the partitionI generated by
the social groups, as well as the price vector p - with the maintained convention that
pi ≥ p j if i > j . In this context, we can distinguish between settings where prices are
restricted to be non-negative p(w) ∈R+ and settings where subsidies for some groups
are feasible p(w) ∈R.16
The focus on Pareto-efficiency in the agents’ game allows us to derive a Bertrand-type
result. In any equilibrium where no agents are excluded, the lowest (active) price has
to be 0. If not, some other firm could offer a price vector that undercuts the other
firm while maintaining the same group structure. This would necessarily be a Pareto
improvement in the agents’ game; the market provision would have to recommend
14It is not necessary that each firm’s provision is incentive compatible as only a subset might choose
this firm in equilibrium. Thus only the market provision needs to be incentive compatible. There is,
however, no loss in focusing only on the prices and groups chosen by a measurable set of agents.
15Recall that ‘active’ prices refers to those prices that are associated with a group that is chosen by a
measurable set of agents.
16In the case of a monopolist supplier or social planner, a restriction to non-negative prices is inconse-
quential as all incentive compatible group structures can be implemented with non-negative prices
and subsidies are never profit maximizing for a monopolist.
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this firm’s provision to all agents and this would allow that firm to capture the entire
market.
Result 10.4. In a competitive setting with p(w) ∈ R+, any full-participation equilib-
rium that is Pareto-efficient in the agents’ game has the lowest active price p1 = 0.
If the restriction to non-negative prices is removed, it becomes possible to subsidize
membership in lower quality groups. This ensures that profits are reduced to 0. Nat-
urally, this is only possible in a full-participation outcome; with p1 ≤ 0, no agents can
be excluded. Furthermore, it implies that all full-participation equilibria are payoff-
equivalent to one where a single supplier serves the entire market.17 The intuition is
as follows: At least the highest quality group has to be offered at a positive price to
ensure non-negative profits. If one supplier offers all groups that are priced positively,
then this supplier can also provide the highest membership subsidies. The equilib-
rium that is Pareto efficient from the agents’ perspective is the one with the lowest
prices - this is the case for a single supplier. In general, the number of firms providing
active groups in a stable equilibrium with full-participation cannot be larger than the
number of active (weakly) positive and (weakly) negative prices. If, for example, there
two active groups, there can be only one supplier. However, this does not imply that
there will generally be full participation. In fact, allowing for non-negative prices has
no influence on equilibria with a positive level of social exclusion.
Result 10.5. In a competitive setting with p(w) ∈R, any full-participation equilibrium
Pareto efficient in the agents’ game with more than one active social group has p1 < 0.
The number of firms providing active groups is bounded by both the number of non-
positive active prices and the number of non-negative active prices. All firms make 0
profits.
Competition also rules out some cases of social exclusion. In particular, if a set of
agents at the low end of W can be offered a separate group, then excluding them can-
not be an equilibrium. A firm could offer a group provision that leads to a Pareto im-
provement for all agents. This differs from the monopoly setting where a monopolist
might have an incentive to not offer this group in order to increase revenue. Never-
theless, as discussed before, if status concern is sufficiently strong, it might not be
possible to offer such a separate group that maintains incentive compatibility for all
other social groups.
17To maintain equilibrium, at least one other firm has to offer the same provision but it is not recom-
mended my the market provision to a measurable set of agents.
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Result 10.6. Suppose there is an incentive compatible market provision µ inducing
group structure I = {w1, ..., w} and µ′ inducing group structure I ′ = {w0, w1, ..., w}.
Under competition,I = {w1, ..., w} is not an equilibrium group structure.
Competition is, in some sense, good news to the agents in at least the full participa-
tion equilibria. It necessarily drives down all group prices relative to the correspond-
ing monopoly prices. On top of that, it also rules out some equilibria where agents
are excluded: under competition, no set of agents is excluded if they could at least be
offered a separate group without changing the remaining group structure. Neverthe-
less, despite the focus on Pareto efficient equilibria, competition does not necessarily
lead to an increase in aggregate welfare or even just a reduction in social exclusion. In
particular, in settings where many equilibria are on the agents’ Pareto frontier, there
can be equilibria with higher prices and lower welfare compared to the monopoly out-
come. The example in the following section details such a case.
The role of status here is more subtle. Without status concern, the number of active
social groups could approach infinity. This can pose a problem for existence. As was
shown in Proposition 4, the number of active social groups under status concern in
any equilibrium is bounded. In this sense, competition does not immediately lead
to a problem with existence. Furthermore, the presence of status concern implies
that changes in social groups have more heterogeneous effects on agents. Shifting
the group boundary or splitting a group into several groups can increase the utility of
some agents and reduce that of others due to the accompanying changes in rank. As a
consequence, many different equilibria can lie on the agents’ Pareto frontier.
In comparison to a monopoly setting, no social exclusion occurs in cases where agents
can be offered a separate group. But if status concern is sufficiently strong, this might
not be incentive compatible. Without status concern, such a group would always be
offered in a competitive market. Status concern exacerbates social exclusion even in a
competitive setting. In fact, there can be competitive equilibria with more agents ex-
cluded than both in the planner and the monopoly environment. The overall effect of
competition on welfare is thus ambiguous. It is dependent on how exactly the agents
(can) coordinate and further research would be desirable to examine the competitive
provision in more detail.
2.6 Numerical Example
The following example illustrates previous claims about the social exclusion induced
by a social planner and a monopolist: it might be a second best to exclude some agents
from participating and, in fact, more agents than in a monopoly setting. Furthermore,
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it is demonstrated that even in a competitive environment, agents might be excluded
- and indeed potentially more so than under the two other market structures.
In the example below, types are distributed over [1,2] according to a (truncated) Pareto
distribution with parameter 1. The example is set-up such that there can be at most
one group in equilibrium. Depending on the relative importance of quality and rank,
we can create scenarios in which both a social planner and a monopolist exclude some
agents, only the planner excludes agents or neither excludes any agents. In one case,
the monopolist offers a price that all agents accept while the social planner offers a
price such that all agents with type lower than w 1 ≈ 1.22 prefer their outside option.
In each of the cases, the quality of the group is determined by the lowest type in the
group. Accordingly, if we compare this to a setting where agents have preferences over
status only (e.g. r = 1/2 for all w), segregating a given partition further always leads to
an increase in welfare and there always exists a price vector that makes this incentive
compatible.
Example 1: Types are distributed according to a truncated Pareto distribution (shape
a = 1) over [1,2]. Preferences are represented by:
U (w, g ,L A)= (α1+β1wγ1 )φg + (α2+β2wγ2 ) ln(rg (w)+ 1
2
)−pg (2.12)
The quality of a social groupL g > 0 is given by:
φg = 1
2
+ 1
2
w g (2.13)
Table 2.2: Optimal levels of social exclusion
(1) γ1 = 15.48 γ2 = 15.50 eq. group structure
social planner w SP1 ≈ 1.22 I SP = {1.22,2}
monopolist w M1 = 1 IM = {1,2}
(2) γ1 = 15.00 γ2 = 15.00
social planner w SP1 = 1 I SP = {1,2}
monopolist w M1 = 1 IM = {1,2}
(3) γ1 = 16.00 γ2 = 15.00
social planner w SP1 ≈ 1.44 I SP = {1.44,2}
monopolist w M1 ≈ 1.88 IM = {1.88,2}
For all cases:α1 = 560, α2 = 15ln(2)−1, β1 = 1 β2 = ln(2)−1
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Example 1 [Table 2.2] gives an indication of the underlying logic for the exclusion of
agents. Social exclusion occurs in cases (1) and (3); in (1) only the social planner ex-
cludes agents and in (3), both the planner and the monopolist exclude agents. In case
(1), the complementarity between type and quality is stronger than in case (2) where
no exclusion is optimal. In principle, this provides an incentive to exclude some agents
in order to raise the quality, given that the quality is determined by the lowest type. At
the same time, the complementarity between rank and type is also stronger than in (2).
Excluding agents lowers the rank of almost everyone in the group. This is an offsetting
force to the increase in quality. While on aggregate the quality dominates - hence the
positive social exclusion in the planner case - the monopolist does not take into ac-
count the higher utility of agents strictly inside the support. In this case, an increase in
price does not sufficiently increase revenue generated by the agents joining the group
to compensate for the loss of revenue from the excluded agents. A monopolist prefers
to serve all agents as in (2). In case (3), the complementarity is strong enough that the
incentive to raise quality by excluding agents dominates for both the planner and the
monopolist.
Extending the example to a competitive environment, we first note that since in any
equilibrium there can be at most one group, competition does not necessarily lead to 0
profits. However, there does exist a full-participation equilibrium where p1 = 0 with a
single group - which follows from Result 10.4. But as indicated, there are other equilib-
ria on the Pareto frontier where there is social exclusion. In fact, there is a continuum
of equilibria with w 1 ∈ [1,1.76]. At high levels of exclusion, welfare is even lower than
in the monopoly case.
Table 2.3: Social exclusion in a competitive environment
(1*) γ1 = 15.48 γ2 = 15.50 eq. group structure
competition any wC1 ∈ [1,1.76] is
PE in the agents’ subgame IC = {wC1 ,2}
As before: α1 = 560, α2 = 15ln(2)−1, β1 = 1 β2 = ln(2)−1
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2.7 Conclusion
In this model, a large number of agents observe a set of membership prices and simul-
taneously decide which group to join. Group membership gives them access to social
spillovers generated by the other members. In particular, agents have preferences over
the composition of the group (the quality) and their rank in the distribution of types
within the group (their status). The novel aspect of this paper is the exploration of the
role of status concern in such a setting. The focus lies on the consequences for segre-
gation and social exclusion.
This chapter qualifies the following two broad claim: Firstly, status concern reduces
the benefit in terms of welfare and revenue from segregating agents. The incentive to
segregate any given group is, in many cases, lower under status concern. This applies
- albeit to different degrees - whether the market is served by a social planner, a mo-
nopolist or by competitive firms. Secondly, status concern in combination with pref-
erences over the quality of a group can aggravate social exclusion. It can be a second-
best outcome to exclude a positive measure of agents. Status concern also creates a
stronger incentive for a monopolist to exclude a set of agents even though they could
be offered a separate group. And even in a competitive setting, there can be equilibria
with a positive degree of social exclusion. Most importantly, by comparing this to the
setting in Board (2009), where agents do not have preferences over their rank, we can
establish that it is indeed status concern that is driving these results.
Since status concern can lead to different conclusions about the welfare and revenue
maximizing group structures, determining whether agents have preferences over sta-
tus in a given setting can be crucial for empirical investigations. If we observe that part
of the population is excluded from a certain type of social group (e.g. tuition fees be-
ing set such as to exclude some potential students), we cannot immediately conclude
that authority is maximizing profits as opposed to welfare. It could be a constrained
welfare optimum to do so. If the quality of groups is monotone in types - i.e. the higher
the types the higher the group quality - and there are complementarities between type
and quality, then without status concern prices are sufficient to separate agents into
any partition of groups. Sorting can be arbitrarily fine. With status concern, this is
not feasible. There is a role for screening methods other than prices. Universities, for
example, rarely rely on prices alone for admission decisions.
As a final comment, it is the absence of status concern that allows for a high degree of
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segregation. An authority might want to actively discourage positional concerns and
status thinking. But in this setting, status concern limits the degree to which agents
can be separated. Discouraging positional concern might lead to more rather than
less segregation - and thus to more unequal access to the semi-public good that is of-
fered through the group. On the other hand, positional concerns can lead to the social
exclusion of agents. A policy maker might have to consider this trade-off.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 A: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3 :
Proof. Suppose not and a measurable set of agents pay different prices for the same
group membership. This implies that there are sets W1,W2 ⊂W with y(w ′)= y(w ′′) for
all w ′, w ′′ ∈W1∪W2, and p(w1)= p(w ′) for all w1, w ′ ∈W1 as well as p(w2)= p(w ′′) for
all w1, w ′ ∈W1. However, p(w1) 6= p(w2) for all w1 ∈W1 and w2 ∈W2. Suppose w.l.o.g.
that p(w1)< p(w2). This group provision cannot be incentive compatible as agents in
W2 could obtain strictly higher utility by reporting a type in W1 as
u(w2,φy(w1),ry(w1)(w2))−p(w1)> u(w2,φy(w2),ry(w2)(w2))−p(w2)
since y(w1) = y(w2) and misreporting the type does not affect the rank of an agent
conditional on being assigned to the same group. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 3 that p(w) needs to be constant over the sup-
port of each social group.
As m(w) assigns each type w ∈ W a choice in A, the support of each social group
generated by m intersect on a measure 0 set by construction. It follows that if the
assignment y(w) is an equilibrium given p, it is a stable equilibrium. Following the
equilibrium definition (Definition 2) in Chapter 1, incentive compatibility and indi-
vidual rationality directly imply an equilibrium in the agents’ game. Every incentive
compatible and individually rational m(w) is a stable equilibrium in the agents’ game.
To show the other direction, note that in an equilibrium in the agents’ game, prices
are constant for each group by construction since p contains a price for each g ∈ A
(but no more). The equilibrium definition implies directly incentive compatibility and
individual rationality. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Proof. I prove the contrapositive: if splitting a group is not beneficial without status
concern, it cannot be beneficial under status concern since the benefit from doing is
is necessarily less.
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SinceI ′ is a finer group structure thanI , there exists at least one active social group
L g under I whose support is split into several groups under I
′. Suppose the sup-
port of g is split intoL l andL h with qualitiesφl andφh . WLOG, assume thatφl <φh
noting that they can’t be equal if m′ is incentive compatible. If a refinement does not
increase welfare without status concern, then there are w l =w h ∈I ′ such that:
∫ w l
w l
u
(
w,φl ,r0
)
dF (w)+
∫ wh
wh
u
(
w,φh ,r0
)
dF (w)
≤
∫ wh
w l
u
(
w,φg ,r0
)
dF (w)
(2.14)
where r0 is the fixed reference rank of U q .
Comparing this to preferences with status concern, we note first that it follows from
the quality-status-neutrality assumption that for i ∈ {l ,h} and for any φ:
∂
∂φ
∫ w i
w i
u
(
w,φ,ri (w)
)
dF (w)= ∂
∂φ
∫ w i
w i
u
(
w,φ,r0
)
dF (w)
We can conclude that, fixing the ranks agents obtain after the split:
∫ w l
w l
u
(
w,φl ,rl (w)
)
dF (w)+
∫ wh
wh
u
(
w,φh ,rh(w)
)
dF (w)
≤
∫ w l
w l
u
(
w,φg ,rl (w)
)
dF (w)+
∫ wh
wh
u
(
w,φg ,rh(w)
)
dF (w)
(2.15)
The final step is to show that the rank re-allocation creates an additional welfare loss
which would imply that the right-hand-side of inequality (2.15) is strictly less than the
utility in the coarser group g which is:
∫ w l
w l
u
(
w,φg ,rg (w)
)
dF (w)+
∫ wh
wh
u
(
w,φg ,rg (w)
)
dF (w) (2.16)
I show this using an intermediate step with an auxiliary construction that allows to
demonstrate that any re-allocation of rank in the manner of the split induces a welfare
loss. This is then used to show that splitting any group is less beneficial under status
concern - the result follows.
Take a hypothetical group structure with two types of agents, w− and w+ where w− ≤
w+. The measure of agents is as in [w l , w h]. Denote this k0 ≡LW ([w l , w h]). First, we
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can look at the limit case where w− = w+ = w but all ranks are still allocated. Mak-
ing use of the probability integral transform, we can establish that the distribution of
ranks in any group is uniform. The hypothetical aggregate welfare from such a group
with quality φ can then be written as:
k0
∫ 1
0
u(w,φ, x)d x
Since k0 only acts as a scaling parameter, it can be normalized to 1. The integral can
be written in two alternative but equivalent ways where again w− =w+ =w .
Firstly, for some x ∈ (0,1):
∫ 1
0
u(w,φ,r )dr =
∫ x
0
u(w−,φ,r )dr +
∫ 1
x
u(w+,φ,r )dr
and secondly:
∫ 1
0
u(w,φ,r )dr = x
∫ 1
0
u(w−,φ,r )dr + (1−x)
∫ 1
0
u(w+,φ,r )dr
Now consider a w+ >w− =w . From the complementarity in w and r , we can conclude
that∫ x
0
u(w−,φ,r )dr +
∫ 1
x
u(w+,φ,r )dr > x
∫ 1
0
u(w−,φ,r )dr + (1−x)
∫ 1
0
u(w+,φ,r )dr
as ∫ 1
x
uw (w
+,φ,r )dr > (1−x)
∫ 1
0
uw (w
+,φ,r )dr
If there is a difference in types between one group and the other, aggregate utility is
higher when ranks a higher in the high-type group.
Next note that for w+ → w , u(w+,φg , x) is the lower bound for almost all w with
r (w) ≥ x in the original group. We can re-write the sums in terms of integrals over
types instead of ranks.
Firstly,
k0
∫ 1
x
u(w+,φ,r )dr =
∫ wh
w+
u(w+,φ,r (w))dF (w)
where r (w)≡ F (w)−F (w l )
F (w h)−F (w l )
.
and secondly:
k0(1−x)
∫ 1
0
u(w+,φ,r )dr =
∫ wh
w+
u(w+,φ,r ∗h (w))dF (w)
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where r ∗h (w)≡
F (w)−F (w h)
F (w h)−F (w h)
.
Inspecting r ∗h (w) and r (w), we can conclude that for almost all w ∈ [w+, w h], r ∗h (w)<
r (w). For w+→ w h , we can write the difference between the hypothetical utility and
the actual sum of utilities as:
∆w+ ≡
∫ wh
w+
(
u(w,φ,rh(w))−u(w+,φ,r (w))
)
dF (w)
and
∆∗w+ ≡
∫ wh
w+
(
u(w,φ,r ∗h (w))−u(w+,φ,r ∗h (w))
)
dF (w)
Observe that for almost every w
u(w,φ,r (w))−u(w+,φ,r (w))> u(w,φ,r ∗h (w))−u(w+,φ,r ∗h (w))
due to the complementarity in r and w and therefore:
∆w+ >∆∗w+
An equivalent argument can be constructed for w−. Re-writing both summations we
get:
k0
∫ x
0
u(w−,φ,r )dr =
∫ w−
w l
u(w−,φ,r (w))dF (w)
and
k0x
∫ 1
0
u(w−,φ,r )dr =
∫ w−
w l
u(w−,φ,r ∗l (w))dF (w)
with r ∗l (w)≡
F (w)−F (w l )
F (w l )−F (w l )
.
We can again conclude by inspection that for almost all w ∈ [w l , w−], r ∗h (w)> r (w). As
before, for w−→ w h we re-write the difference between this hypothetical utility and
the actual utility as:
∆w− ≡
∫ w−
w l
(
u(w−,φ,r (w))−u(w,φ,r (w)))dF (w)
and
∆∗w− ≡
∫ w−
w l
(
u(w−,φ,r ∗l (w))−u(w,φ,r ∗l (w))
)
dF (w)
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Again, due to the complementarity in w and r , we can conclude that ∆∗w− > ∆w− . It
follows that∫ wh
w l
u(w,φ,r (w))dF (w)= k0
∫ 1
0
u(w,φ,r )dr +∆w+ −∆w−
> k0
∫ 1
0
u(w,φ,r )dr +∆∗w+ −∆∗w−
=
∫ w l
w l
u(w,φ,r ∗l (w))dF (w)+
∫ wh
wh
u(w,φ,r ∗h (w))dF (w)
where w h =w l .
The alternative assignment of ranks strictly lowers utility. As the effect of a change
in φ is the same with and without status concern and the ranks necessarily change in
the above defined fashion caused by any split in the support of a group, any finer pro-
vision has a less positive effect on welfare under status concern than without status
concern. As any finer provision can be regarded as an iteration of binary splits, the
result follows.
Proof of Corollary 7.1:
Proof. The result follows from the proof of Proposition 7 if we re-define the ∆w and
∆∗w differences accordingly. ∆w+ and ∆∗w+ are then:
∆w+ ≡
∫ wh
w+
(
u(w,φ,rh(w))−u(w+,φ,r (w))+α(v(w,rh(w)− v(w+,rh(w))
)
dF (w)
∆∗w+ ≡
∫ wh
w+
(
u(w,φ,r ∗h (w))−u(w+,φ,r ∗h (w))+α(v(w,r ∗h (w)− v(w+,r ∗h (w))
)
dF (w)
And we observe that∆w+−∆∗w+ is, for the same reason as before, positive and increas-
ing in α. The equivalent statement is true for −(∆w− −∆∗w−). The result follows.
Proof of Corollary 7.2:
Proof. It follows from the proof of Proposition 7 that changing the rank allocation for
every type w to a lower rank reduces aggregate welfare.
In particular,
∫ w
w− u(w,rw−(w))dF (w) decreases for a FOSD shift in r (w) which corre-
sponds to an increase in w− noting that
rw−(w)≡ F (w)−F (w
−)
F (w)−F (w−)
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An upward shift in the lower boundary of any group reduces welfare for that group.
Furthermore, it follows equally that splitting the support of any group, say the full
participation group, strictly decreases welfare. The welfare maximizing equilibrium
is the full participation equilibrium. Suppose m(w)= (g ,0) for some g ∈G . All agents
joining group g satisfies the participation constraint as p(w) = 0 and since there is
no other active group, incentive compatibility holds. This is an equilibrium group
provision.
Proof of Lemma 4:
Proof. Suppose the social planner offers an incentive compatible group provision in-
ducing prices p and partitionI = {w1, ..., w} with w1 >w .
This implies that the lowest price in p, call this p1, is greater than 0; otherwise agents
with type w ∈ [w , w1) have a strict incentive to join that group.
Because of the complementarity in type and quality, there exists a mq ′(w) with prices
p ′ that maintains partition I ′ = {w0, w1, ..., w} as an equilibrium as long as φ0 < φ1,
where φi is the quality of the group with support over [wi , wi+1]. This is guaranteed
by weak monotonicity.
Since the quality of all social groups under mq remain unchanged, aggregate utility
from agents with types in [w1, w] does not change. However, agents in (w0, w1] re-
ceive payoffs strictly above their outside option which raises aggregate utility. This
also implies prices of all active groups are now lower than before as p ′1 ≤ u(w1,φ1)−
u(w1,φ0)+u(w0,φ0)−u < u(w1,φ1)−u = p1. where u is the agents’ stand-alone pay-
off. It must be that p ′(w)< p(w) for all w ∈ [w1, w]. All agents that were member of a
group under mq pay a lower price under mq ′(w) for the same group membership and
all agents in (w0, w1] are strictly better-off. This is a Pareto-improvement.
Proof of Proposition 8:
Proof. It follows almost immediately from Lemma 4 that extending the interval parti-
tion at the tail end by adding another element strictly increases aggregate welfare. As
u(w,φ,r )≥ u for any w ∈ [w , w], φ ∈ [φ,φ] and r ∈ [0,1], the same applies here. If a p ′
exists such that I ′ is incentive compatible for all w , then this is an equilibrium with
higher aggregate welfare and strictly higher utility for almost all agents.
However, such a p ′ might not exist as is shown in the example in Section 2.6.
Proof of Proposition 9:
Proof. We construct a φ andL to validate the claim.
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Take some type w∗ ∈W with w∗ >w and let S be any measurable set inB and W S the
smallest convex set in W that contains all types w in S.
φ(S)=
infW
S + supW S forsupW S ≤w∗
infW S +w∗ forsupW S >w∗
This quality function is weakly monotone.
We can now establish that for for any group structure I = {w1, w2, ...} with w1 ≤w∗ <
w2, there exists no set of prices such thatI
′ = {w0}∪I for any w0 ∈W with w0 <w1 is
a stable equilibrium group structure if w∗ is sufficiently close to w . This implies that
there is no incentive compatible group provision m′(w) that achieves the partitionI ′.
This follows from the fact that the quality difference between any two adjacent groups
whose quality is weakly less than that of [w1, w2] is bounded by the quality differ-
ence between the group with support [w0, w1] and the group with support [w1, w2].
This difference is w∗−w . As w∗ → w , this difference goes to 0 while the difference
u(w,φ,1)−u(w,φ,0) is bounded away from 0 for any w and φ. This means if there is
any active group with w∗ in the support, there can be no other active group with types
lower than w∗ in any equilibrium - if w∗ is sufficiently close to w .
Let now w1 =w∗ and the difference w∗−w = δ> 0 such that no separate lower qual-
ity group can be offered. We can setL ([w∗, w) sufficiently close to 1 for every w >w∗
such that excluding w∗ is never optimal. We can conclude that any group structure
that is an equilibrium in the agent’s game can be either written as I (i.e. no full par-
ticipation with the lowest-quality group containing w∗ in it’s support) or as the full-
participation structure w ∪ {I \{w1}}. It remains to be shown that offering a group
structure of typeI is optimal for someL .
To this end, we first note that φ does not depend onL beyond what is already deter-
mined by W . Suppose nowL ([w , w∗])= ². OfferingI instead ofI ′ = {w}∪{I \{w∗}}
lowers the rank of almost every agent with type [w∗, w2] but increases the quality of
that group by w∗−w0 = δ> 0. While the quality change is independent ofL , the rank
decrease for every agent is at most ². Finally, we note that w2−w∗ cannot be arbitrarily
small because if w2 →w∗ then the quality difference between group g2 and g1 goes to
0 which cannot be incentive compatible.
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Suppose w2 <w meaning that there is a group g2. In this case, let
w 2 ≡ inf{w ∈W : u(w,φ2(w),0)−u(w,φ1,1)> 0}
where φ2(w) is the quality of the group with support over [w2, w3] with w2, w3 ∈ I .
This is the lower bound such that u(w2,φ2,0)−u(w2,φ1,1) ≥ 0 for all w2 ≥ w 2. Note
that this must be strictly greater than w∗ as u is strictly increasing in rank andφ2 →φ1
for w2 →w∗. If there is no g2 meaning thatI only describes one group, set w 2 =w .
Due to the continuity of U , we can conclude that there exists a small enough ² > 0
such that for every equilibrium group structure I with w∗ = minI , the increase
in aggregate utility for agents in [w∗, w2] outweighs the loss from excluding [w , w∗)
and the loss in rank of agents in [w∗, w2] given that both the loss in aggregate utility
as well as the loss in rank are decreasing in ² while the increase in quality remains
the same and L ([w∗, w2]) ≥ L ([w∗, w 2]) > 0 for any equilibrium partition I . We
conclude that for every equilibrium I , offering the full-participation group structure
I ′ = {w}∪{I \{w∗}} strictly lowers aggregate welfare under the proposed quality func-
tion. The result follows.
Proof of Corollary 9.1:
Proof. LetI be a group partition of W for an equilibrium m(w) with a corresponding
price vector p. Suppose w ∈I , meaning there is full participation. This is without loss
since otherwise we can adjust the definition of W accordingly. Let’s extend W at the
bottom-end by an interval [w ′, w) and call [w ′, w)∪W ≡W ′. Let L ′ be the measure
over W ′ with the obvious restriction thatL ′(A)=L (A) for all A ⊆W .
Consider a partition I ′ = {w ′}∪I . As shown before, this strictly increases welfare
and can thus be implemented by the social planner if there exists a p ′ such that the
corresponding group assignments are incentive compatible.
Let L 0 be the social group with support over [w ′, w] and L 1 the social group with
support over [w , w 1]. Furthermore, let φ0 and φ1 be the group qualities. Let φ′ be the
lower bound of φ given W ′ and L ′. It is for the following argument without loss to
assume φ0 =φ′.
Fix a givenL ′. Now construct an alternative measureL ² withL ′(W ′)=L ²(W ′) such
that almost all agents in [w ′, w] are ‘close’ to w . In particular, let L ² be such that
L ²([w−², w])=L ²([w ′, w]−². This is defined for ²<min{w −w ′,L ′([w ′, w])}. Note
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that as ²→ 0, the measure approaches the (scaled) dirac measure.The measure might
influence φ′ but since the interval is fixed, we know the quality is bounded by some φ
for all measures.
If φ1 ≤ φ0, no set of prices exists that would sustain I ′ as an equilibrium. Suppose
instead φ0 <φ1. Given that almost all agents are within [w −², w], the rank difference
r0(w − ²)− 0 is by construction ² meaning that r0(w)− r0(w − ²) = 1− ². For ² small
enough, u(w ,φ1,0)−u(w − ²,φ1,0) is arbitrarily close to 0. But note that u(w ,φ0,1)−
u(w − ²,φ0,0) does not converge to 0 as for every w and r ∈ [0,1), ur (w,φ,r ) > 0. As
²→ 0, agents at w − ² have a strict incentive to join g1 instead of g0. The partition is
not incentive compatible. As we used the lower bound φ to show this, the result is
independent of how [w ′, w] and is partitioned.
Proof of Proposition 10:
Proof. I demonstrate that splitting a group into two groups is less beneficial to a mo-
nopolist under status concern. Since every refinement can be written as an iteration
of such splits, this suffices to prove the proposition.
Take any equilibrium group provision m(w) and social group L g with support over
[w g , w g ]. Recall that p denotes the price vector arising from m(w).
It follows from the discussion on pricing that the price a monopolist can charge for
agents in g is pg = u(w g ,φg )+ v(w g ,0)−κ where κ is either the stand-alone utility u
or, if there is a group ‘below’, κ is the utility an agent of type w g would obtain if he
reported a type that would have him assigned to the group below i.e. U (w g ,m(w g −
²),L A) for an arbitrarily small ²> 0. Since any split of g does not affect the utility and
prices in the groups below, we can treat κ as a constant. Any refinement of g affects
the price at w g only through changes in quality.
Suppose the monopolist offers a finer provision m′(w) such that g is split into two
groups [w l , w l ] and [w h , w h] where w l =w g and w h =w g with prices p ′l and p ′h .
It follows from incentive compatibility that all prices higher than pg in the original
p need to be adjusted to make the new provision incentive compatible. The effect on
revenue is determined by the change of all prices p ′i ≥ p ′l noting that for every price in
p with pi ≥ pg , there is a corresponding price p ′i in p ′ and there is one additional price
p ′h that does not map from any previous price. We decompose these into the effect
caused by p ′l −pg which affects all prices pi ≥ pg and the effect of introducing a new
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price p ′h , which increases all prices pi > pg by p ′h −p ′l .
It follows from the discussion on incentive compatibility thatφl <φh and p ′l < p ′h oth-
erwise m′(w) could not be an equilibrium provision. Because of the separability, we
can conclude that p ′l−pg is the same for preferences with and without status concern.
It is equal to u(w g ,φl )−u(w g ,φg ) noting that, for preferences with status concern, the
v component cancels. All prices p(w) in the initial provision greater than pg , if any,
have to adjust by the same difference u(w g ,φl )−u(w g ,φg ) in the new provision.
Furthermore, the ‘split’ adds an ‘additional’ price p ′h and all prices in the initial pro-
vision with p(w)> pg need to further adjust by p ′h−p ′l for the new provision. It follows
from incentive compatibility that p ′h = p ′l+u(w h ,φh)−u(w h ,φl )−
(
v(w h ,1)− v(w h ,0)
)
.
The difference to the price these agents paid under p is equal to:
p ′h −pg = p ′l −pg +u(w h ,φh)−u(w h ,φl )−
(
v(w h ,1)− v(w h ,0)
)
(2.17)
As shown before, p ′l −pg is the same with and without status concern while v(w h ,1)−
v(w h ,0) is strictly positive under status concern and 0 without. The change in revenue
from splitting any group is strictly larger without status concern.
Proof of Corollary 10.1:
Proof. The argument follows that in the proof of Proposition 10. We first observe that
p ′l−pg does not depend onα as the effect of a change in quality on the utility of a type-
w l agent does not depend on α. However, the change in price paid by every agent in
[w h , w] as defined in Equation (2.17) needs to be restated as:
p ′h −pg = p ′l −pg +u(w h ,φh)−u(w h ,φl )−α
(
v(w h ,1)− v(w h ,0)
)
This is decreasing inα noting that p ′l −pg is unaffected byα. The change in revenue is
larger for smaller α as the price difference that makes the split incentive compatible is
decreasing in α.
Proof of Result 10.2:
Proof. Both I and I ′ are equilibrium group structures. Let again p and p ′ be the
price vectors generated from p(w) and p ′(w). I denote the lowest price in p as p1 and
the lowest in p ′ as p0 since p ′ has one more price than p.
For the proof, I distinguish between the price vectors under status concern (p, p ′) and
the prices inducing the same structure without status concern (q, q ′).
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The total gain in revenue from offering the full-participation group structureI ′ under
status concern is:
p ′0− (p1−p ′1)[1−F (w1)]
and equivalently for preferences without status concern.
We observe that
p ′1 = p1−
[
U (w1,m
′(w),L g )−U (w ,m′(w),L g )
]
i.e. the intra-group utility difference for the lowest group under m′. (Recall that U (w1,m′(w),L g )=
u(w1,φ0,1) since r (w) is determined by the true not the reported type). Furthermore,
p ′0 = u(w ,φ0,0)−u.
The prices without status concern are accordingly:
q ′1 = q1−
[
U q (w1,m
q ′(w),L A)−U q (w ,mq ′(w),L A)
]
and q ′0 = u(w ,φ0,r )−u.
As u(w,φ,1)−u(w,φ,0)> 0, it follows from complementarity that the intra-group util-
ity difference is larger under status concern meaning:
[
U q (w1,m
q ′(w),L A)−U q (w ,mq ′(w),L A)
]< [U (w1,m′(w),L g )−U (w ,m′(w),L g ))]
and thus
q ′0 = u(w ,φ0,r )−u ≥ u(w ,φ0,0)−u = p ′0
we can conclude that
p ′0− (p1−p ′1)[1−F (w1)]< q ′0− (q1−q ′1)[1−F (w1)]
The result follows.
Proof of Result 10.3:
Proof. Suppose a monopolist offers m(w) instead of m′(w) with prices p(w) and p ′(w)
respectively. Incentive compatibility requires that the price difference at the lowest
cut-off is:
p1−p ′1 = u(w1,φ1,0)−u(w ′1,φ′1,0)
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Since φ is bounded, we can set φh =φ and φl =φ. If u(w ,φh ,0)−u(w ,φl ,0)= ², then
this implies that u(w1,φ1,0)−u(w ′1,φ′1,0) < ². For any I , incentive compatibility re-
quires:
p1−p ′1 < ²
For any higher quality group g , pg−p ′g < p1−p ′1 < ². This is due to the fact for incentive
compatibility, all such prices increase by p1 − p ′1 but, at the same time, need to be
reduced by u(w2,φ1,1)−u(w2,φ′1,1)> 0.
The effect on profits is thus bounded above by
²[1−F (w1)]− [F (w1)−F (w ′1)]p ′1
As ²→ 0, this becomes negative. Excluding agents with types in [w ′1, w1) is not optimal
for the monopolist. As a final step, we show that welfare is not bounded by this.
The welfare increase can be positive as for all r (w)> 0:
u(w,φ,r (w))−u(w,φ′,r (w))> u(w,φ,0)−u(w,φ′,0)
and it is thus feasible that∫ w2
w1
(
u(w,φ1,r1(w))−u(w,φ′1,r1(w)′)
)
dF (w)>
∫ w1
w ′1
(
u(w,φ′1,r1(w)
′)−u)dF (w)
The increase in w ′1 weakly lowers the rank of all agents in [w1, w2] but if φ1 −φ′1 is
sufficiently large, this is beneficial for almost all agents in that group. The aggregate
welfare of all other groups is unchanged. The effect of excluding more agents is thus
either negative or positive while for sufficiently small ², excluding more agents always
lowers profits.
Proof of Result 10.4:
Proof. Suppose there is a full participation equilibrium with the lowest price p1 > 0. If
the price vector arising from the market provision is p, some firm i can offer a pi (w)
such that the price vector for the corresponding provision is p−² for some ²> 0. Since
all the price differences between groups remain the same, if the equilibrium provision
µ(w) induced the group structure {L g } then this is also an equilibrium under the new
prices. Since ² > 0, all agents are strictly better off. µ′ must be such that the group
structure is identical but all agents pay the lower price according to p−². The firm of-
fering these prices would capture the entire market. For small enough ², this increases
revenue for any firm not serving the entire market before.
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Proof of Result 10.5:
Proof. Take any equilibrium, full-participation group structure with social groups {L g }g∈G
and prices p. Suppose there are K ≥ 2 active groups. Suppose further that p is normal-
ized so that the lowest price p1 = 0 - this is always possible for full participation group
structures. The lowest price vector p ′ that maintains the same group structure and
achieves 0 profits is such that:
p ′ = p−
K∑
2
pkL k (W )
If N firms are serving the market, then they must all make 0 profits. If not, then there
exists some firm providing active groups Gn such that
Πn =∑
Gn
p ′kL k (W )> 0
Another firm can offer prices p˜ = p−²Πn for some ²> 0. This is a Pareto-improvement
to all agents since the group structure does not change but prices are lower. For ² small
enough, it strictly increases profits for this firm. This implies at least the lowest active
price p ′1 < 0 in equilibrium.
Suppose the number of active social groups in a ≥ 2. Then the number of non-negative
active prices is a− ≥ 1. Note that if there is no such price, at least one firm would make
positive profits since the number of active groups is K ≥ 2 and so there is at least one
strictly positive price. If now N > a−, then there is at least one firm providing only
positively priced groups which, by the previous argument, cannot be an equilibrium.
Finally, suppose a+ is the number of non-negative active prices. (Note that either
a+ + a− = a or a+ + a− = a + 1). If N > a+ i.e. the number of firms is greater than
the number of strictly positive active prices, then at least one firm must provide only
negatively priced active groups. This firm makes negative profits and has a strict in-
centive to raise prices. This cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof of Result 10.6:
Proof. SupposeI = {w1, ..., w} is an incentive compatible group structure under p and
I ′ =w0∪I with w0 <w1 is incentive compatible under p ′. We note that under p ′, all
active prices p ′i with i ≥ 1 are less than pi . To exclude agents in the interval [w0, w1), it
must be that p1 =U (w1,µ(w1),L A)+p1−u - an agents with w1 is indifferent between
joining and not joining. Under p ′, we need that agents with w0 are indifferent. Incen-
tive compatibility requires that at the cut-off U (w1,µ(w1),L A) = U (w1,µ(w0),L A)
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but as utility is increasing in rank, U (w1,µ(w0),L A) > u. It must be that p ′1 < p1.
Furthermore, since all groups with higher types are unchanged, pi −p ′i = p1−p ′1 > 0.
Since almost all agents in [w0, w1) are strictly better off and all agents in higher qual-
ity groups pay a lower price, this is a Pareto improvement. Since it allows one firm to
capture the entire market, it follows from previous arguments that there is a strict in-
centive for at least one firm to offer p ′ if all other firms offer p. I is not an equilibrium
group structure.
2.8.2 B: Comparison Table
We first observe that in all cases, the price difference between two adjacent groups is
lower under status concern as u(w,φh ,0)−u(w,φl ,1)< u(w,φh ,r )−u(w,φl ,r ).
Case 1: φl <φg and φh <φg
We observe that as φ and r are complements, pg − p ′l = u(w l ,φg ,0)−u(w l ,φl ,0) is
less than u(w l ,φg ,r )−u(w l ,φl ,r ) for the reference utility at 1 > r > 0, which is the
price change under status concern. Since this leads to a drop in revenue, the effect is
weaker under status concern. Furthermore, u(w h ,φg ,1)−u(w h ,φh ,1) is larger than
u(w h ,φg ,r )−u(w h ,φh ,r ) which has a greater positive effect on revenue if w h 6=w (i.e.
there is at least one additional active group with higher quality).
Case 2: φl <φg and φh >φg
The effect for the low quality group is as in Case 1. For the top group, we note that
the increase in quality has a negative effect on revenue at w h if there are groups with
higher types. This is because u(w h ,φh ,1)−u(w h ,φg ,1) is larger than u(w h ,φh ,r )−
u(w h ,φg ,r ). This difference reduces revenue as the price difference to groups above
has to fall by that amount. If the weighted difference for the higher p ′l under status
concern outweighs the lower prices p ′i > p ′l , then the increase in revenue is larger un-
der status concern and vice versa. The overall effect is thus ambiguous.
Case 3: φl >φg and φh >φg
The effect of the change φh −φg is as above and has a more negative impact un-
der status concern. To reach the conclusion that the increase in revenue is less un-
der status concern, we note that p ′l must increase by less under status concern since
u(w l ,φ,0)−u(w l ,φg ,0) is less than u(w l ,φ,r )−u(w l ,φg ,r ) for any φ > φg . We con-
clude that under status concern p ′l − pg is lower, p ′h − pg is lower and the difference
p ′i −pi in all prices pi > pg is less. Under status concern, revenue increases less (de-
creases more) when offering p ′ instead of p.
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Case 4: φl >φg and φh <φg
This would imply φl >φh which is ruled out by Corollary 3.1.
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Chapter 3
The Benefits of Being Misinformed
1
3.1 Introduction
We commonly observe situations in which people take actions in line with hypotheses
that seem to be contradicted by empirical evidence. Furthermore, these actions often
produce additional information that should highlight the initial mistake. For exam-
ple, a significant number of people refuse even essential vaccinations despite the very
strong evidence of their benefit and despite the measurable increase in outbreaks of
the related disease as a consequence of this refusal.2 For this purpose, we revisit the
comparison of experiments as in Blackwell (1951) under the assumption that informa-
tion processing is not always flawless and might be impeded by systematic mistakes.
We do this in a setup that captures the fundamentals of Bayesian updating and its con-
sequences on utility: First an agent takes an action that directly affects his payoff but
also provides information about the payoff relevant state of the world. The agent then
takes another action before payoffs are realized. Motivated by the psychological and
experimental literature on beliefs and perceptions, the information processing can be
‘imperfect’ in two ways: an agent might initially hold an incorrect prior affecting the
type of signals he receives and the agent might misinterpret the signals.3
We find that both types of biases by themselves are welfare decreasing. The potential
welfare loss can be ordered according to the magnitude of the bias. Next, we provide
necessary and sufficient conditions under which a given binary ranking of action pro-
files can be reversed by a perception bias. Building on these findings, we can show
that it is not always true that adding another type of bias to a pre-existing one makes
1This chapter is joint work with Marcus Roel.
2See, for instance, Wallace (2009).
3For example: Bruner and Potter (1964), Darley and Gross (1983), Fischoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein
(1977) and Lichtenstein, Fischoff and Lawrence (1982).
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an agent even worse-off. In particular, if the agent tends to misperceive signals, then
pushing the agent’s prior further away from the truth can beneficial if it causes the
agent to prefer an action whose signal is less ambiguous and thereby less likely misin-
terpreted. Our setting thus provides a novel channel for the long known observation
by Hirshleifer (1971) that information may not always be welfare improving.
On the other hand, when the agent’s prior is incorrect and signals are useful in the
sense that they inform decision-making, the agent will always be worse off from mis-
perception. Only in the extreme case, where it’s optimal for an agent to always take a
fixed action irrespective of any signal, increasing the agent’s degree of misperception
can be beneficial. It follows that no straight-forward welfare ordering can be estab-
lished if both types of misperception are present. We further explore the implications
of an agents awareness over the bias. We provide conditions under which sophistica-
tion regarding the misperception of signals can help or harm the agent’s welfare.
To provide an illustration, let’s look at a student who decides whether to become an
entrepreneur. The literature highlights that entrepreneurship is ex-ante not very prof-
itable. Landier and Thesmar (2009) show that entrepreneurs tend to be overly opti-
mistic with respect to their company’s future growth prospects. Moreover, their opti-
mism is positively correlated with higher-education, and more optimistic entrepreneurs
tend to choose more short-term debt. Suppose the payoffs from being an entrepreneur
depend on the student’s ability. The student can either quit university immediately in
order to start his business, or wait and finish his degree first. While graduating is in-
herently useful, it also provides him with a signal about his abilities. Finally, when he
starts his business, the student also has to decide how much to borrow.
A student who is very overconfident in his abilities will find it optimal to start his busi-
ness immediately, yet may not be overconfident enough to borrow much. In contrast,
a slightly less overconfident agent will pursue the more ‘sensible’ path of completing
his studies. When the student also suffers from biases in perception, he may (a) mis-
interpret the signal as confirming his superior ability or (b) over-interpret the signal
strength. As a result, the student may come out of university feeling even more con-
fident in his ability, which can persuade him to start a business as well as taking on
larger risks, i.e. a bigger amount of debt. While both businesses fail with equal proba-
bility, the initially less over-confident agent may end up being worse off in expectation.
The more over-confident agent managed to avoid the signal and thereby was not in a
position to misinterpret it.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2, we summarize the relevant literature.
82
This is followed by a basic description of our model in Section 3 and the characteriza-
tion of the unbiased choice problem in Section 4. Section 5 introduces biased per-
ception and biased priors into the model and relates our setting to Blackwell (1951).
This is followed by our main results in Section 6. We conclude with a short investment
example in Section 7 and a final discussion in Section 8.
3.2 Literature
Blackwell (1951) formalizes when an information experiment is more informative than
another. Marschak and Miyasawa (1968) transfer these statistical ideas to the realm of
economics. The key conclusion is that no rational decision maker would choose to
‘garble’ his information, i.e. voluntarily introduce noise into his experiments.
Having more information, however, may not always be better in an economic settings.
Hirshleifer (1971) highlights that public information may destroy mutually beneficial
insurance possibilities. The recent behavioral literature takes this idea further: Pa-
pers on overconfidence have shed light on how holding incorrect beliefs can be useful.
These benefits arise from strategic interaction between agents. Ludwig, Wichardt and
Wickhorst (2011) show that overconfidence can improve the agents relative and ab-
solute performance in contests by inducing higher efforts. De La Rosa (2011) studies
the effect of overconfidence on incentive contract in a moral hazard problem. When
agents overestimate the probability of success as well as their marginal contribution
to success, it becomes easier for the principal to induce effort. It turns out that the
efficiency gains from slight levels of overconfidence can improve the agent’s welfare.
Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) show that Blackwell garbling of information may increase
the current self’s payoff when individuals are time-inconsistent. Benabou and Tirole
(2002) develop this idea further. In their model, a time-inconsistent agent can take
on a project with deferred and uncertain benefits but immediate losses. Due to time-
inconsistency a time-0 self prefers that the project is undertaken in the next period,
but anticipates a lack of motivation by her next period’s incarnation. Having the op-
portunity to either perfectly learn the true success rate or to stay uninformed, she may
prefer to stay uninformed if her prior motivates the time-1 agent to work. While these
two papers are phrased as a decision problem, an agent with time-inconsistency plays
a game among his different selves, which is the fundamental driver of these results.
Other papers analyze how various behavioral shortcomings can be improved upon by
overconfidence. These papers aim to provide a motivation why overconfidence exists
in the first place. In Compte and Postlewaite (2004), failing to recall past failures can
improve welfare as it counteracts the fear of failure. Brunnermeier and Parker (2005)
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highlight that agents prefer to hold incorrect, too optimistic beliefs about the future,
when they derive immediate benefits from these expectations.
Our paper is also related to the enormous literature on mistakes in updating expecta-
tions. Given our focus on how basic biases in information processing interact, we shall
keep references to specific biases short. In our model, agents have the tendency to
misperceive information, which represents a generalisation of the confirmatory bias
in Rabin and Schrag (1999). In their paper, they show how confirmatory bias, the ten-
dency to misinterpret new information as supportive evidence for one’s currently held
hypothesis, can not only lead to overconfidence in the incorrect hypothesis, but even
cause someone to become fully convinced of it.
There have been many studies that suggest people hold incorrect beliefs. On aver-
age, people tend to have unrealistically positive views of their traits and prospects. To
mention a few, see Weinstein (1980) for health and salaries, Guthrie, Rachlinski and
Wistrich (2001) for rates of overturned decisions on appeal by judges, and Fischoff,
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977) as well as Lichtenstein, Fischoff and Lawrence (1982) for
estimates of ones’ own likelihood to answer correctly. Recent papers include Landier
and Thesmar (2009), for entrepreneurs, as well as Malmendier and Tate (2005) linking
CEO overconfidence to a higher likelihood of pursuing risky actions, for instance ac-
quisitions. Benoit and Dubra (2011) argue that a lot of the empirical evidence is also
consistent with Bayesian updating under correct priors and thus may not demonstrate
overconfidence. In response, laboratory experiments robust to this criticism were car-
ried out by Burks et al. (2013), Charness, Rustichini and van de Ven (2014), and Benoit
and Moore (2015), again documenting overconfidence.
3.3 The Setting
We consider a two period model with two states of the worldΩ= {A,B}. The agent has
a finite set of actions X = X1× X2. In the first period, he chooses an action from X1
and subsequently receives a signal about the state. The quality of the signal depends
on the action he chooses. He then decides on a second action from X2 and receive a
payoff determined by the action profile as well as the state of the world. The proba-
bility that a particular state materializes is Pr(ω= A)= p ∈ (0,1) and Pr(ω= B)= 1−p
respectively. Denote the agent’s prior belief that the state is A by µ. This belief may or
may not coincide with the correct p. Let u(x1, x2|ω) denote the payoff if x1 is taken at
t = 1, x2 at t = 2 and the state is ω, with u(x1, x2|ω) ∈R.
We make the following assumptions on payoffs which guarantee that in each state
there is a unique best action profile:
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Assumption A1: There exist action profiles:
(a) (x A1 , x
A
2 ) ∈ X such that u(x A1 , x A2 |A)≥ u(x1, x2|A) for any (x1, x2) ∈ X .
(b) (xB1 , x
B
2 ) ∈ X such that u(xB1 , xB2 |B)≥ u(x1, x2|B) for any (x1, x2) ∈ X .
To avoid trivial scenarios, we exclude cases in which those two profiles have any com-
mon component. It will also be implicitly assumed that X only contains actions that
are not completely payoff equivalent and ties are broken deterministically. Addition-
ally, payoffs are assumed to be bounded:
Assumption A2: There exists a K ∈R such that K >max{u(x A1 , x A2 |A),u(xB1 , xB2 |B)}.
After period one, an agent receives a private signal s ∈ S. For each action x1 ∈ X1,
there is a binary set of potential signals S(x1) = {a(x1),b(x1)} ⊂ S. The probability
distribution over those signals is conditional on the action as well as the state of the
world meaning that x1 defines a probability measure on S ×Ω. Let pi(x1,ω) ≡ Pr (s =
a(x1)|ω, x1) and consequently 1−pi(x1,ω) ≡ Pr (s = b(x1)|ω, x1). Let the signal struc-
ture be symmetric between states, i.e. pi(x1, A)= 1−pi(x1,B), and let signals be weakly
informative in the sense that a-signals are more likely than b-signals in state A. We
call (x1, {xa , xb}) an action profile where xa , xb ∈ X2 represent the actions taken after
an a(x1) or b(x1) signal. Such an action profile is said to be signal-sensitive if xa 6= xb .
A simple action profile is such that xa = xb meaning the second-period choice is not
conditional on the signal. It is for brevity denoted by (x1, x2).
We can think of the first action as an experiment that delivers information about the
realized state. The agent can react accordingly and adjust his action in the second
period. Notice, however, that an experiment is only useful if it is not too costly. For in-
stance, it could perfectly reveal the state but reduce the attainable utility to an extent
that it would be better to choose a noisier experiment.
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3.4 Unbiased Choice Problem
We reverse-engineer the agent’s decision problem step by step which serves to clarify
the later results. First we look at optimal actions in the second period and then fo-
cus on the optimal choice of experiments in the first period. The discussion is rather
technical and the descriptions necessarily somewhat dry. But it allows for more con-
structive proofs later. Readers impatient for key results may skip ahead and return to
this section as needed for later understanding.
3.4.1 Period 2 Cutoff-Strategy
The expected utility of an action x2 ∈ X2 from the second period’s perspective depends
on the posterior after receiving the signal. Furthermore, it can also depend directly on
the action in the previous period. Let µ(s) be the posterior after receiving a type-s
signal. An agent chooses action x2 at t = 2 given a posterior µ(s) and an action x1 at
t = 1 if
E
[
u(x1, x2)|µ(s)
]≥ E [u(x1, x)|µ(s)] ∀x ∈ X2
The expected payoff from any given action in period 2 is monotonic in beliefs. Start-
ing from some 0 < µ < 1, an increase in µ strictly increases the expected payoff from
(x A1 , x
A
2 ) and decreases the one from (x
B
1 , x
B
2 ). In fact, for any (x1, x2) ∈ X with u(x1, x2|A) 6=
u(x j , xk |B), the expected payoff is either strictly in- or decreasing in µ. We can order
actions at t = 2 according to expected payoffs based on µ(s) - the belief after receiving
the signal s. This gives rise to a cutoff-type decision rule.
To illustrate this, consider the period 2 expected payoff of x A2 given the action x
B
1 in
period 1 and some posterior µ(s):
µ(s)u(xB1 , x
A
2 |A)+ (1−µ(s))u(xB1 , x A2 |B)
Similarly, the expected payoff from xB2 is
µ(s)u(xB1 , x
B
2 |A)+ (1−µ(s))u(xB1 , xB2 |B)
If u(xB1 , x
A
2 |A) > u(xB1 , xB2 |A), there exist some µ∗(s) ∈ (0,1) such that for all µ(s) >
µ∗(s), the expected payoff from choosing x A2 is larger than from x
B
2 . Equally, for all
µ(s) < µ∗(s), the expected payoff from xB2 exceeds the expected payoff from x A2 as
u(xB1 , x
A
2 |B)< u(xB1 , xB2 |B). An equivalent argument shows that the same is true for any
other x2 ∈ X2 such that u(xB1 , x2|A) > u(xB1 , xB2 |A). For µ large enough, the expected
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payoff from x2 exceeds the one from xB2 and vice versa for µ small enough. Iterating
this argument over all available actions at t = 2 and each t = 1 action allows us to con-
clude that the region in which a given x2 is chosen must be connected. Result 12 in
Appendix 3.9.3 shows this formally.
We can now derive the conditions under which a given action is chosen in period 2
for at least some beliefs. For any x1 ∈ X1 there is a xa ∈ X2 such that u(x1, xa |A) ≥
u(x1, xk |A) for all xk ∈ X2. xa is optimal for µ(s) = 1 and will be chosen if µ(s) is high
enough. The equivalent is true for some action in state B . If the actions are identical
across states then this is the best possible action for all µ(s). Otherwise, there might
be different optimal actions for intermediate beliefs.
Consider the threshold belief µa, j for which the expected payoff from (x1, xa) is exactly
equal the one from (x1, x j ):
µa, j u(x1, xa |A)+ (1−µa, j )u(x1, xa |B)=µa, j u(x1, x j |A)+ (1−µa, j )u(x1, x j |B)
We can rearrange the equation to
µa, j
(1−µa, j )
= u(x1, x j |B)−u(x1, xa |B)
u(x1, xa |A)−u(x1, x j |A)
Since by definition u(x1, xa |A) is the highest utility in state A for x1, the equation
highlights that u(x1, x j |B)> u(x1, xa |B) is a necessary and sufficient condition for this
threshold to exist. We can then simply order actions according to payoffs in both states
and ignore actions that are dominated in both states. Starting from µa = 1, for which
xa is the best action, we can compare the potential cutoffs for all actions xi ∈ X2 that
are not strictly dominated. The action with the highest µa,i will be the one chosen for
some range of beliefs. We then continue to iterate this process from this action until
there is no more action that has a higher payoff in state B .
Result 1: For every x1 ∈ X1, there exists a partition Px1 of [0,1] such that for every two
consecutive elements pi and pi+1 of the partition, there is an action x2 ∈ X2 such that
E [u(x1, x2)|µ]≥ E [u(x1, x)|µ] for all x ∈ X2 and pi <µ< pi+1.
Result 1 follows directly from the previous argument and Result 12. It highlights how
the choice in period 2 depends on the posterior, which in turn is determined by the
signal. Differences in the posterior are only welfare relevant if they fall in different
elements of the partition. For binary signals, there are at most 2 different choices in
period 2 and thus potentially 4 different utility outcomes. Since those are pinned down
for every x ∈ X1byPx , we can collapse the problem to a comparison of experiments in
87
period 1, fixing the corresponding optimal period 2 choices.
3.4.2 Choice in Period 1
In the first period, the decision maker simply maximizes his expected utility:
max
x1∈X1
E
[
u
(
x1, {x
∗
a(x1)
, x∗b(x1)}
)|µ]
where {x∗a(x1), x
∗
b(x1)
} are the optimal period 2 actions following x1 ∈ X1. The period 1
choice balances the information value of an experiment as well as the immediate util-
ity derived from it. A very informative action leads to very different posteriors and,
keeping in mind the partition, to different actions in period 2. When the experiment
is uninformative, the posterior µ(s) equals the prior µ and falls into the same bracket
of the partition.
Taking x1 as given, let µ(s) be the posterior after receiving a type-s signal and x∗s be
the corresponding optimal action. We can write the expected utility as
[µ(a)u(x1, x
∗
a |A)+ (1−µ(a))u(x1, x∗a |B)]Pr (s = a|x1,µ)
+ [µ(b)u(x1, x∗b |A)+ (1−µ(b))u(x1, x∗b |B)]Pr (s = b|x1,µ)
Recall that the probability of receiving an a(x1) signal in state A is pi(x1, A) ≥ 12 which
is also equal the probability of receiving the signal b(x1) in state B . Using Bayes’ rule,
we can rewrite the expected utility expression as:
µ [pi(x1, A)u(x1, x
∗
a |A)+ (1−pi(x1, A))u(x1, x∗b |A)]
+(1−µ) [pi(x1,B)u(x1, x∗a |B)+ (1−pi(x1,B))u(x1, x∗b |B)]
(3.1)
This is the objective function for the utility maximization problem atµ. It is a weighted
average of receiving the "correct" signal and thus choosing the correct action and the
probability of receiving the "incorrect" signal and thus choosing the action that yields
the lower utility in the realized state. A higher informativeness in the sense of pi(x1,A)1−pi(x1,A)
reduces the likelihood of such a mistake. An agent might then be confident enough in
the signals that he chooses actions that have a higher variation between states.
We finish this section with a key property of the unbiased agent’s problem. Some of
the later results arise from a violation of this.
Result 2: The maximum expected utility at t = 1 as a function of µ is convex in µ.
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The previous discussion is best illustrated with a simple example:
Example 1: In each period, there are three actions {xA, xI , xB } = X1 = X2. The actions
xA, xB yield uninformative signals with pi(xA, A) = pi(xB , A) = 0.5. Action xI provides
an informative signal with pi(xI , A) = 0.75. Utilities are symmetric in states such that
u(xA, xA|A) = 5 = u(xB , xB |B), u(xI , xA|A) = u(xI , xB |B) = 4 while all other combina-
tions yield 0 utility. xI represents a pure information experiment that is only useful
because it indicates the true state and thus the appropriate action at t = 2.
In this setting, the agent never chooses a combination of xA and xB . If the agent takes
the information experiment in period 1 then he will choose between xA and xB in pe-
riod 2 depending on whether his posterior is greater or smaller than 12 .
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Figure 3.1: Utility frontier
Figure 3.1 illustrates the expected utility outcomes. Actions xA (orange) and xB (red)
are optimal for extreme enough beliefs. For intermediate beliefs, the informativeness
of xI (blue) is more valuable. The posterior can fall into both partition elements such
that xA or xB is chosen at t = 2 conditional on the signal. His maximum expected
utility, indicated by the bold line, is clearly convex in µ.
3.5 Biased Perception
We now turn to our main area of investigation: scenarios in which the agent might
misinterpret parts of his environment. In particular, he might not always perceive in-
formation accurately or might commit systematic mistakes when observing signals.
We call this a perception bias. Furthermore, the agent could have a prior that is devi-
ating from the true probability distribution over states. We call this somewhat loosely
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a bias in prior.
The perception bias adds noise to the signal; a form of Blackwell garbling. It weak-
ens the correlation between the signal and the state and thus reduces the information
value of experiments in period 1. The agent arrives at incorrect posteriors following
the initial signal and may choose suboptimal actions in the second period. The bias
in prior might lead to a suboptimal choice of experiment in period 1 with potential
consequences for the subsequent choices.
The perception bias could be due to an agent’s unwillingness to change their preferred
hypothesis or a systematic mistake in interpreting information. Initially, we take no
stand regarding the source and exact form of the bias. Unless stated otherwise, we
make the crucial assumption that the agent is naive in the sense that he is unaware of
this perception problem. He computes his posterior and chooses his actions as if he
was receiving signals according to the true underlying structure. In a later section, we
discuss how this is related to a setting where agents have no perception bias but sim-
ply a distorted view about the accuracy of signals. We argue that they overlap but are
not identical. We also explore the implication of a sophisticated agent, who is aware
of his perception problem.4
To illustrate the setting, imagine the following thought experiment. A doctor orders
a medical test. The outcome can be either negative or positive. On top of any inaccu-
racies of the test itself, suppose there is a certain chance the lab technician enters the
incorrect result in the patient’s file. The attending doctor never misperceives informa-
tion if the technician does his job perfectly. However, there will be an information loss
if, for instance, the technician mistakenly enters a positive result if the test actually
came back negative. It is as if the doctor misperceives the signal. The distortion does
not have to be balanced but is independent of the state of the world: the lab techni-
cian does not have any knowledge about the truth other than through the test result
he observes. If the doctor is unaware of his technician’s potential mistake, we refer
to him as naive; if he takes his mistakes into account, we call him sophisticated. As
mentioned before, we mostly maintain the assumption of a naive doctor. An incorrect
prior regarding the condition of the patient might simply lead to an unnecessary test
(or failure to conduct a necessary one).
4Note that a distinction between a sophisticated and naive agent would be meaningless for a bias in
prior.
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Let s t be the signal observed by the technician conducting the experiment x1, and
s the signal received by the doctor. Then
Assumption A3: Pr(s, s t |ω, x1)= Pr(s t |ω, x1) ·Pr(s|s t , x1) ∀ω ∈ {A,B}
Define the signal probability distortion function d as a function that converts the true
signal probabilities into (potentially different) probabilities that capture the likelihood
with which the agent actually perceives the signals. In particular, d
(
(pi,1−pi),S(x1),µ
)
gives the vector of probabilities for a and b signals for a belief µ, signal structure S(x1),
and the undistorted probability structure (pi,1−pi). We can break this down into two
functions, da and db , one for each type of signal. Let the probability of correctly trans-
mitting an a signal when performing the experiment x1 be ka(x1,µ), and let kb(x1,µ)
be the corresponding probability for a b signal. Notice that the likelihood of mistakes
may depend on the prior of the agent as well as the type of signal. We can then write
the signal probability distortion function as:
d
(
(pi,1−pi),S(x1),µ
)=
 da(pi, x1,µ)
db(1−pi, x1,µ)
=
ka(x1,µ)pi+ (1−kb(x1,µ))(1−pi)
kb(x1,µ)(1−pi)+ (1−ka(x1,µ))pi
 (3.2)
for any pi ∈ [0,1] with the obvious restriction that da(pi, x1,µ)+db(1−pi, x1,µ) = 1. An
increase in the magnitude of the bias means a reduction of ka(x1,µ), or kb(x1,µ), or
both.
Result 3: The signal probability distortion function d takes the form of equation (3.2).
It is state independent in the sense that ka(x1,µ) and kb(x1,µ) are state independent.
5
For convenience, we can represent the actual experiment as well the distorted one by
a Markov matrix. In this notation, an experiment is characterized by a 2× 2 Markov
matrix K , where element Ki j refers to the probability of receiving a signal s = j in state
ωi .
Denote the unbiased, information experiment arising from x1 by Px1 with the struc-
ture:
Px1 =
 pi 1−pi
1−pi pi
 (3.3)
5Notice that the true probability of receiving a certain signal is obviously still conditional on the state.
If we want to think of this distortion as confirmation bias along the lines of Rabin and Schrag (1999),
with an agent being biased towards hypothesis B and thus misinterpreting a signals as b signals with
probability δ, but never the other way around, we set: ka(x1,µ)= 1−δ, kb(x1,µ)= 1.
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The agent’s perception bias is represented by a Markov matrix MPx1 :
MPx1 =
 ka(x1,µ) 1−ka(x1,µ)
1−kb(x1i ,µ) kb(x1,µ)
 (3.4)
The resulting probability structure of the experiment Px1 MPx1 captures exactly the
idea behind the signal probability distortion function:
Px1 MPx1 =
 da(pi, x1,µ) db(1−pi, x1,µ)
da(1−pi, x1,µ) db(pi, x1,µ)
 (3.5)
3.5.1 Blackwell (1951)
We now take a small detour to Blackwell’s seminal research on the comparisons of ex-
periments (Blackwell (1951), Blackwell and Girshick (1954)).6 This digression is useful
as it highlights the general principles behind information experiments. We will also
see how Blackwell’s general results translate to settings where agents are biased - both
naive, or sophisticated with respect to their perception mistakes.7
In Blackwell’s comparison of experiments, an agent compares statistical information
experiments. Our setting is slightly more general in the sense is that experiments not
only yield information but may also have direct payoff consequences. Upon receiving
a signal from an information experiment, the agent maximizes his utility. Denote the
value function of experiment P by V (P ).
Definition B.1: Let P and Q be two experiments. We say that experiment P is more
informative than Q, denoted by P ⊃Q, if there is a 2×2 Markov matrix M with P M =Q.
This definition highlights how the information experiment P is garbled into Q by the
matrix M ; it is as if noise was added to P to create a less informative experiment Q.
From this statistical notion, Blackwell derives his famous result:
Result B1: Let P and Q be two experiments. V (P ) ≥ V (Q) if and only if there is a 2×2
Markov matrix M such that P M =Q.
Simply put, a more informative experiment implies a higher utility. Surprisingly, the
6Both are phrased very much in the language of a statistician. For an economist’s take on this see
Marschak and Miyasawa (1968) who translated the setup into a utility-framework.
7For further details about the general setting of Blackwell, please see the Appendix B. All statements
generalise to n-signals and n-states. These can also be found in the Appendix.
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converse is also true: If one experiment yields a higher expected utility than another,
it must be more informative.
In Blackwell’s setup the agent is rational. He fully understands the signal generating
structure of the two experiments and correctly perceives each signal. The garbling ma-
trix doesn’t represent the agent’s misperception but is a tool to order the experiments
by informativeness.
In order to talk about a Blackwell setting when agents misperceive information, we
need a new function representing the agents’ expected utility from the experiments.
Suppose the unbiased, true information experiment is P but the agent misperceives
some signals according to matrix M . As a result, the agent faces an information ex-
periment P M . We denote the expected utility of a naive agent, who is unaware of his
perception bias, by Vn(P, M). The first argument always indicates the original signal
generating process and the second argument the agent’s misperception. This agent
believes the information experiment is P and thus chooses his action as if he was ra-
tional facing P .
If the agent is sophisticated, that is he is cognisant of his misperception M , we write
his utility as: Vs(P, M).
At this point, all tools and notation are developed, the stage is set for agents who are
unbiased, sophisticated or naive with respect to their signal processing.
3.6 Biases and Their Implications
We start with the statement that the agent is always worse off with a perception bias
than without. This observation follows from the original Blackwell result on the order-
ing of information experiments.
Result B2: Take two experiments O and P, with O ⊃ P, and let M be a Markov matrix
with OM = P. Then V (O)≥V (OM)=Vs(O, M)≥Vn(O, M).
The first inequality shows the welfare effect for sophisticated agents, which follows
immediately from the Blackwell result. In the Blackwell setting, the agent has a choice
between the original and the garbled experiment. Since it is impossible to reverse one’s
bias, a biased agent does not actually have this choice and so will always be worse off.
The second inequality says that a naive agent is (weakly) worse off than a sophisticated
given the same bias. This arises from two observations. One, both the sophisticated
and the naive receive the same signals with the same likelihoods. Two, for each signal,
the sophisticated is aware of its lower information value, which allows him to make
better decisions. It follows that:
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Proposition 1: Take any information experiment P. A sophisticated agent’s utility from
P is (weakly) larger than the naive agent’s utility, but weakly worse than an agent that
doesn’t suffer from any misperception.
For our specific choice problem, a stronger statement is possible. We say that the mag-
nitude of the bias increases if ka , kb , or both, decrease, i.e. when the off-diagonal of
the garbling matrix M increases.
Result 4: Any signal distortion function where da(pi(x1,ω), x1,µ) 6=pi(x1,ω) for someω ∈
Ω (weakly) reduces the expected utility if x1 ∈ X1 is chosen at µ = p. It strictly reduces
the expected utility if the action profile is signal sensitive.
The welfare loss is increasing in the magnitude of the bias.
Any perception bias is bad news for an agent who conditions his choices on signals. It
leads to more "mistakes" in period 2 choices. As the misperception increases, i.e. da
moves further away from pi, the mistakes increase and the expected utility falls. The
welfare consequences of a perception bias can thus be ordered for a given direction of
bias.
Looking at this from the perspective of the distortion function d, the following Result 5
shows that we can interpret an increase in the magnitude of the bias as a reduction in
the differences of the signal probabilities across states. As the bias increases, the like-
lihood of receiving a given signal converges across states. Given the previous result,
this leads to a welfare loss.
Result 5: An increase in the magnitude of the bias for some x1 and µ leads to a decrease
in
da(pi(x1,ω), x1,µ)−da(1−pi(x1,ω), x1,µ)
Using the earlier example, we can illustrate the welfare consequences of a bias for a
signal sensitive action profile:
Example 2: Take the setting from Example 1 and suppose that the agent has a confir-
mation bias towards B . This implies that he perceives b(xI ) too often, i.e. ka(S(xI ),µ)=
1−δ, but never misperceives a(xI ), i.e. kb(S(xI ),µ)= 1. The following graph plots the
utility frontier for δ= 0.2 which increases the likelihood of receiving a b signal in state
B from 1−pi(xI ,B) to 1−pi(xI ,B)+0.2pi(xI ,B) and in state A accordingly.
The utility frontier, as seen in Figure 3.2, is strictly lower for any interval in which xI is
actually chosen and identical otherwise. It does not affect the expected utility for more
extreme priors, even if xI was chosen as the posterior will always remain in the same
partition regardless of the signal realization. In contrast, the effect is strictly negative
for the interval in which the agent conditions the choice on the signal.
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Figure 3.2: Utility frontier with confirmation bias
3.6.1 Biased Prior
We now introduce an alternative source of suboptimal choice: the agent holds an in-
correct prior, namely µ 6= p. The prior may be wrong as a consequence of a variety of
behavioral and or updating mistakes in the past. If µ = p the agent will take optimal
choices. If, however, µ 6= p, then the true expected utility does not necessarily match
the one evaluated by µ.
Equation (3.1) illustrates how a different µ can lead to different choices. An inaccurate
µ puts too much weight on one of the states and thus favours actions appropriate for
that state. As it realizes with a different probability p, the choice might be suboptimal.
It follows:
Result 6: For any µ ≥ p, expected utility is (weakly) decreasing in µ. Equivalently, for
µ≤ p expected utility is increasing in µ.
3.6.2 Interaction of Biases
So far, we have learned that, in isolation, both biases have a negative effect on out-
comes. Additionally, an increase in the magnitude of the biases exacerbates the prob-
lem. One might expect that the interaction of both reduces expected utility even fur-
ther, a ‘double whammy’. However, it turns out that this is not the case. To the contrary,
an agent with both, a biased perception and a biased prior, can be better off than an
agent who only suffers from one of the two. The fundamental reason behind this is that
the perception bias shuffles the otherwise straight-forward ranking of experiments at
different priors to a different degree. We analyse both directions, i.e. fixing one bias
and increasing the other - and determine when a welfare ordering can be established.
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Adding a Biased Priors to a Biased Perception
In this section, we assume that the agent’s perception is biased ‘from the start’. This
can either be specific to the experiment - i.e. some experiments generate signals that
are more likely to be misperceived than others - or the same across all experiments.
We investigate how a bias in prior interacts with the misperception. Breaking the es-
tablished pattern, we first present an example and then generalize this insight.
Example 3: Reconsider the setting of Example 2 with an agent exhibiting confirma-
tion bias. If the agent is unaware of the bias, the utility frontier is not convex in µ.
This arises due to the merely perceived indifference between action xB and xI - given
optimal period 2 actions - at µ= 0.4. Both achieve an expected utility of 3. The "true"
expected utility from xI is only 2.88 because the agent perceives b(xI ) too frequently
and thus takes the period 2 action xB more often in state A than he would without the
bias. The agent should strictly prefer action profile (xB , xB ). The equivalent situation
applies to (xA, xA) and µ close to 0.6.
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Figure 3.3: Non-convex utility frontier
Now consider the following: if the true p is just below 0.6, then the actually attainable
expected utility of an agent with any µ> 0.6 is strictly higher compared to his expected
expected utility with µ= p. The choice (xA, xA) which would be suboptimal for a fully
rational agent, actually yields a strictly better outcome than the "rational choice" xI .
The agent with a biased prior and perception bias fares better than an agent with only
perception bias, because his suboptimal choice has a signal structure that is less (or
not at all) affected by the perception bias.
To understand the conditions under which such a situation can arise, we introduce
the following relation between action profiles:
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Definition D1 [Worst-case dominance]: An action profile (y1, {ya , yb}) worst-case dom-
inates (x1, {xa , xb}) at µ ∈ (0,1) if
min
s∈{a,b}
µu(x1, xs)|A)+ (1−µ)u(x1, xs |B)< E [u(y)|µ].
In words, worst-case dominance compares an action profile y to the scenario where
the agent gets the ‘worst’ signal realisation for the profile x; meaning the signal that
leads him to make the worst choice in his contingent plan {xa , xb} evaluated by the ex-
pected utility. Clearly, this worst signal depends on the prior. If the prior is sufficiently
close to 1, the worst signal is b and for a prior close to 0, the worst signal is a. Notice
that y may or may not be preferred to x when worst-case dominance holds.
The usefulness of this definition lies in the fact that the concept is independent of the
state of the world and enables us to identify which action profiles can be made worse
relative to another profile.
Result 7: For any signal sensitive action profile y that worst-case dominates x at µ ∈
[0,1], there exists a distortion d with associated distortion matrices Mx , My such that
Ed [u(x)|µ]< Ed [u(y)|µ].
If an action profile is worst-case dominated, it is possible to create a distortion that
would rank another profile strictly higher in terms of expected utility. Nevertheless,
the result is quite weak since it might require a distortion that targets a specific type of
signal: the signals S(x1) generated by experiment x1. Depending on the scenario, this
is hard to justify in practice in a literal way. But we can think of it as a particular exper-
iment yielding harder-to-interpret results while another experiment has very straight-
forward outcomes. In this context, worst-case dominance tells us something about
how the ranking of alternatives can change when one experiment generates very am-
biguous signals. We can now state the result that tells us the precise condition when
adding a bias in prior can make an already perception-biased agent better off.
Proposition 2: For any signal sensitive action profile x that is chosen atµ and any action
profile y 6= x that is chosen atµ′ 6=µ, there exists a distortion d with associated distortion
matrices Mx , My such that Ed [u(y)] > Ed [u(x)] when p = µ 6= µ′ if and only if y worst-
case dominates x at µ.
At least for a relatively unrestricted class of distortions d , we can always find one that
makes an agent with an incorrect belief µ′ 6= p better-off than an agent with a correct
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belief as long as there is sufficient potential variation in payoffs. The next corollary
shows that this does not hinge on distorting only one experiment. With a notion very
similar to worst-case dominance, we can extended the result to a setting where all sig-
nals are distorted equivalently. In the context of our example of a lab technician that
might enter incorrect results, the tendency to make such a mistake is now equalized
across tests rather than one test being more prone to transcription errors than another.
Definition D2 [Simple dominance]: An action profile (y1, {ya , yb}) simply dominates
(x1, {xa , xb}) at µ ∈ (0,1) if
µu(x1, xa)|A)+ (1−µ)u(x1, xa |B)<µu(y1, ya)|A)+ (1−µ)u(y1, ya |B)
or
µu(x1, xb)|A)+ (1−µ)u(x1, xb |B)<µu(y1, yb)|A)+ (1−µ)u(y1, yb |B)
or both.
Definition D2 breaks each action profile down into the simple profiles that can be
derived from it and compares their expected utility. While simple dominance is not
directly comparable to worst-case dominance, the idea is similar. Simple dominance
compares the expected utility at µ of each of the two simple profiles derived from the
action profiles that are being contrasted. Worst-case dominance compares the ex-
pected utility of an action profile with the expected utility of the worst simple profile
generated from the action profile it is contrasted against.
Returning to our example, simple dominance compares two treatment methods fix-
ing a particular test result without taking into account the information value. If one
method is inferior in at least one of those cases, we can find a type of mistake the lab
technician could commit equally across those tests such that the treatment optimal
in the absence of mistakes is inferior if the mistake is present. In contrast, worst-case
dominance compares a test under ideal conditions with one where the lab technician
commits the worst possible type of mistake from an ex-ante perspective.
Corollary 8: For any signal sensitive action profile x that is chosen at µ and any action
profile y 6= x that is chosen at µ′ 6= µ, there exists a distortion d with associated matri-
ces Mx = My such that Ed [u(y)] > Ed [u(x)] when p = µ 6= µ′ if and only if y simply
dominates x at µ.
Proposition 2 and Corollary 8 provide a tight characterisation for utility reversals, ac-
counting for first period action’s direct utility effect. The reason behind these results
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is that the naive agent has an incorrect view about the information value from x1 rela-
tively to some alternative y1. This is captured in the following result:
Result B3: : Take two experiments O and P, with perception biases MO , MP . For the
naive agent, neither the ordering (according to informativeness) of O and P nor the
ordering of OMO and P MP determines, or is determined by the agents expected utility
ranking of the experiments, Vn(O, MO) and Vn(P, MP ).
To understand this statement, recall that with rational agents, Blackwell’s result B1
says that if O is more informative than P , then the agent is better off from O. For naive,
the fundamental underlying experiment O can be more informative than P , yet may
yield lower utility as he ultimately faces a different experiment due to his perception
bias. However, even if we take into account what the naive’s effective experiments
are, OMO and P MP , it is still possible that the more informative experiment OMO can
have lower utility. This is due to the fact that the agent does not recognize the true
information value of the experiments. It follows that Blackwell’s main result on the
comparison of experiments does not holds for biased agents.
Given the fact that there is no first period action in Blackwell, this result highlights
when the worst-case dominance definition is trivially satisfied, and how first period
actions’ instrumental- and direct utility value can be separated.
First, suppose that the information experiment from x1 is more informative than from
y1, Px1 ⊃ Py1 . If the direct utility from x1 is lower than from y1 at p, then worst-case
dominance will always be satisfied by Result B3. However, if the utility from x1 is
higher at p, then we need to check whether worst-case-dominance is satisfied.
Similarly, when x1 is less informative, Px1 ⊂ Py1 , but it is precisely chosen for it’s direct
utility, we again need to check worst-case dominance.
To understand the role of naivety, we present the Blackwell result for sophisticated
agents:
Result B4: : Take two experiments O and P, with perception biases MO , MP . OMO ⊃
P MP if and only if Vs(O, MO)≥Vs(P, MP ).
The result follows from the observation that the sophisticated but biased agent’s utility
of O is equal to the rational agent’s utility, who faces OMO : Vs(O, MO)= Vs(OMO , I )=
V (OMO). Clearly, this statement has no implication for the ordering of O and P it-
self. Observing an agent who takes an ‘objectively’ less informative experiments does
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therefore not imply that he is making an incorrect choice.8 But this also implies that
any sophisticated agent cannot be better off from an incorrect prior. The incorrect
prior may cause him to choose an alternative action y1 with a different underlying ex-
periment. Since he correctly accounted for the lower-information value arising from
his perception bias for any information experiment, this simply makes him choose
worse first period actions.
Adding a Biased Perception to a Biased Priors
We now turn the previous analysis around. Taking the agent’s biased prior as given, we
show under which conditions adding or increasing a perception bias can make him
better off. This result turns out to be more clear-cut. Adding any type of perception
bias makes an agent worse-off if his chosen action profile is not ‘too suboptimal’ given
the true p. Otherwise, there exists some type of perception bias that can improve the
agent’s welfare.
Proposition 3: Let x= (x1, {xa , xb}) be a signal-sensitive action profile chosen at µ 6= p.
(a) If E [u(x)|p] > max{E [u(x1, xa)|p],E [u(x1, xb)|p]} then increasing the degree of per-
ception bias strictly decreases expected utility for any type of perception bias.
(b) If E [u(x)|p] <max{E [u(x1, xa)|p],E [u(x1, xb)|p]}, then increasing the degree of per-
ception bias strictly increases expected utility for some type of bias.
Statement (a) says that the signal-sensitive x is preferred by an agent with the correct
prior p over choosing the simple profile where the agent always chooses xa or xb in
the second period. Adding noise to the signals is equivalent to putting more weight
on a simple profile and strictly lowers µ’s payoffs. This is exactly what any distortion
function does.
Statement (b) states that one of the simple action profiles is preferred to the contin-
gent one by the agent with belief p. In that case, the agent is strictly better off the more
often he receives the respective signal realization that makes him choose such a pro-
file.
We can also interpret Proposition 3 in terms of how severe the bias in prior is. To see
this, recall that the action profile is signal sensitive at µ for exactly the reason that the
posteriors following the signal fall into different parts of the partition that prescribes
optimal second-period behavior. If we push up the prior, then after any signal action
xa is relatively more appealing compared to xb than before. Pushed far enough the
agent only wants to take xa regardless of the signal realization; xa is, after all, strictly
8To see this take a fully informative n ×n vector P and some informative O of equal dimension. Let
MP = [1/n]n×n i.e. the matrix filled only with 1/n which will turn P completely uninformative and
keep the information value of O by setting MO = I , so that O ⊂ P but OMO ⊃ P MP .
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better in state A. At this point, a perception bias can help the agent (b). If the prior is
too close to p he is always worse off due to losing information.
Finally, it should also be clear form this discussion that for every signal sensitive pro-
file, there always exists a region for either case.
Martingale bias
In the previous sections, the bias could generate a drift in beliefs whenever the percep-
tion bias was unbalanced between signals. A rational observer aware of the bias would
form an ex-ante expectation over the posterior different from the prior. We now re-
strict the perception bias to what we call a ‘martingale’ bias: a bias such that the agent
as well as the observer form the same expectation over posteriors. The martingale
bias represents a simple random error in perception, that occurs indiscriminately of
the signal type.9 This section will help to qualify our previous Propositions. In contrast
to Proposition 3, we show that under such a mistake, the agent with a biased prior can
never be better off when a martingale perception bias is added. Changing the prior for
an agent with such a perception bias can still be beneficial, however.
Consider a naive agent that thinks the signal strength is the true undistorted pi(x1,ω).
Let ka(x1,µ)= kb(x1,µ)≡ κ ∈ [ 12pi(x1,A) ,1]. We can write the agent’s expected utility as
µ [κpi(x1, A)u(x1, xa |A)+ (1−κpi(x1, A))u(x1, xb |A)]
+(1−µ) [(1−κ(1−pi(x1,B)))u(x1, xa |B)+κ(1−pi(x1,B))u(x1, xb |B)]
(3.6)
From state independence, we know that κ≤ 1. Since the martingale bias represents a
pure random error, in the extreme the signal should be pure noise and thusκ≥ 12pi(x1,A) .
As can be seen from Equation (3.6), if the true probability of receiving an a signal in
state A is κpi(x1, A), but the agent believes this to be pi(x1, A), there is too much weight
on u(x1, xa |A) and u(x1, xb |B). The agent expects to achieve the high outcomes too
often which overstates his perceived expected utility of the action profile. It follows
that as the perception bias becomes worse, i.e. κ decreases, the agent is worse off.
Moreover, this is true for any true p and any prior belief µ, so that there is no way that
adding a martingale perception bias to a bias in prior is welfare improving:
Corollary 9: For any κ ∈ [ 12pi(x1,A) ,1] and any signal sensitive action profile {x1, {xa , xb}}
chosen at µ, a decrease in κ decreases the expected utility for any µ and p ∈ (0,1).
9i.e. the garbling matrix is symmetric M =
[
m 1−m
1−m m
]
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Hence the restriction to a martingale bias yields a stronger result than Proposition
3. The martingale bias adds noise and thus reduces the signal strength equally for all
signal types. Independent of the true state, this leads to strictly worse period 2 choices.
However, it is still possible that under such random error perception bias, the agent
can benefit from an incorrect prior:
Corollary 10: For any signal sensitive action profile x that is chosen at µ, and any action
profile y 6= x that is chosen at µ′ 6= µ, there exists a κ such that E [u(y)]> Ed [u(x)] when
p =µ 6=µ′ if and only if
µ
2
[u(x1, xa)|A)+u(x1, xb)|A)]+
1−µ
2
[u(x1, xa)|B)+u(x1, xb)|B)]< E [u(y)|p] (3.7)
Like Proposition 1 this assumes that the bias applies only to the chosen profile x. We
can also apply the bias symmetrically as long as we respect the condition that we can
at most generate pure noise (rather than achieve a negative correlation). This means
the experiment with the less precise signals determines the limit up to which we can
garble symmetrically. We then get the following result:
Corollary 11: For any signal sensitive action profile x that is chosen atµ, and any signal-
sensitive action profile y 6= x that is chosen at µ′ 6=µ and
for κmi n ≡ max{ 12pi(x1,A) ,
1
2pi(y1,A)
}, there exists a κmax with 1 > κmax > κmi n such that
Ed [u(y)]> Ed [u(x)] when p =µ 6=µ′ for all κ ∈ [κmi n ,κmax) if and only if
E [u(x)|p,κmi n]< E [u(y)|p,κmi n] (3.8)
In other words, if we want to check whether an agent with prior µ′ could be better off
than one at the true p, we have to compare y to x at the extreme point where one of
the two information experiments yields just noise. If at this point y is indeed preferred,
such a reversal in the ordering of x and y is possible. But of course, this could already
happen at a less extreme distortion.
In this section, and indeed in all previous ones, the agent is overconfident in the signal
as he fails to discount the perception bias. The martingale property makes this quite
similiar to a related major updating mistake found in the literature: in inference prob-
lems agents tend to sometimes over- and sometimes under-infer from a given sample
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of signals. For instance in the classical paper by Griffin and Tversky (1992) agents over-
infer from small sample sizes but under-infer from large ones.10 Indeed one can find
a corresponding martingale bias setup for someone who over-infers: The two agents
perceive the signal to be of the same strength and will receive the same signal with the
same likelihood. However, the key difference between the two mistakes is that over-
/ under-inference takes the true signal process as given and only changes the percep-
tion of signal strengths, whereas the distorted transmissions fixes the perception of
signal quality but alters the actual probabilities with which signals are perceived. By
changing the perceived signal strength, anything can happen in terms of welfare con-
sequences. This lack of structure leads us to relegate the discussion to a footnote.11
3.6.3 Sophisticated vs Naive Agents
When the prior is correct, we have seen that a sophisticated agent is always weakly
better off than a naive agent. We finish this section with a short example that high-
lights that this no longer needs to be true when µ differs from p. A sophisticated agent
is aware of the reduced information value of each experiment and thus may want to
take a different choice than a naive agent. If the true ordering of experiments under µ
is different than under p, such behavioral adjustments can be suboptimal.
Example 4: Example 1 serves again as the basis. Suppose that the agent suffers from a
martingale bias and tends to misperceive both a and b signals with probability 1−κ=
0.7. Suppose further that µ= 0.57.
Compared to the naive agent, the sophisticated is aware of the lower information value
10For a current, extensive summary of the experimental evidence on this topic, see Appendix B of Ben-
jamin, Rabin and Raymond (2013).
11With over- or under-reaction to information, the agent can almost trivially achieve a higher utility re-
gardless of which bias is adjusted:
First, suppose the sets of actions are X1 = {x1} and X2 = {xa , xb}. First, take the wrong prior as given:
(1) Let the signal sensitive action profile x be optimal at p whereas the agent with prior µ 6= p prefers
the simple profile (x1, xa). Then the agent is better off by exaggerating the signal quality so that his
second period profile becomes signal sensitive. (2) Similarly, suppose the simple action profile (x1, xa)
is optimal at p. Then an agent with µ 6= p, who prefers the signal sensitive profile, can be better off by
inferring too little if he prefers (x1, xa) over (x1, xb) in the absence of any signal.
Next take information processing bias as given: (3) Suppose that due to over-inference the agent
prefers the conditional profile when it is optimal to choose (x1, xa). Changing the correct prior to
some µ> p where the agent prefers (x1, xa) improves his utility.
The only non-trivial case (4) is under-inference and changing the correct prior. Suppose x is optimal
at p but due to under-inference the agent with the correct prior prefers z. Let y be the agent’s pre-
ferred choice at some µ 6= p. If the actual signal strength of S(y1) is sufficiently larger than of S(z1),
then shifting the prior from p to µ helps the agent. To see why, notice due to under-inference his
response to the signal is attenuated. However, the likelihood of receiving the correct signal under y1
is higher (than he thinks) which will ‘too often’ select the ‘correct’ action from his conditional profile.
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of x I and opts for the simple profile (xB , xB ). If µ = p he clearly does better than
the naive who still chooses the information experiment in the first period. The naive
agent, however, can do better than the sophisticated when the actual p is lower, take
for example p = 0.4. His naivety causes him to pick the information experiment and
subsequently to take x A whenever he receives an a signal. For a low enough p this is
always better than the sophisticated’s choice of (xB , xB ).
3.7 Example: Investment with Information Acquisition
We finish this paper with a simple investment problem that captures the fundamen-
tals of the entrepreneur example outlined in the introduction.
An agent can invest his income w in either a risk-free or a risky asset, both having a
unit price. There are two states of the world Ω = {A,B}. The risk-free asset’s return in
any state of the world is normalised to zero. The risky asset yields a positive return of
rh in state A, but a negative return of rl in state B . The agent has a prior µ0 = Pr(ω= A)
and is risk averse with U (c)= ln(c).
Before investing, the agent has the opportunity to purchase a signal s ∈ {a,b} at a cost
c > 0 that fully reveals ω. He then decides on the fraction of income he invests in the
risky asset, denoted by x. Finally, let the agent’s information perception bias be of the
following structure: Whenever he receives a b signal - a signal that tells him not to in-
vest - he might misinterpret it as an a signal with a probability δ. On the contrary, a
signals are always perceived correctly.
We now show how holding an incorrect prior can help mitigate the bias in information
perception through avoiding information.
First, we solve for x as a function of the posterior µ:
x(µ,rh ,rl )=

0 if µrh + (1−µ)rl ≤ 0
1 if µ≥−rl (rh +1)/(rh − rl )
µrh+(1−µ)rl
−rl rh otherwise
Let Pr(ω = A) = p = 0.55. Let the risky asset’s return be rh = 60% in state A and rl =
−95% in state B . The agent’s wealth is w = 1.2. The cost of acquiring information is
c = 0.25. Furthermore, the agent’s information bias is δ= 0.4.
Notice that the expected return of the asset is 0.55·0.6−0.45·0.95=−0.0975< 0. When
µ= p, an agent who does not acquire information would never invest in the risky asset.
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If the agent acquires the fully informative signal, he will invest everything into the risky
asset when he observes an a signal, and nothing at all following a b signal.
An unbiased agent (with the true prior) will acquire information since the information
is cheap enough, EU (acquire info) = p ln((1+ rh)(w − c))+ (1− p) ln(w − c) = 0.21 >
ln(1.2)= EU (not acquire).
A naive agent with misperception bias makes the same choices as an unbiased one.
When his prior is correct, his true utility from acquiring information is only
EUtr ue (acquire info|µ= 0.55)=−0.33
since he sometimes invests his whole income when the state is B .12
If he instead holds a rather incorrect prior, i.e. µ = 0.9, the information becomes of
little value.13 He consequently chooses not to acquire it and actually does better than
if he had the correct prior.14 While holding an initially more extreme belief, his pos-
terior belief is lower than the naive agent who observed a (possibly wrong) a signal.
This makes him invest only 78% of his total income, which is useful when the negative
returns of an asset are large. On top of that, he benefits from saving on the information
cost.
If we interpret the cost of acquiring information either as the direct cost of going to
university or the opportunity cost of not working, this investment problem become
analogous to the entrepreneur example that was outlined at the beginning. If the
would-be entrepreneur holds a very inflated view about his abilities, he starts his busi-
ness immediately (invests without information). If not, he goes to university. Suffering
from a perception bias, he might then become even more convinced about himself,
leading him to gamble even more on his endeavour. In expectation, the possibly use-
ful information hurts him if the probability of misinterpreting it is too high.
12This is true for any µ ∈ [0.47,0.89]
13The results hold for any extreme prior in the interval [0.89,0.925]. An even higher prior causes too
much investment, lowering utility.
14His perceived expected utilities are: EUper cei ved (acquire info|µ = 0.9) = −.39 < −0.37 =
EU (not acquire|µ = 0.9) while is actual utility (evaluated at the true prior) is EUtr ue (not acquire|µ =
0.9)=−0.22.
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3.8 Discussion
We have analyzed the interaction of two fundamental mistakes in information pro-
cessing. We have seen how and when one bias can alleviate the problems caused
by the other. The recent worrying rise of the anti-vaccination movement, with their
tendency to disregard surmounting scientific evidence in favour of circumstantial ob-
servations that autism happens after (one of many) childhood infections, is just one
example for the potential importance of these biases.
The idea that a mistake on one dimension may counteract some failure on another is
clearly not new (Compte and Postlewaite (2004), De La Rosa (2011), etc.), yet to our
knowledge it has never been explored in this basic updating setting. In contrast, the
recent literature on confirmatory bias (Clements (2013), Roland G. Fryer, Harms and
Jackson (2016)) as well as biases in information processing (Andreoni and Mylovanov
(2012), Kartik, Lee and Suen (2016)) focuses solely on beliefs, how beliefs may con-
verge or diverge in group, or whether information can be aggregated in social settings.
It does not fully capture the dynamic aspect of payoff-relevant decisions as informa-
tion experiments and their consequences on future payoffs. In that sense, we think of
this paper as an extension of Blackwell (1951) to behavioral mistakes in information
processing, for which we provide a full characterisation.
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3.9 Appendix
3.9.1 A: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Result 2. Convexity follows directly from the fact that maximum expected util-
ity is convex in µ. This result extends to two period model with intermediate signals.
Let ~µ be row vector of belief about the different states Ω, ~µ = (Pr(ω= A),Pr(ω=B)).
Define ~u(x) as the state contingent vector adjusted by signal probability and signal re-
sponse:15
~u(x)=
pi(x1, A)u(x1, xa |A)+ (1−pi(x1, A))u(x1, xb |A)
pi(x1,B)u(x1, xa |B)+ (1−pi(x1,B))u(x1, xb |B)

Define maximum expected utility as a function of ~µ as g (~µ)=maxx∈X ~µ ·~u(x) and no-
tice how this expression coincides with the rewritten expected utility formulation of
equation 3.1.
To show g (µ) is convex, let x ′ (x ′′) optimal choice given the belief ~µ′ (~µ′), and xˆ the
optimal choice for the convex combination ~ˆµ=λ~µ′+ (1−λ)~µ′′ with λ ∈ (0,1). Then
g (λ~µ′+ (1−λ)~µ′′)= (λ~µ′+ (1−λ)~µ′′) ·u(xˆ)
≤λ~µ′ ·u(u′)+ (1−λ)~µ′′ ·u(x ′′)
=λg (~µ′)+ (1−λ)g (~µ′′)
proving convexity.
Proof of Result B2. By Blackwell’s Result B1 it must be that V (O) ≥ V (OM). A ratio-
nal (non-biased) agent would never choose the distorted over the undistorted ex-
periment. A sophisticated agent is not able to choose the undistorted experiment,
however. All he can do is to adjust his second period action profile anticipating the
lower information value. His utility from O given M is equivalent to a rational agent
facing the experiment OM . As a result the following inequalities hold: Vs(O, M) =
Vs(OM , I )=V (OM). This establishes the first inequality.
The naive agent acts as if he was fully rational, i.e. he applies the rationally optimal
decision rule for P to OM . Consequently, he holds an incorrect posterior after observ-
ing the signal - which is equivalent to having wrong beliefs about the likelihood with
15compare this to the simple 1 period convexity proof, where ~u(x) is defined as the state contingent
utility vector
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which he receives a and b signals. He makes (weakly) worse decisions than a sophis-
ticated agent; if not, the sophisticated agent could always imitate him.
Proof of Result 4. Let the (unbiased) information experiment following action x1 be of
the form
P =
 pi 1−pi
1−pi pi

with pi = pi(x1, A). Let experiment P ′ be the experiment arising from the distortion
function with the same action x1, namely
P ′ =
 da(pi, x1,µ) db(1−pi, x1,µ)
da(1−pi, x1,µ) db(pi, x1,µ)

If follows that P ⊃ P ′ , as we can find an M such that P M = P ′ . The corresponding M is:
M =
 ka(x1,µ) 1−ka(x1,µ)
1−kb(x1,µ) kb(x1,µ)

where da(pi, x1,µ)= ka(x1,µ)pi+ (1−kb(x1,µ))(1−pi) etc.
According to Result B1, a rational (non-biased) agent would never choose the distorted
over the undistorted experiment. The utility arising from the distorted experiment is
(weakly) lower.
To show the effect of an increase in the magnitude of the bias, we write the expected
utility from x1 as
p
[(
ka(x1,µ)pi+ (1−kb(x1,µ))(1−pi)
)
u(x1, xa |A)+
(
kb(x1,µ)(1−pi)+ (1−ka(x1,µ))pi
)
u(x1, xb |A)
]
+(1−p)[(ka(x1,µ)(1−pi)+ (1−kb(x1,µ))pi)u(x1, xa |B)+ (kb(x1,µ)pi+ (1−ka(x1,µ))(1−pi))u(x1, xb |B)]
Suppose that initially kb decreased. If we decrease it further to k
′
b < kb , the linearity
property of the expected utility in probabilities implies that the expected utility must
also decrease.
The same argument holds for any further decrease in the alternative parameter ka .
Since there are no cross-interactions between changes of ka and kb , the same holds
true for any joint change.
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Proof of Result 5. Note that we can write the matrix of the signal probabilities as a gar-
bling of the matrix containing the true signal probabilities: da(pi, x1,µ) db(1−pi, x1,µ)
da(1−pi, x1,µ) db(pi, x1,µ)
=
 pi 1−pi
1−pi pi

 ka 1−ka
1−kb kb
 (3.9)
where the matrix on the right is the garbling matrix. Since the garbling matrix needs
to be a Markov matrix, we know that ka ,kb ∈ [0,1].
Now suppose we increase the magnitude of the bias resulting in a distortion function
d ′ and, contrary to the statement in the result, we have d ′a(pi, x1,µ)−d ′a(1−pi, x1,µ)≥
da(pi, x1,µ)−da(1−pi, x1,µ). This implies that:
pik ′a+ (1−pi)(1−k ′b)− (1−pi)k ′a−pi(1−k ′b)≥pika+ (1−pi)(1−kb)− (1−pi)ka−pi(1−kb)
where k ′a ,k ′b are the elements in the modified garbling matrix reflecting the increase
in the magnitude of the bias. This can be rearranged to:
(2pi−1)(k ′a − (1−k ′b))≥ (2pi−1)(ka − (1−kb))
But this requires that since pi > 1/2, either k ′a > ka , or k ′b > kb , or both which contra-
dicts the increase in the magnitude of the bias.
Proof of Result 6. Take the action profile (x1, {xa , xb}). It’s actual expected utility is
p [pi(x1, A)u(x1, xa |A)+ (1−pi(x1, A))u(x1, xb |A)]
+(1−p) [pi(x1,B)u(x1, xa |B)+ (1−pi(x1,B))u(x1, xb |B)]
If we evaluate this with some µ > p, then the weight on the outcome in state A in-
creases. This has two potential effects. Firstly, according to Result 12, a different ac-
tion might be chosen in period 2 as the potential posteriors are now different. Fur-
thermore, as follows from Result 1, a different x1 might become optimal. Denote the
potentially altered choice by (y1, {ya , yb}). Any such alternative choice has the property
that:
[pi(y1, A)u(y1, ya |A)+ (1−pi(y1, A))u(y1, yb |A)]
> [pi(x1, A)u(x1, xa |A)+ (1−pi(x1, A))u(x1, xb |A)]
109
and
[pi(y1,B)u(y1, ya |B)+ (1−pi(y1,B))u(y1, yb |B)]
< [pi(x1,B)u(x1, xa |B)+ (1−pi(x1,B))u(x1, xb |B)]
As otherwise either the choice (y1, {ya , yb}) would not be optimal as it yields lower ex-
pected utility when evaluated by µ or the choice under p would not be optimal since
it results in lower utility in both states. It then immediately follows that if any choice
of action is different when comparing optimal choices under µ and p, such a µ leads
to a utility loss because of suboptimal choices. Furthermore, fixing some µ > p and
iterating this argument for µ′ >µ yields the result. The equivalent argument applies to
µ< p.
Proof of Result 7. If the agent prefers y over x, i.e. E [u(x)] < E [u(y)], the statement is
trivially true. If it does not hold, we show that there is such a d that makes
Ed [u(x)|µ]< Ed [u(y)|µ]
According to D1, we have that µu(x1, xs |A)+ (1−µ)u(x1, xs |B) < E [u(y)|µ] for some
s ∈ {a(x1),b(x1)}.
Suppose wlog that s = a(x1). This implies that small enough ²> 0, we have
(1−²)[µu(x1, xa |A)+ (1−µ)u(x1, xa |B)]+²[µu(x1, xb |A)+ (1−µ)u(x1, xb |B)]
=µ [(1−²)u(x1, xa |A)+²u(x1, xb |A)]+ (1−µ) [(1−²)u(x1, xa |B)+²u(x1, xb |B)]
< E [u(y)|µ]
(3.10)
which quite resembles the maximum expected utility representation (3.1).
Now set ka(x1,µ) = 1 and kb(x1,µ) = ²pi(x1,A) . This causes the agent to receive the
worst-case signal a in state B with probability da(pi(x1|B),S(x1),µ) = 1− ². Clearly,
this also makes him receive the (correct) worst-case signal a in state A with probabil-
ity da(pi(x1|A),S(x1),µ)> 1−². Consequently, the actual expected utility following this
distortion is slightly larger than the left-hand side of Equation 3.10 above, but as ² be-
comes sufficiently small, Ed [u(x)|µ] < E [u(y)|µ]. Finally let there be no distortion for
the signals S(y1), i.e. da(pi,S(y1),µ)=pi for all pi ∈ (0,1). The result follows.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Sufficiency is an almost immediate consequence of Result 7.
We know there exists d , such that Ed [u(y)|µ]> Ed [u(x)|µ] by worst-case dominance at
µ and that an agent with belief µ′ chooses y compared to x. Finally simply set µ= p.
In the other direction, suppose such an improvement is possible. Since any distortion
garbles the information, E [u(y)|p] ≥ Ed [u(y)|p]. But if worst-case dominance does
not hold there is no marginal distribution over S(x1) such that Ed [u(x)|p]< E [u(y)|p]
since Ed [u(x)|p]≥mins∈S(x1) E [u(x1, xs)]> E [u(y)|p]. A contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 8. Sufficiency: Similar to Proposition 2, consider the extreme distor-
tion d that only sends the signal
sx = argmin
s
µu(x1, xs)|A)+ (1−µ)u(x1, xs |B)
sx = argmax
s
µu(x1, xs)|A)+ (1−µ)u(x1, xs |B)
If simple dominance holds, at least one of those signals must yield lower expected util-
ity under x than under y .
Necessity: Suppose such a distortion exists. Then
E [u(y)|p]< E [u(x)|p]
while
Ed [u(y)|p]> Ed [u(x)|p]
We can write the actual expected utility explicitly as a linear combination between the
a and the b signal.
p pi(x1, A)u(x1, xa |A) + (1−p)pi(x1,B)u(x1, xa |B)
+p (1−pi(x1, A))u(x1, xb |A) + (1−p)(1−pi(x1,B))u(x1, xb |B)
and similarly for y . Any distortion can either lower terms or shift weight from one to
the other. If the distortion is such that weight is added in the sense that both pi(x1, A)
and pi(x1,B) are increased or decreased then if Ed [u(y)|p]> Ed [u(x)|p] it must be that
either
pu(x1, xa |A)+ (1−p)u(x1, xa |B)< pu(y1, ya |A)+ (1−p)u(y1, ya |B) (3.11)
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or
pu(x1, xb |A)+ (1−p)u(x1, xb |B)< pu(y1, yb |A)+ (1−p)u(y1, yb |B) (3.12)
or both which guarantees simple. If the distortion lowers both terms i.e. by gar-
bling both type of signals equally, then pi(x1,B) and (1−pi(x1, A)) increase. If this in-
crease leads to a reversal in the expected utility ranking of x and y in the sense that
Ed [u(y)|p] > Ed [u(x)|p], then because of linearity this must also be true for the most
extreme case with da(pi(x1, A))= db(pi(x1,B))= 12 . But then
p
2
u(x1, xa |A)+ (1−p)
2
u(x1, xa |B)< p
2
u(y1, ya |A)+ (1−p)
2
u(y1, ya |B) (3.13)
or
p
2
u(x1, xb |A)+
(1−p)
2
u(x1, xb |B)<
p
2
u(y1, yb |A)+
(1−p)
2
u(y1, yb |B) (3.14)
or both which means at least one of them is also true for da(pi(x1, A))= da(pi(x1,B))= 1
or db(1−pi(x1,B))= db(1−pi(x1, A))= 1 which again guarantees simple dominance.
Proof of Result B3. To see take two separate experiments O and P , with O ⊃ P . First,
let MO be such that OMO = P and let P be undistorted, i.e. MP = I . It follows that the
naive agent is better off from P than O as Vn(P, I )=V (P )>Vn(O, M1) (the inequality is
strict if the agent is signal sensitive). But by continuity this also implies that there exist
some MO , MP such that OMO ⊃ P MP yet Vn(P, MP )>Vn(O, MO). As a result, the naive’s
expected utility can neither be ordered by the perceived information experiments, nor
the actual ones. In the other direction, we know that for Vn(P, MP ) > Vn(O, MO) it is
possible that OMO ⊃ P MP , as well as O ⊃ P .
Proof of Proposition 3. Statement (a) says that the signal-sensitve x is preferred by an
agent with the correct prior p over choosing the simple profile where the agent chooses
either always xa or always xb in the second period. Adding noise weakens the corre-
lation with the state and the dominated outcomes occur more frequently.Hence the
agent with prior µ can never be better off.
Statement (b) highlights that one of the simple action profiles is preferred to the con-
tingent one by the agent with belief p. Assume wlog that the preferred action pro-
file is (x1, xa). Any distortion function that increases the likelihood of an a signal will
make the agent better off as he will take action xa as a result, i.e. set ka(x1,µ) = 1
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and kb(x1,µ) ∈ (0,1). Clearly, the agent’s expected utility is increasing as kb(x1,µ) de-
creases to 0. The extreme kb(x1,µ)= 0 represents a perception bias where all b signals
are interpreted as a signals and the agent always takes the (second) best simple action
profile.
Proof of Corollary 9. A decrease in κ leads to a less informative signal.
µ [κpi(x1, A)u(x1, xa |A)+ (1−κpi(x1, A))u(x1, xb |A)]
+(1−µ) [(1−κ(1−pi(x1,B)))u(x1, xa |B)+κ(1−pi(x1,B))u(x1, xb |B)]
Trivially, the expected utility at µ as written above decreases as there is more weight on
u(x1, xb |A) and u(x1, xa |B). The agent is unaware of this and his choice in unaffected
by κ. For any κ, he evaluates the profile as follows:
µ [pi(x1, A)u(x1, xa |A)+ (1−pi(x1, A))u(x1, xb |A)]
+(1−µ) [(1−pi(x1,B))u(x1, xa |B)+ (1−pi(x1,B))u(x1, xb |B)]
The true p could be different from µ, so we just need to show that for any p, a decrease
in κ has a negative welfare effect. The actual expected utility is:
p [κpi(x1, A)u(x1, xa |A)+ (1−κpi(x1, A))u(x1, xb |A)]
+(1−p) [(1−κ(1−pi(x1,B)))u(x1, xa |B)+κ(1−pi(x1,B))u(x1, xb |B)]
Simply notice since u(x1, xb |A) < (x1, xa |A), as well as u(x1, xa |B) < u(x1, xb |B), the
random noise indeed lowers expected utility for any p.
Proof of Corollary 10. If: Suppose the inequality in Equation 3.7 holds. Then a dis-
tortion of κ = 12pi(x,A) turns the signals into complete noise. If this applies to the pro-
file x only, y yields higher expected utility at p even though without any distortion
E [x|p]> E [y|p].
Only if: Suppose the property does not hold. The for any distortion κ ∈ [ 12pi(x,A) ,1],
the expected utility from x at p exceeds the one from y as for any such κ,
Ed [x|p]≥
µ
2
[u(x1, xa)|A)+u(x1, xb)|A)]+
1−µ
2
[u(x1, xa)|B)+u(x1, xb)|B)]
113
Proof of Corollary 11. If: Follows directly as it is the case for κ = κmi n and continuity
guarantees that for small enough ²> 0 such that it is also the case for κ= κmi n +²
Only If: Note that for x to be chosen at p, we need that E [x|p] > E [y|p] as the agent
is unaware of the perception bias. The effect of a decrease in κ is
−∂Ed [u(x)|p]
∂κ
= −ppi(x1, A)[u(x1, xa |A)−u(x1, xb |A)]
−(1−p)pi(x1, A)[u(x1, xb |B)−u(x1, xa |B)]
(3.15)
This does not depend on κ itself. Therefore, if[
∂Ed [u(x)|p]
∂κ
]
κ=1
>
[
∂Ed [u(y)|p]
∂κ
]
κ=1
then the inequality also holds for all allowable κ. Take the κe ∈ (κmi n ,κmax) such that
Ed [x|p,κe ] = Ed [y|p,κe ]. If this does not exist, then y is never the best choice which
yields the result. If it does exist, then it must mean that[
∂Ed [u(x)|p]
∂κ
]
κ=1
>
[
∂Ed [u(y)|p]
∂κ
]
κ=1
But then for all κ ∈ [κmi n ,κe ), the inequality also holds and therefore
E [u(x)|p,κmi n]< E [u(y)|p,κmi n]
as desired.
3.9.2 B: Relationship To Blackwell
This section provides a general introduction to Blackwell, going beyond the 2-stage,
2-signal case, and providing clear definitions of value functions. In Blackwell’s com-
parison of experiments, an agent compares two statistical information experiments, P
and Q, which generate a signal about the states of the worldΩ= {ω1, ...,ωn}. As before,
an information experiment is defined by a n ×nK Markov matrix K , where element
Ki j refers to the probability of receiving a signal s = j in state ωi . We denote the set of
possible signals from K by SK = {1,2, . . . , NK }.
The agent is endowed with utility function u(x,θi ), defined over A×Ω. After receiving
a signal sK , he chooses an action x from his finite action set X . His prior is denoted
by the vector µ0 = {µ(1), ...,µ(n)}, whereas his posterior after receiving signal s from
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experiment K is denoted by µ(sK ). The agent maximizes expected utility:
max
x∈X
∑
i
µ(i |sK )u(x|ωi )
Denote the solution to this problem by x∗(µ(sK )) and the corresponding value func-
tion V (µ(sK )).
The agent’s probability of receiving an sP signal ispi(sP )=∑i∈n Pi sPµ0(i ). and expected
utility from observing experiment P is V (P )=∑sP∈SP pi(sP )V (µ(SP )).
Definition 12. Let P and Q be two experiments. We say that experiment P is more
informative than Q, denoted by P ⊃ Q, if there is a nP ×nQ Markov matrix M with
P M =Q.
This definition highlights how the information experiment P is garbled into Q by the
matrix M ; as if noise was added to create a less informative experiment. From this
statistical notion, Blackwell derives his famous result:
Result B5: Let P and Q be two n×nP and n×nQ Markov matrices. V (P )≥V (Q) if and
only if there is a nP ×nQ Markov matrix M such that P M =Q.
Simply put, a more informative experiment implies a higher utility. Surprisingly, the
converse is also true: If one experiment yields more expected utility than another, it
must be that it is more informative.
In Blackwell’s setup the agent is rational. He fully understands the signal generating
structure of the two experiments and correctly perceives each signal. The garbling ma-
trix doesn’t represent the agent’s misperception but is a tool to order the experiments
by informativeness. Moreover, the agent does not take any first period choice. All that
occurs is a welfare comparisons of the two experiments. Needless to say, if the rational
agent had to make a choice in Blackwell, he would prefer the more informative exper-
iment.
In order to talk about a Blackwell setting when agents misperceive information, we
need a new function representing the agents’ expected utility from the experiments.
Suppose the unbiased, true information experiment is P but the agent misperceives
some signals according to matrix M . As a result, the agent faces an information exper-
iment P M . We denote the expected utility of a naive agent unaware of his perception
bias by Vn(P, M), where the first argument always indicates the original signal generat-
ing process and the second argument the agent’s misperception. This agent believes
the information experiment is P and thus chooses his action as if he was rational fac-
ing P . If the agent is sophisticated, that is he is cognisant of his misperception M , we
write his utility as: Vs(P, M)=∑sP∈SP M pi(sP M )V (µ(SP M )).
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3.9.3 C: Decision Problem Appendix
Result 12: For any action x1 ∈ X1 and any x2 ∈ X2 such that for some µ(s) ∈ (0,1) we
have E [u(x1, x2)|µ(s)]≥ E [u(x1, y)|µ(s)] ∀y ∈ X2, there exists an intervalI ⊂ [0,1] with
the property that x2 is chosen if and only if µ(s) ∈I .
Proof of Result 12. If for some (x1, x2) ∈ X we have
E [u(x1, x2)|µ(s)]≥ E [u(x1, y2)|µ(s)] ∀y2 ∈ X2
then continuity inµ(s) implies that this is also true for at least some [µ(s),µ) or (µ,µ(s)].
If this interval is [0,1], the proof is complete. If not, there is some µ j for which x j ∈ X2
is the optimal choice. Then either u(x1, x j |A)> u(x1, x2|A) or u(x1, x j |B)> u(x1, x2|B).
This shows us that for either µ > µ j or µ < µ j , x j achieves a higher expected payoff
than x2. This completes the proof.
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